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UNESCO: AN EXAMINATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS
PHILOSOPHY, PURPOSES, PROGRAMMING AND POLICIES, 1945-1952

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
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by

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled Unesco: An Examination of the Development of Its Philosophy, Purpose, Programming and Policies, 1945-1952, submitted by Duncan Darroch Campbell, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

ABSTRACT

This thesis springs from the analysis of a variety of approaches to world government presented in Gerard J. Mangone's book "The Idea and Practice of World Government (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), pp. 278. In concluding his review, Professor Mangone poses as a solution, the development of a pattern of life, a universal democratic world culture and its diffusion throughout the world with militant zeal. This would emanate, he proposes, from an active crusading organization. He suggests further that such a missionary movement must be supported by force.

It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the development of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in its formative years, 1945-1952, against this proposition.

By way of introduction, reference is made to the Economic and Financial Organization of the League of Nations, the International Labour Organization and the League's Organization for Intellectual Cooperation against the background of the League itself. The origin, rationale, objectives and operations of these organizations is briefly surveyed to provide a backdrop of comparison and contrast to Unesco. The narrative traces the development of this new public international agency, Unesco, from its World War II beginnings and suggests some of the diverse influences which operated to shape it.

The analysis of Unesco is undertaken in two periods, 1946-1949 and 1950-1952. The approach in each is an examination, chiefly through the verbatim records of the Sessions of the General Conference, of attempts



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to develop a philosophy for Unesco, of its search for purpose and the formulation of its policies. Noted particularly are the contributions of Julian Huxley, Reinhold Niebuhr and Jacques Maritain, each of whom, in different capacities, were closely connected with Unesco. Specific attempts to formulate appropriate program criteria, policy codes and a basic program are traced in each of the two periods noted above. The many and varying conceptions of Unesco's function, the great differences between Member States, uncertainties in the Constitution, vested interest of various disciplines, disagreement over the breadth of its program and to whom and how it should be directed, staffing, unsatisfactory public relations and political differences were among the growing pains of Unesco.

The thesis concludes that the new movement proposed by Mangone is not strictly comparable to Unesco. It suggests that the essential difference between the two lies less in the matter of long-run purpose than in method of approach. It argues further, that on the basis of evidence drawn from its 1945-1952 span of life, the Unesco approach seems on balance to be the more realistic as an avenue leading towards world government.

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Duncan Darroch Campbell

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CHAPTER I

APPROACHES TO WORLD GOVERNMENT

At no time, in recorded history, has the world seen the development of international organizations of states as they have occurred in this century. Although the past has witnessed arrangements and agreements involving large numbers of states, these have been essentially on a regional basis. But it has been in this century that the world has seen a striking growth of international organizations and agencies dealing with health, aviation, crime, food, labor, narcotics, involving membership of governments of nations scattered around the earth. Each of these has had its base in a body of commonly held principles or values. Each has attempted, with varying degrees of success, to refine and adjust its objectives. Most have developed empirically since there was little experience to guide their methods of approach in the pursuit of their objectives. Each in its own way, sometimes with ease, sometimes with the greatest difficulty, has developed its policies as a reflection of its method of operation. Each has its own unique machinery for giving direction and for providing control of its operation to greater or lesser degrees. Each has, as circumstances have warranted, attempted to evaluate its success or failure.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization is one of these. Created in 1945, it has survived and grown through fifteen years. Both in its creation and in its growth, it has been a reflection of the desire of the peoples of the world for some mechanism which might prevent war and more positively, contribute

toward international development on all social fronts. Indeed, in some minds, the growth and development of such organizations is a prelude to world government and thus to a cessation of war and the inception of harmonious international cooperation.¹ This thesis has been stimulated by an analysis of the nature of world government and approaches to it as seen by Gerard J. Mangone in his book The Idea and Practice of World Government.²

In the first few chapters of this provocative study, this writer reviews the purpose, characteristics and requirements of world government. Ideas and plans for world government, he records, are not new and "historical literature is starred with a thousand gleaming ideas for the reorientation of political society . . . and each is a mirror of the age in which it was conceived."³ That is to say, any form of world government would seem to be a direct reflection of man's view of himself

¹"Arnold Toynbee - Close-up on a Famous Historian," CBC Times, XIII, No. 24 (June 12-18, 1960), 2. "I think world government will happen because I don't think the human race is going to destroy itself. And if it's not going to destroy itself, it must in some form establish unified control over atomic energy's production and use. Even if we abolish atomic weapons, the civilian use of atomic energy, which is certainly going to increase very much, is a dangerous thing, it needs very strict regulation like our road traffic. So I think in some form what you might call world government is going to happen. Not by conquest, but by agreement about rather concrete, unpolitical things like atomic energy."

²Gerard J. Mangone, The Idea and Practice of World Government (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951). This author's approach has been to examine and weigh the variety of answers to world government suggested by other writers including international law, the functional approach, regional organization and the theory of inevitable democratic progress. He inclines to dismissing these in favor of tackling the problem through world culture and education.

³Ibid., p. 3.

and of his society. The establishment of universal government on any voluntary basis, this author suggests, would seem to depend on universal consensus as to man's conception of himself and his society. If the goal of world government were security, then there would be need for agreement on what was worth securing. Were the goal to be peace, under what conditions would it be acceptable? If freedom, then how is the notion of freedom to be defined? And if justice, then how are both truth and justice to be determined?

"In the last analysis," Mangone has said "it means that a philosophy of government must precede any pattern of world government."⁴ That is to say, there would seem to be a need for universal agreement on many aspects of man's rights, responsibilities and destiny before there could be any agreement on the economic and political framework within which he moved. Indeed, declares Mangone, "it is not the size, or even the monumental complexity which daunts the hardest advocate of world government, but the conflict of rights and duties, privileges and obligations, all of which are ultimately grounded on non-rational tenets."⁵

The conception of world government as advanced by Mangone would seem, then, to require a universally pervasive moral and intellectual communion. Thus, world government must commence with the building of agreement on essential values and with establishing a common sense of purpose as a point of departure. In succeeding pages, as the early experience of Unesco is reviewed, we shall catch a glimpse of the Herculean task the building of such consensus poses.

In his analysis of the problems standing in the way of world organization, Mangone points to several which can only be mentioned here. The

⁴Ibid., p. 12.

⁵Ibid., p.15.

first of these, and one which he suggests as offering the greatest difficulty is "the adjustment of unequal powers and the resistance to change."⁶ Closely related to this and to the administrative complex seemingly necessary in world government is another major stumbling block: with reference to what criteria can authority be delegated acceptably and equitably? On what basis should a balance between states rest? Is it to be population, area, industrial development, raw material potential or political sophistication?⁷

As if these and other technical and organizational problems were not enough, there is a need, Mangone emphasizes, to root an organization, if it is to be successful, in the hearts and minds and emotions of people. For, as Mangone has lyrically declared, there are "a thousand throbbing passions which move the soul beyond the search for bread."⁸ Or as Lincoln in more homespun fashion observed, "public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed."⁹ The difficulty in achieving such roots for an organization will be seen in the account following of the establishment of Unesco.

It is necessary then, for a world organization to consider how it might give "satisfaction of emotional as well as economic requirements."¹⁰ As can readily be imagined, these pervasive, non-economic roots include the ties of language, of custom, of national ambitions. The Preamble to Unesco's Constitution reads "that since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that peace must be constructed."¹¹ This clearly

⁶Ibid., p. 32. ⁷Ibid., pp. 34-36. ⁸Ibid., p. 115.

⁹G. B. d'Huszar "Peace Through Education," Free World, II (May 7, 1946), p. 25.

¹⁰Mangone, The Idea and Practice of World Government, p. 38

¹¹Preamble to the Constitution of Unesco, Appendix A.

is in denial of the "realist" who might speculate whether individuals as members of states will ever grow out of the ties, the chauvinism, the prejudices which would seem to block the achievement of the maturity necessary for world government.

In a chapter entitled "The Consequences of World Government"¹² Mangone emphasizes particularly the requirement of "totality" in world government. His point simply - and his argument has implications for the effectiveness of the Unesco idea - is that world government is a whole and that anything else is substantially different.

Whatever form or force world government may take, the organization will be an integrated one, united in the purpose, scope, and execution of its principles, for anything less will not be world government, but an alliance or a retractable agreement among states.¹³

In support of this, he cites William E. Rappard's comment: "Either there is a government, and then it is not international, but supernational . . . or there are independent nations and then there is no international government."¹⁴ Or in the same vein, he poses the observation of Robert MacIver: "Anything less than a universal order is no order at all. Anything short of universal order is doomed from the start."¹⁵

A considerable part of this work is devoted to an exploration of various proposals and approaches which are and have been considered to

¹²Mangone, The Idea and Practice of World Government, pp. 48-68.

¹³Ibid., p. 61.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 60.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 56.

expedite world government organization. Within this section, Mangone reviews the federal system and the unitary system. He explores the possibility of world government maturing through what has been termed "the functional approach," suggesting that no real power has been turned over to functional agencies as yet. Regional economic ideological association, he declares, does not offer a solution but the more sharply delineates international rivalry. Most interesting in its implications for a United Nations agency is a recurring theme: the prime need for a meeting of minds between states, of a common consensus with respect to the nature of man and society and of commonly held values.

In a chapter entitled "The Idea of Progress" Mangone reviews the validity of the assumption that the world inevitably makes progress, albeit at a slow rate, toward harmony. "The philosophy of the eighteenth century, therefore, was pregnant with the perfectability of man and the elevation of society. Progress was in the air - spiritually, economically, politically."¹⁶ But later he suggests,

Two world wars have since punctured the balloon of inevitable democratic progress, and the hissing sound of escaping hope has been the tune for not less than twelve dictatorships on the European scene since 1918. . . . Still the bland comparisons of society to a healthy biological organism growing to a more perfect shape as it solves the conflicts of its environment have not been silenced."¹⁷

How valid, he asks, is the idea of "progress" with respect to an expanding web of interstate functions, increasing adaptability to environment and larger areas of life under larger forms of government?¹⁸ His answer is negative. "Progress toward world government on the basis of ability to articulate the mechanical components of life through larger

¹⁶Ibid., p.73. ¹⁷Ibid., p. 86. ¹⁸Ibid., p. 87.

political units, it would seem, is a specious postulate."¹⁹ In his view then, the world does not necessarily move inexorably toward some future harmony.

With this brief review, we might turn to his concluding pages "World Culture and World Community."²⁰ Having performed his analysis of world government, its nature and possible approaches to it, he turns from the economic, the political and the legal to another aspect of world organization, world culture. It is his observations on this subject which provide a point of departure for this thesis.

Perhaps one of the most interesting phenomena of recent world politics, he declares, is the growth of cultural imperialism.²¹ Until recently, he points out, no state had been more adept in this area than France. Following her example, Germany and Japan came rapidly to recognize this kind of propaganda as an invaluable aid to foreign policy. The British and the Americans, he records, were the last great powers to join the movement towards cultural propaganda but in every instance the cultural relations program was guided by the national interests and could be fairly viewed as a tool of diplomacy. As to its value, he suggests that

it would be an error to assume that since modern communication makes it incumbent upon national powers to employ mass propaganda, for both domestic and foreign consumption, a free market of ideas is being fostered and that, like some magic economic mechanism, the people of the world will select the most democratic.²²

Turning to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which, he recognizes, endeavours to remove the barriers to the flow of information, he suggests that it views a wide diffusion of a

¹⁹Ibid., p. 91. ²⁰Ibid., pp. 193-220. ²¹Ibid., p. 193.

²²Ibid., p. 196.

culture, emphasizing the education of mankind for justice and liberty as "a sacred duty which all nations must fulfill."²³

His enthusiasm for the Organization is less than marked. Referring to its Preamble, he remarks that its "aphorisms are indisputably correct, but the very action of the Organization during the past year casts an overweening shadow of doubt on its ability to further the principles of its Constitution."²⁴

In his view, the clearing house functions of Unesco have been progressively more emphasized than its operational activities and specific educational projects to meet regional challenges have been abandoned.²⁵ Indeed, he asks

whether a different type of agency is demanded by the incontrovertible need for unison on basic tenets of government, fundamental agreement on the purposes of society, and above all, a supreme allegiance to a body politic transcending the local interest and the nation.²⁶

There is today, Mangone considers in the light of progress of communications, a good argument for the possibility of diffusing a general pattern of life over a wider area at a briefer time than has hitherto been possible. Such a pattern, he declares, could, if it were "firm in its convictions, disseminated by ardent disciples, coupled to the physical power of giant political organizations, and, above all, given a time of confusion, moral instability, fear and hopelessness at its periphery, rush across space like a wind-blown brush-fire."²⁷

²³Preamble to the Constitution of Unesco, Appendix A.

²⁴Mangone, The Idea and Practice of World Government, p. 197. The preface to his book is dated February, 1951.

²⁵Ibid., p. 197. ²⁶Ibid., p. 199. ²⁷Ibid., p. 206

But does such a unity, he asks, mean a throttling of culture and a suffocation of all the rich diversity of mankind? This is a genuine danger by his admission and the result would be what he terms a dead society. A core element of this diffusion of such a world culture, in his view, would be the spreading of democratic principles of government.

Central to the diffusion of a world culture is the diffusion of democratic principles of government; constitutional echelons to a popular management of the political processes, in fact, an individual respect for minority criticism.²⁸

The immediate challenges which he sees to the development of such a universal democratic culture are three.²⁹ First there is the task of understanding and recognizing the values of existing democratic institutions. Secondly comes the job of instilling into the minds of people of the world "militant zeal for self-expression and self-government" and finally, and perhaps paradoxically, he underlines the task of creating a source of power dedicated to the furtherance of democratic institutions. Quite reasonably, he adds that the necessity to satisfy basic needs, a filling of hungry bellies must go hand in hand with the diffusion of such a world culture. Translated, this would mean that effective trade organization, resource development, food distribution at a supra-national level must precede or accompany this proposed massive propagandization.³⁰

What of the program of such a radical new organization? Without question, in his view, it must be something more than a pleasant interchange of books, of films, of teachers and students. Much more than this is demanded.

²⁸Ibid., p. 209. ²⁹Ibid., p. 212. ³⁰Ibid., p. 213.

To develop a cosmopolitan democratic outlook, however, demands the mobilization of shock troops, imbued with a confidence in their mission, positively planning and executing a total campaign to win the minds and hearts of all people to fundamental principles of government and human conduct.³¹

The need is not simply for publicity. The need is for actual vibrant participation. The need is for an awakened sense in men, women and children of belonging to a larger association.

The stimulus for such activity can only come from a crusading organization not a passive one, an educating organization, not an educational one, a preacher's union of world leaders devoted to the gospel of democratic procedure and for whom the mass communication facilities of the modern state would be made progressively available . . . Further there is a need for the establishment of a vital agency dedicated to the continuous inculcation and dissemination of faith in man's rationality, in the dignity and worth of person, in the values of compromise, concession, tolerance, and compassion. Without this creed democracy will perish, and the ensuing anarchy or imperium will bear the peoples of the earth upon wretched litters into purgatory.³²

Hand in hand with this crusading organization in his view, and basic to its operation, is the use of force.

There can be no naive assumption that the heavens will be moved and the kingdom of darkness rolled away without the use of force. Every democracy has had to be forged out of the molten steel of war, revolution, or rebellion; and each new generation must be prepared to fight for what its fathers have so perilously won or else admit that the ideals are worthless.³³

The task of translating this crusade into actuality rests upon a nucleus of implementing power. For Mangone, an "unarmed democracy is a contradiction of terms."³⁴ In short, without a willingness to organize force and to use force in the interests of a universal democratic community, the first faltering steps of any gathering of states towards this goal must end in an ignominious stumble.

With reference to the conclusions noted above, it is the purpose of this paper to analyze the development of Unesco in its formative years.

³¹Ibid., p. 217. ³²Ibid., p. 218. ³³Ibid., p. 238. ³⁴Ibid., p. 218.

The pages following will explore the maturing of Unesco's philosophy, the formulation of its objectives, its internal and external relationships and the operational problems it encountered. It is not intended to deal with program content but rather the administrative-organizational development which made it possible.

Rather little in the way of interpretation of this facet of Unesco has been undertaken either through books, journals or periodicals. The evidence examined has, in large part, been the verbatim records of the meetings of the General Conference of Unesco over the six year period together with related Unesco documents.

It has seemed that an appropriate point of departure for this analysis was the examination of the experience of Unesco's precursors - the International Labour Organization, the Economic and Financial Organization and the Organization for Intellectual Cooperation - to which we now turn.

CHAPTER II

PRECURSORS OF UNESCO

Unesco, of course, was not unique as an organization nor was its inception in 1945 entirely without antecedents.¹ This new Organization, it can be fairly said, derived in part from the experience of the League of Nations.

It is the purpose of this chapter to examine some experiences in intellectual and social cooperation gained following the First World War. Beginning with a sketch of the League of Nations within the framework of which they worked, it is proposed to examine the initiation, development and experience of the International Labour Organization, the Institute for Intellectual Cooperation and the Economic and Financial Conference of 1933.

The Great War of 1914-18 had brought havoc to Europe in a degree unprecedented by earlier conflicts. In 1899, at the Hague Peace Conference he had sponsored, Czar Nicholas had over-optimistically suggested that the twentieth century would not see the recurrence of war.² In the wake of the calamity of World War I there seemed to be a great mass of opinion both among belligerents and neutrals that a recurrence of such a disaster must be made impossible. Out of the end of the war came the League of

¹Alice R. Craemer, "International Solidarity," Current History, XII (March 6, 1947), 230. This article provides a brief account of some of the older and less well known themes for international cooperation.

²Gerard J. Mangone, The Idea and Practice of World Government (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), p. 73.

Nations with its satellite organizations including the International Labour Organization, the Organization for Intellectual Cooperation and the Economic and Financial Organization.

F. P. Walters³ suggests that the pre-history of the League may be conveniently divided into three periods. The first of these, covering three to four hundred years, was one in which Europe shaped itself into a number of independent national states and which saw the development in theory, he records, of a number of schemes for the prevention of war. The second of the three periods - from the close of the Napoleonic War to 1918 - was one in which population increased substantially, technological development mushroomed and improvements in communication resulted in increased contacts between nations. It was during this period for the protection of commerce and the solution of mutual problems consequent of technological advance, that a number of international organizations were established with varying powers of control.⁴ They included the Danube Commission established in 1856, the International Telegraphic Union of 1865, the Universal Postal Union of 1874 and somewhat later, the International Institute of Agriculture and the International Health Office. While these organizations possessed no direct political power, they performed useful services in their fields. Perhaps most important, they demonstrated the extent of common interests among nations and pointed at a measure of artificiality in national barriers and state frontiers. This was the period of that "powerful yet ill-defined institution" known as the Concert of Europe.⁵ While characterized as creaking and unwieldy,

³F.P.A. Walters, A History of the League of Nations, 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 4 ff.

⁴Ibid., p. 7. ⁵Ibid., p. 9.

the Concert, which met about thirty times in all during the nineteenth century, moved forward from time to time in clumsy fashion, though lacking in continuity, firmly established objectives and a sense of direction. As an advisory body, it had some value. It had, for example

occasion to take executive measures, which, by giving decisions on general questions of international law, it sometimes acted as legislator, and that more than once it served as mediator between the divergent interests of its own members or of other powers. Thus, in certain respects, it was a precursor of the Council of the League.⁶

The third of the periods noted by Walters is that following the 1918 Armistice and which saw the development of the League and its subsidiary organizations. It has been said that the fact that it was possible in 1919 to form such an association as the League was an astonishing sign of international progress which marked a definite breach with the practice of the past. It was a substantial step forward that nations now agreed "that aggressive war is a crime against humanity and that it is the interest, the right, and the duty of every State to join in preventing it, is now everywhere taken for granted."⁷ The supreme element of the League of Nations organization was its Covenant which "was at the same time the law of its action and the very source of its existence. It established the organs of the League, dictated their composition, defined their competence, and guided their decisions."⁸

Pitman B. Potter, commenting on the nature of the League, suggests

⁶Secretariat of the League of Nations, The Aims, Methods and Activity of the League of Nations, (Geneva, 1935), p. 15.

⁷Walters, A History of the League of Nations, 1, 2.

⁸Ibid., p. 40.

that it was "something of a novelty but much more of a recapitulation of experience . . . The name . . . had no great historic precedent. In its general character the League of Nations was a loose federal union, with a few traits of unitary power."⁹

Structurally, the League consisted of the member States, an Assembly, a Council, a Secretariat with accompanying auxiliary organizations. By a variety of experimental methods, it developed procedures and techniques which Potter records became fairly well standardized and developed over the course of twenty years.

This sketch cannot include an account of the activities, operation and ultimate demise of the League. Of the weaknesses which contributed to its decline, in the opinion of Professor Corbett, there were four which figured most prominently.¹⁰ In the first place he points out that it had no means at its direct disposal for the enforcement of decisions; all depended on the cooperation of member States, their relationship to the dispute and indeed, their internal political organization. Secondly, it had no compulsory jurisdiction in the settlement of disputes although appropriate machinery existed in the International Court of Justice. There was inadequate provision, he concludes, for peaceful change which might perhaps have been less serious in a period in which political, economic and technological development came at a less rapid rate. Finally, the League had no adequate machinery for economic cooperation. While expert advice for such cooperation was made available through the Economic and

⁹P.B. Potter, An Introduction to the Study of International Organization (5th ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948), pp. 242-3.

¹⁰P.E. Corbett, Post-War Worlds (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1948), p. 186.

Financial Organization, that consensus which is the sine qua non for action was lacking as a result of the fear induced by the depression of the 1930's. Of a central reason advanced for the League's failure by other writers, the lack of participation by the United States, Corbett points out that

narrow views of national interest, and the skepticism of important governments as to the validity of the whole idea of supranational community, might have defeated even a strong American initiative. Sometimes, it seems, the absence of the United States was not so much a factor preventing success as a ready excuse for not taking action which the principal governments did not wish to take.¹¹

It can be concluded that the world's experience with the League of Nations was useful and that it was a necessary forerunner to the organization of the United Nations. Indeed, that writer points out that the world is in a stage of transition from a nation state to the world community and that while this transition is impeded by distrust, by vested political interests and the ambitions of demagogues, "in the light of political history it would seem that the question is not so much whether this large integration will take place as how much time it will require."¹²

The World Monetary and Economic Conference, 1933.

F. P. Walters has said that "in nothing did the historical development of the League differ more widely with earlier conceptions than in the creation and growth of its new social and economic institutions."¹³ They went far beyond anything that was imagined before or indeed during the war and concerned themselves with every aspect of international relations, from housing, nutrition and wages to taxation, immigration and health. Many

¹¹Ibid., p. 24. ¹²Ibid., p. 114.

¹³Walters, A History of the League of Nations, 1, 175.

writers, including an American Secretary of State, ¹⁴ were prepared to admit of these organizations that they had been responsible for developing exchange in discussion of ideas to a greater extent and in more fields of humanitarian and scientific endeavour than had any other organization in history. This kind of international exchange, one should pause and note, while commonplace today, was something of a rarity before the First World War and the trend towards international exchange was considerably stimulated by the League.¹⁵

One of the organizations through which this kind of exchange was facilitated was the Economic and Financial Organization of the League. It is the purpose of this account only to review one major project of this Organization, the consequences of which were a distinct change of approach of the Organization to its work.

Economic and financial affairs, as well as political matters, were in crisis in the first years of the 1930's. The ILO, at its April Conference in 1932, pressed for a world conference on international and monetary affairs, production and trade, and as a result, a decision was taken to hold, in 1933, a world monetary and economic conference. The Economic and Financial Organization had been unable to break down the intense nationalism of the world's treasuries and commerce ministries. It had been unable to "teach the world that prosperity is indivisible, and that selfish and shortsighted economic policies are dangerous to peace. It made no appeal to public opinion: its principles and purposes were unknown to the average consumer and average worker."¹⁶

The Conference, for a variety of reasons which cannot be considered

¹⁴Ibid., p. 176. ¹⁵Ibid., pp. 175-76. ¹⁶Ibid., p. 178.

here, was unsuccessful but it was abundantly clear that "the attempt to create world-wide cooperation in economic policy by means of specific plans which could be effective only when accepted and applied by a large number of governments"¹⁷ was useless.

With this abortive experience behind it, the Economic and Financial Organization turned to new methods. Thereafter, it concerned itself more with groups of individuals than with the state. It worked in closer cooperation with parallel organizations including the Health Organization, the ILO and the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome. The result was a series of practical studies, conferences on matters of immediate importance, including housing, world hygiene, standards of living and nutrition. It gave increased emphasis to scientific study and implemented thorough-going research in fundamental economic and financial problems.

During the years which followed the failure of the ill-timed Economic Conference of 1933, and which witnessed the gradual breakdown of the political institutions of the League, its economic and social agencies enjoyed an unexpected renaissance and discovered new fields of work, wider and more fruitful than the old. Experience had shown that it was hopeless to go on trying to develop formal international agreements. These, when presented to individual nations for binding signature, were often ignored or convincing reasons were found for delaying or refusing to give a binding signature. As a result of the 1933 experience, the economic and social agencies took another tack. They began to organize meetings limited to certain groups of States or individuals with similar interests in mutual

¹⁷Walters, A History of the League of Nations, 11, 522.

problems.

The new processes were less formal and less rigid than the old. The object of meetings was not to draft precise texts but to exchange information, to receive disinterested advice and to lay down general principles. In those cases where formal treaties were prepared, they were largely regarded as models which any two or more nations might accept between themselves, modified if necessary as they wished. As Walters puts it,

in turning their attention to the problems of the individual rather than of his government, the League's institutions had been, in a sense, retreating against their will from positions they had originally occupied but in their second line they had found elements of strength which had never been fully available in the first. They had learned much about the inter-dependence of the activities which they had hitherto carried on in separate compartments.¹⁸

Thus, although the Economic and Financial Organization failed, it left an important residue: a path of experience, successful and unsuccessful, as guides to the United Nations and its subsidiary organizations.

The International Labour Organization

"The greatest challenge to the conscience of the world at the Paris Peace Conference" writes J. T. Shotwell, "is not to be found in the pioneering documents of the Covenant of the League of Nations; it is to be found in a relatively obscure sentence in the Preamble to the Constitution of the International Labour Organization which forms Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles. This is the statement that 'Universal peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice.'" ¹⁹

¹⁸Ibid., p. 757.

¹⁹J. T. Shotwell, The Great Decision (New York: MacMillan Co., 1945), p. 162.

Peace, in Shotwell's view, was to be defined as something more than a truce negotiated in an atmosphere of sullen enmity. Peace must be total peace; the mere repression of violence being only a beginning to what should be. Only a just world, Shotwell points out, can be safe and free from the menace of war. A just world, it would seem, is one that eliminates exploitation in human affairs. Since definitions of social right and social justice can not be static, advances which are made in these areas provide opportunities for fresh advances and a view of new horizons. When social maladjustments become intolerable, the whole social fabric suffers, this author reminds us, and give threat of violence.

It was in part, at least, on such a base, that the International Labour Organization was conceived as one of a number of auxiliary organizations to the League of Nations. Its function was to assist the Council and the Assembly with its advice and to facilitate the work of States in labour activities. Its staff was to be regarded as the "experts of the League of Nations."²⁰

H. B. Butler, Deputy Director of the International Labour Office, cites three influences which, in his view, forced the labour problem into the international sphere.²¹ They were these: the competition by cheap underpaid labour, the need for international agreements to regulate international business, the application of general tariffs on the grounds that it enabled the employer to pay higher wages. More specifically, in the view of L. Larry Leonard, the immediate factors which led to the establishment of the ILO included pressure from international labour. One

²⁰Geneva Information Service, Essential Facts About the League of Nations, (9th Rev. ed., 1938), p. 92.

²¹The League of Nations Starts: An Outline by Its Organizers. (London: MacMillan Co. 1920), pp. 141-42.

inter-allied group at the time, he points out

called upon governments to incorporate in the peace treaties provisions that would insure to the working class . . . guarantees of a moral, as well as a material kind, concerning the right of association, emigration, social insurance, hours of labour, hygiene, and protection of labour, in order to secure them from the attacks of international capitalistic competition.²²

Or another factor, the Russian Revolution, he relates the comment of a British delegate at Versailles:

I need scarcely remind you of the urgency of this work of labour amelioration because it is known to all of us that new thoughts are surging up all around us, and as a result the world is at present in a ferment.²³

Since the ILO had been established by the Treaty of Versailles, it had an independent legal base and in fact, functioned before the League. In part, at least, because of its leadership, the ILO, while part of the League framework, possessed a great degree of autonomy. Subordinate in theory to League administration, it was independent in action. Moreover, and again because of its leadership, it drew great vitality from world organized labour.

Albert Thomas, the first Director of the Organization, gained for it substantial acclaim.

²²L.L. Leonard, International Organization (New York: McGraw Hill Co. Ltd., 1951), p. 449.

²³Ibid. Werner Levi in his book The Fundamentals of World Organization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960), p. 102, characterizes the ILO as "an instrument of social justice" intended to appease the demands of millions of soldiers and workers of World War I. C.K. Webster and S. Herbert in their book The League of Nations in Theory and Practice (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1933), p. 239, cites this comment of William II of Germany in 1890: "international difficulties reflect themselves in the condition of workers which result from international competition which in turn can be dealt with in no other way than by international agreement."

His personality had overshadowed all others. He had secured the unchallenged leadership of the Organization which had been committed to his charge and he seemed to embody in his own person the will and energy of a world-wide movement.²⁴

Indeed, this biographer recounts, he was a man of such stature that when Sir Eric Drummond announced his intention of resigning his post as Secretary-General of the League, there were many who thought that Albert Thomas would succeed him. This fighting young French socialist politician was responsible for the vigor of his Organization which grew in strength, power and prestige while the League itself declined. It was due to his guidance, Phelan acknowledges, that the ILO tended to remain aloof from the political convulsions of the twenties. Nor was it insignificant that Brazil and Japan continued as members of the ILO after withdrawing from the League of Nations.

While an antecedent of the ILO, a body called the International Association for Labour Legislation had done some pioneer work resulting in several resolutions, in character it bore little resemblance to the League's new organization which Mander describes.²⁵ He records that in the view of the ILO, low labour standards in any country constituted a danger to standards elsewhere. Cutthroat competition arising from discrepancies in labour pay from country to country had to be avoided. Crises arising out of overproduction could be overcome by raising the purchasing power of workers and thus providing more extensive markets. Deficiency of labour and improvement of conditions were only to be had as a result of intelligent legislation agreed to by member countries. Organized labour,

²⁴S. J. Phelan, Yes, and Albert Thomas (London: The Cresset Press, 1949), p. 232.

²⁵L. A. Mander, Foundations of Modern World Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1948), pp. 337 ff.

it argued, should not merely have the right of association but also a voice in the determination of international labour policy.

This thinking - which today is generally accepted - had its critics. Labour, they said, had no right to demand a voice in industrial policy, nor indeed, the right to organize itself. Moreover (and curiously to today's observer) society, it was argued, should trust to natural economic forces and avoid government intervention. Countries adopting ILO standards might well experience heavier production costs and thus higher prices and a poorer competitive position. And finally, labour legislation was deemed to be a domestic rather than an international problem. The residue of this debate, which ranged prior to the formation of the ILO, is to be found in Article XXIII, Paragraph A of the Covenant and the Charter of the ILO which sketches this philosophical framework: that social justice is recognized as a condition of universal peace; that conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship and privations so great that the peace of the world is imperiled; that failure of nations to adopt humane labour conditions is an obstacle to the improvement by other nations of conditions in their own countries.

With this background, the organizers of the ILO went on to establish specific objectives: the improvement of working conditions; the assurance of economic security through adequate terms of labour, wages and pensions; the establishment of the status of labour as an active participant in the policies of production; the provision of welfare services for the worker and his family.

All members of the League at its initiation were, ipso facto members of the ILO. The structure of the Organization comprised three principle elements. The first of these was a Conference comprising representation

from all member States which was to meet once annually. The second, and somewhat unique part of the Organization, was a governing body comprising thirty-two persons strengthened by a broad representation.²⁶ The final element in the structure was a Secretariat to serve the Organization and to make itself responsible for the development of world-wide branch offices.

The Constitution of the ILO provided three methods of ensuring the enforcement of Agreements by members. The first of these lay in the required presentation of an Annual Report by each Member State. By their nature, however, these Annual Reports were not so prepared as to focus immediate attention on specific problems. Thus it was agreed that a Committee of Experts should condense these annual summaries for the ready digestion of members. This precis prepared annually by the Committee became an important instrument in bringing to bear the pressure of unfavorable publicity on non-cooperating governments.

Machinery was available within the Organization for formal representations by both employers and workers, other than those which might be presented by their respective governments. Further, there was an opportunity for any government to lodge a complaint against another if it believed that an approved convention was not being applied.

Disputes involving the ILO Charter or regarding observances of con-

²⁶D.S. Cheever and H. F. Haviland, Jr., Organizing for Peace (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1954), p. 173. Representation included eight members selected by the governments of 'chief industrial importance' as determined by the League Council, eight delegates from other governments represented in the Conference, eight employer delegates and eight labour delegates.

ventions by member states were submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Occasionally, as was the experience of the Economic and Financial Organization (and as was to be later the experience of Unesco) the ILO experienced difficulties with countries which did not live up to their ratifications and which argued in excuse that these were against the Constitution, that the general economic situation was unpropitious, that the financial condition of the country was unfavorable or that some special circumstances justified departure from what had been agreed.

The method of the ILO was to frame draft conventions or recommendations thought desirable by government, employers or employees, to see that the international instruments were incorporated in the labour legislation of the various States and to enforce their application in both the letter and the spirit. As at 1935, forty-six draft conventions had come into force with 650 ratifications obtained. Each of these draft conventions at that time constituted a real advance. Each opened the door to an improvement in labour conditions and an opportunity for further progress.²⁷

The International Labour Organization can fairly be said to have enjoyed a large measure of success. As its Deputy Director argued at its inception in 1920,

²⁷Typical draft conventions included: employment of women during the night, workmen's compensation in agriculture, white lead in painting, hours of work in coal mines.

It may fairly claim to be a constructive experiment imbued by the spirit of the new order of things, which seeks above all to solve the economic differences between nations by common effort instead of by mutual antagonism.²⁸

It has not, as Pitman D. Potter points out, revolutionized labour conditions throughout the world since it lacks legislative power. It has, however, promoted much salutary labour legislation and accomplished more than is generally appreciated in both research and the provision of information and in the adjustment of relations between employers and employees.²⁹

Or as Shotwell comments, well before the United States of America joined the Organization in 1934, it had "justified itself in history as an indispensable instrument for the advancement of social welfare."³⁰

To what has the ILO owed its success? A review of various accounts of its development and experience suggests some general observations. In the first place it would seem that there was a fair measure of consensus that, with respect to labour, the "winds of change were blowing," that changes were imminent and could be best handled through an international organization, that labour unrest imperiled world peace and that inhumane conditions in labour in one country constituted an obstacle to the improvement of conditions in other countries. As will be noted when compared to the Organization for Intellectual Cooperation, the ILO was concerned with a relatively narrow field. That is to say, its activities did not range across a wide spectrum of human activity. In part, because of this reason, it would seem to have been more successful in stating its objectives clearly and in gaining recognition for them. Undoubtedly it was fortunate in the

²⁹Potter, An Introduction to the Study of International Organization, p. 252.

³⁰Shotwell, The Great Decision, p. 163.

leadership of M. Thomas and perhaps, most important, it enjoyed immediate popular support within many of the various nations which comprised its membership. More specifically, its constitutional tri-partite representation of government, capital and labour was a source of strength to the Organization. Because of this government-labour-management representation, ILO proposals for legislation had a vitality greater than would normally be the case in inter-country diplomatic negotiation. Again, because of this representation, the Organization had an excellent inherent safeguard against ill-conceived projects which, it will be noted in consideration of the Organization for Intellectual Cooperation, was not achieved by all League bodies. As has been noted above, the ILO's Committee whose function it was to review the Annual Reports of nations, had at its fingertips an important instrument with which to focus public attention on those nations which did not live up to the spirit of the Charter. This infusion of strength from its direct contact with private associations as well as government is a factor in the success of the ILO well worth noting in its implications for Unesco.

E. J. Phelan's biography of Albert Thomas, its first Director,³¹ reveals the emphasis put by the Secretariat of the Organization on coordination of projects with other international organizations and infers the need for personal contact, for consultation and discussion outside of the headquarters of the Secretariat. It is in these meetings that objectives can be clearly defined and careful plans made for technical study and recommendations to government. The ILO, it would seem, was successful in providing adequate resources for research and that essential clarification of problems necessary to progress. Unlike the Organization for Intel-

³¹Phelan, Yes, and Albert Thomas, passim.

lectual Cooperation, it was fortunate in a continuity of operation and unbroken effort toward the achievement of its goals. The operation of the ILO does, however, suggest a danger inherent in such an international organization: that in dealing with broad problems within its field, there is a risk of under-emphasizing the special conditions of a particular country. The alternate danger lies in concentrating upon special conditions in a narrow area and thus running the risk of losing sight of broad goals and of general standards.

The experience of the Organization for Intellectual Cooperation, organized about the same time as the ILO, and Unesco, set in operation some thirty-five years later, provides an opportunity for interesting comparison and contrast.

The Organization for Intellectual Cooperation

"The Covenant of the League," so states a Geneva publication of 1935, "implies international action for the purpose of solving, by loyal cooperation, the problems raised by the complexities of our age. The League of Nations could hardly fail, therefore, to put intellectual rapprochement in the forefront of its activities and in so doing, it was bound to make an appeal to those who devote themselves to educational and intellectual work in each nation."³²

Until the beginning of the present century, this report continues, the intellectual, the scientist, the research worker, was very much of an individualist. International cooperation in the arts and sciences was

³²Secretariat of the League of Nations, The Aims, Methods and Activity of the League of Nations (Geneva, 1935), p. 154.

the exception rather than the rule, excepting perhaps, the exchange of information through correspondence and infrequent congresses.

The idea that peace depends on the state of men's minds as well as of their bodies was an insight which found expression in several pre-World War I organizations such as the Union of International Associations.³³ It was during the war that the British Foreign Office and specifically Lord Cecil and General Smuts proposed that the League should concern itself with cultural cooperation. During the first and second sessions of the League Assembly, Mr. Henri Lafontaine, a Belgian, and Gilbert Murray, the British scholar, were largely responsible for persuading the Assembly to authorize the Council to create a Committee on Intellectual Cooperation.

The idea of an organization for intellectual cooperation was not one which received the immediate and enthusiastic support of all nations. Indeed, the Nations of the League

demonstrated remarkable ingenuity in thinking of reasons for objecting to such activities, especially on the conflicting grounds that they would either exert dangerous pressure on domestic matters, such as education, or they would be so amorphous that they would exert no pressure at all.³⁴

Or, as Werner Levi pointed out

some nations feared inroads into their internal affairs, others felt governmental activities might infringe upon academic freedom, still others hesitated to devote scarce funds to such luxuries. The pronounced fear of many was presumably that such an organization might be successful and undermine sovereignty!³⁵

Nor was education, which had long since been jealously regarded by each state as its own private instrument for molding the minds of its citizens, given any explicit mention in the terms of reference for the Committee on

³³Cheever and Haviland, Organizing for Peace, p. 183.

³⁴Ibid., p. 619.

³⁵Levi, World Organization, p. 195.

Intellectual Cooperation when it was formed.

An immediate and obvious problem of such an organization was that it started from first beginnings with little in the way of principle or precedent to guide it. There were objections that its purposes were not clear and for that reason "its entry into this tractless forest was viewed with skepticism in many quarters."³⁶

Its operational principle was the general statement that "intellectual activity affects what is most intimate and profound in the life of peoples."³⁷ Suggested by inference from its work rather than by direct statement of the Organization itself were the following aims:³⁸ to improve the material conditions of intellectual workers; to build up international relations and contacts between teachers, artists, scientists, actors; and to strengthen the influence of the League of Nations for peace.

One thing, however, was clear at the time of the Organization's formation - that it should expedite contacts and cooperation among intellectual leaders. That is to say, it should serve to bring together the intellectual elites of the various countries and to assist them in their search for peace, based "upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind."³⁹

In 1920, the First Assembly of the League requested the League Council to encourage intellectual organization. It is indicative of the lack of enthusiasm of Council members at the prospect that it was not until 1922 that the Committee on Intellectual Cooperation was established and that

³⁶Secretariat of the League of Nations, The Aims, Methods and Activities of the League of Nations, p. 155.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Robert E. Asher et al., The United Nations and Promotion of the General Welfare (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1957), p. 165.

³⁹Preamble, Constitution of Unesco, Appendix A.

not until 1926, six years after the Assembly's request, was a constitution of the organization - the Intellectual Cooperation Organization of the League of Nations - approved. Within the first few months of its existence, the Organization had decided to dissolve itself rather than to struggle on the all-too-modest subsidy allotted to it by the League's budget.⁴⁰ It was at this point that the French government stepped in and gave the new Organization its executive organ, the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, centred in Paris. Initially, the Committee on Intellectual Cooperation consisted of nineteen members appointed by the Council. It directed the work of the Institute in Paris and two special bodies, the Institute for the Unification of Private International Law and the International Educational Cinematographic Institute lodged in Rome and presented by the Italian government in 1928. The Committee reported to the Council and the Assembly. Between its meetings, an executive carried out its decisions. Smaller committees of experts, some permanent and others temporary, were set up to answer special questions, as for example, the Permanent Committee on Arts and Letters, and the Advisory Committee on the Teaching of Principles and Facts on Intellectual Cooperation.

The conception of League responsibility for international intellectual cooperation was put forward in an atmosphere of suspicion. It did not receive immediate or all-embracing support. It was starved financially and, indeed, all but collapsed when at last the Institute was established in Paris. Not only was it considered by some to be dominated by France (a charge which would seem not to be supported)⁴¹ but it also suffered the disadvantage of physical separation from Geneva.⁴² The Institute, moreover,

⁴⁰Walters, A History of the League of Nations, I, 192.

⁴¹Ibid. The initial budget of the Committee was set at £5,000 after much acrimonious debate.

⁴²Ibid.

took some years to become efficient, owing in part to an unhappy choice of its first Director.⁴³

Impressive in the eminence of the men and women involved in its work,⁴⁴ the Committee was faced with a tangled web of problems and in consequence, an embarrassingly large range of choice of activity.

In pursuit of its purposes to improve the material conditions of intellectual workers, to build up international relations between intellectuals and to strengthen the League's influence for peace, the Committee embarked on a program which was characterized in the main by its variety.⁴⁵

At various points in Europe and South America, a series of conferences called "Conversations" and paralleling these, publications called "Open Letters" on such typical subjects as "Goethe," "The Future of Culture," "Art and Reality," "Art and the State," "The Training of Modern Man," were established. In the field of international relations, an Annual Conference on Higher International Studies was held in various parts of Europe to contemplate such themes as "Relations Between the State and Economic Life" and "The Organization of Security and Peaceful Change." In the exact sciences, it was some time before the Committee made any specific plans and although prior to World War II, the Institute was about to embark on a series of Conferences in the Exact Sciences, little matured. A Committee of Library Experts, set up to study methods of library coordination, issued "An International Guide to Archivists." Contacts between library personnel were supported and encouraged.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴These included Henry Bergson, Madam Curie, Albert Einstein, Gilbert Murray.

⁴⁵Walters, A History of the League of Nations, I, 190.

Little-known literary masterpieces of Latin America were made known to Europe through translation. Prior to the Second World War, the Committee was about to make a start on the dissemination of Japanese literature. Paralleling this development was the publication in 1932 of an International Repertory of Translations covering philosophy, religion, law and the social sciences. Attached to the Institute for Intellectual Cooperation were the International Museums Office, the International Offices of the Institutes of Archeology and the International Commission on Historical Monuments. Various publications, through the encouragement of the Institute were issued by these Organizations. An international agreement concerning the protection of national, artistic and historical possessions and their protection in times of war and civil disturbance was prepared.

Attempts were made to encourage countries to include in their school curricula, material on the need for international cooperation and emphasis on the theme of national interdependence. An attempt was made to revise school textbooks with a view to the exclusion of inaccurate or unfavorable comments about other countries. As a League publication wistfully suggests, "a declaration on the teaching of history, drawn up by the Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, came into force on November 24, 1937, and is still open for the signature of governments."⁴⁶

Again, speaking with reference to the perpetuation of anti-foreign prejudice in school textbooks, the Committee asked itself "whether education authorities could be induced to revise in a spirit of impartiality and international tolerance, such of their textbooks as were animated by

⁴⁶Geneva Information Service, Essential Facts About the League of Nations (9th Rev. Ed., 1938), p. 260.

a spirit incompatible to the spirit of the League."⁴⁷

In attempting to teach the aims of the League, the Institute drew up certain suggestions and practical recommendations addressed to governments with the end of ensuring that school children in the various countries should be properly instructed in the aims of the League. But these recommendations, the Institute reported, "have been received with some distrust in certain quarters (for States jealously reserve the right to teach their children as they think best) but, on the whole, they have had good results."⁴⁸

Among its other activities, the Committee prepared a draft International Convention on Broadcasting and Peace under which contracting parties were to undertake to facilitate the broadcasting of items calculated to promote a better knowledge of the civilizations and conditions of life of other peoples. Optimistically, it was said to have exerted a generally beneficent influence.

What can be said of the work of the Organization for Intellectual Cooperation? Professor Alfred Zimmern has likened the League in its first decade of operation to a building in which the work was going on in the first floor midst all the equipment while the foundation was still being laid. Is this to imply that activities in the area of intellectual cooperation can be fruitful only when a political base has been stabilized? Lindon A. Mander speculates on this point: was it possible for an Institute to function properly in the world of political anarchy of the middle

⁴⁷Secretariat of the League of Nations, The Aims, Methods and Activity of the League of Nations (Geneva, 1935), p. 158.

⁴⁸Ibid. Sir A. Zimmern in his book The League of Nations and the Rule of Law (London: MacMillan & Co., 1936), p. 137, records that when discussion took place in 1921 in Geneva regarding an organization for intellectual cooperation to "deal with questions of intellectual cooperation and education, an objection was raised by the Canadian delegate and the reference to education was dropped."

thirties? How, for example, could a scientist present the results of his research if these results were to be translated into the strengthening of the military power of a potentially hostile state? What kind of welcome could be given to foreign students and professors if there were suspicion that they were not seekers after truth but propagandists?⁴⁹

In short, what minimum of political stability must there be for such an institution to operate effectively?

The great problem of the Committee in its time (as with Unesco in our time) was how to create across the world an understanding of the attitudes of other countries, not just of their material interests but of their cultural and intellectual interests as well.

As has been noted above, the inclination of the Committee for Intellectual Cooperation was towards facilitating contacts and cooperation among intellectual leaders. Its purpose was to bring together the intellectual elites of the various countries and to assist them in their search for peace based on "intellectual and moral solidarity." At the formation of Unesco, this emphasis on the elite was again advanced by the French but found unacceptable by the United States. The membership of the Committee, it has been noted, comprised a group of outstanding intellectuals. A recurring criticism, however, was that it frequently operated at a level beyond the comprehension of the common man and that it lacked the background and experience to translate its conclusions into practical application. Werner Levi, speaking with reference to the high, abstract, intellectual plane on which the Committee worked, emphasizes that it made no desirable impression. He continues that "this need not be cause for

⁴⁹Mander, Foundations of Modern World Society, p. 767.

despair, however, but rather a warning in the age of mass society that organization must aim at the masses."⁵⁰

From the beginning, there seems to be considerable evidence that the scope of the Committee's interest was too large and that "it tended to ride off in all directions at once."⁵¹ Its objectives, it has been suggested, were not defined with sufficient care; it lacked any single body of knowledge or standards such as those which tended to unify the Financial or the Labour or Health Organizations.⁵² Proposals of all kinds were made and many were adopted without much thought of their practicability nor inquiry into the best methods of carrying them out. The Institute plunged into ambitious projects, some of which it had not the resources to carry out.

In some cases, it was said of the Institute that it was not the most suitable body to initiate work. For this reason, many of its projects failed or produced such small effects as inadequately compensated the effort made. There was duplication of effort, as, for example, the attempt to create an international bibliography, a project which was in train in Brussels.

The Institute for Intellectual Cooperation never received adequate financial support. It is extraordinary to note that a 1939 publication of the Secretariat suggests that "for some ten years past, the League has had adequate means of action and material resources for its work in intellectual cooperation."⁵³

⁵⁰Levi, The Fundamentals of World Organization, p. 196.

⁵¹Cheever and Haviland, Organizing for Peace, p. 185.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Secretariat of the League of Nations, The Aims, Methods and Activity of the League of Nations (Geneva, 1935), p. 155.

Having in mind the objectives of the Organization, this suggests no little lack of vision and understanding of the potentialities of the Organization. In some quarters, considerable criticism accrued to the Institute in that it placed excessive emphasis on European interests.

But nevertheless, there is some measure of agreement that the Committee did accomplish much useful work in such technical fields as library cooperation, museum cooperation, film exchange and in secondary or higher education.⁵⁴

A Backdrop for Unesco

When the Nazi infantry reached Paris in 1940, instead of destroying the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation, they attempted to take it over and make it an instrument for propaganda directed to the countries of Latin America. Thus, the only part of the League of Nations which Hitler annexed was that which had been established to combat ignorance and prejudice among nations.⁵⁵ The Institute did not cooperate and until the

⁵⁴Asher, The United Nations and Promotion of the General Welfare, p. 165. See B.J. Hovde, "Unesco," Social Research, XIV (March, 1947), 7. Speaking of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, Hovde suggests that "The Institute, while suffering from some serious unavoidable drawbacks, performed a tremendously useful task in keeping alive the idea of true international intellectual effort and causing it to grow."

Note the comment, too, from International Conciliation, 415 (November, 1945), 733. "While its work was not sufficiently extended nor developed to provide a broad and popular base of cooperation between peoples of various nations, the efforts of the Intellectual Cooperation Organization made a very important contribution to cultural interchange and provided valuable experience and guidance in shaping the plans for the United Nations Education and Cultural Organization."

⁵⁵Shotwell, The Great Decision, p. 188.

end of the war was alive in name only.

It was generally felt during World War II that the work initiated by the League's Organization would be resumed following the war. While the war was still in mid-course, the British, at a moment of utmost national crisis, took the initiative in establishing in 1942 periodic meetings of a Council of Allied Ministers of Education or C.A.M.E., as it was subsequently known. Its Chairman was R.A. Butler. Its primary purpose was to consider the rebuilding of educational facilities damaged by the war. Charged with the task of post-war educational reconstruction, C.A.M.E. gradually expanded to include delegations not only from the European countries and those of governments in exile, but also observers from the United States, the U.S.S.R., China, India, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. In 1943, the United States formally associated itself with the Council and with this added strength, it began to work towards a permanent post-war international agency.

Meanwhile, private groups were concerned with problems of educational and cultural post-war reconstruction. Among these was the National Education Association of the U.S.A. which, through nation-wide conferences, broadcasts and the circulation of pamphlets, supported American representations in C.A.M.E. for a broadly based continuing organization. The British delegation, by contrast, concentrated its interest in the problems of educational reconstruction. Various proposals were submitted, contemplating a future organization of a temporary nature with the emphasis primarily on educational reconstruction. It was the United States view that it was unwise to become involved in negotiations concerning a specialized agency in either the educational or the cultural field before a plan of the United Nations Organization as a whole had been clearly framed. At the meeting

of C.A.M.E. in April, 1944, a draft proposal for an interim United Nations Organization for Education and Cultural Reconstruction had been worked out and transmitted to world governments.⁵⁶

The Dumbarton Oaks Conference of 1944 was concerned primarily with questions of security among nations. But such functions as Unesco was later to assume were almost certainly in the minds of delegates to the Conference. Chapter I, Article II of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, for example, which sets forth the purposes of a new United Nations Organization, suggests that one of its functions should be "to develop friendly relations among nations and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace."⁵⁷

Chapter V dealing with the General Assembly, indicates in Articles VI and VII, that the General Assembly should have a responsibility for initiating studies and making recommendations "for the purpose of promoting international cooperation in political, economic and social fields and of adjusting situations likely to imperil the general welfare." Article VII of the same Chapter would have the General Assembly consider the coordination of the policies of "international, economic, social and other specialized agencies brought into relation with the Organization."

In Chapter IX entitled "Arrangements for International, Economic and Social Cooperation," under Article I it was agreed that the new Organization should "facilitate solutions of international, economic, social and other

⁵⁶Cheever and Haviland, Organizing for Peace, p. 270. The authors suggest that short-range thinking dominated this first C.A.M.E. draft for post-war organization.

⁵⁷Vera Micheles Dean, The Four Cornerstones of Peace (New York: Whittlesey House, 1946), pp. 145 ff.

humanitarian problems and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." Article II continues: "each such organization or agency should be brought into relationship with the Organization on terms to be determined by agreement between the Economic and Social Council and the appropriate authorities . . . subject to the approval of the General Assembly."

As Vera Micheles Dean points out, Chapter I of the Charter of the United Nations enlarges considerably on the corresponding chapter of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals in that it emphasizes not the achievement of peace only, but peace "in conformity with the principles of justice and international law."⁵⁸ Reference too, is made to the principles of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples. In addition, the idea of international cooperation is extended to include not only political, economic and social problems but cultural problems as well, the word "culture" here being understood to include education.

The Council of the Allied Ministers of Education met at the same time as the U.N.C.I.O. at San Francisco in 1945. Its purpose was to consider and to endorse a draft of the Constitution of the new cultural organization. Among the voices heard at its meetings were those of educators who insisted that the single word "cultural" was not sufficiently explicit. At their request, the word "education" was added to the title of the new Organization. At this juncture, the scientists, clamoring for recognition as well, pressed for the inclusion of the word "scientific" in the title, a lobby which they were to resume at the London Conference in 1945. A general feeling existed among delegates that reconstruction should serve only as a starting point and that this new Organization should aim at a

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 67-77.

permanent Educational and Cultural Organization rather than merely a reconstruction agency. A further consideration was the relationship of the new organization to the United Nations system; whether as a subsidiary to the Economic and Social Council or as an independent and specialized agency standing in a relationship of affiliation only with the United Nations.

Meanwhile at the San Francisco Conference, Edward R. Stettinius of the United States, pressed for inclusion in that Conference's agenda, a proposal that the Economic and Social Council should provide for educational and other forms of cultural cooperation. Subsequently this was approved by the Conference and the Charter's language includes the phrase "the United Nations shall promote . . . international, cultural and educational cooperation." Further, it was agreed that "specialized agencies established by inter-governmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities . . . in economics, social, cultural, educational, health and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations . . . through agreement with the Economic and Social Council."⁵⁹

The measure of agreement thus concluded made possible the London Conference in November, 1945, at which representatives of forty-five nations met to write the Constitution for Unesco.⁶⁰ The backdrop to the meeting must surely have been one of bitter memories of a weapon of

⁵⁹W.H.C. Laves and C.A. Thomson, Unesco: Purpose, Progress, Prospects (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), p. 23.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 25. The Soviet Union did not participate in the London Conference because it had a generally negative attitude towards the specialized agencies, because it considered education and related matters to be purely domestic problems and because it had little sympathy for the individualistic-liberalistic approach which it thought might characterize Unesco.

absolute destruction and world-wide dislocation. But there was positive feeling, nevertheless, that the time was ripe for great accomplishments in the field of education and culture. The ready adoption of the United Nations Charter at San Francisco was evidence of a universal longing for a better world. Thus, according to a French philosopher, the United Nations having been given a body through its Charter, it was through Unesco's constitution that it would be given a soul.⁶¹ In his excellent brief summary of the 1945 Conference, Laves records that the task of writing a constitution for Unesco revolved around decisions on five important issues: Unesco's program, purpose, character, its relations with the United Nations and its role.⁶²

From the beginning of the London Conference, there was general agreement among delegates that the new organization was not one which could or should intervene in the affairs of member states. Thus Article I of the Constitution is noteworthy for its use of the words "encouraging," "recommending," "suggesting." The grasp of the delegates of the potentialities of Unesco was large. Perhaps, because of the general optimism concerning Unesco of that time, perhaps because of a feeling of satisfaction in sharing in the development of an Organization with such ideals, delegates were unwilling seriously to resist a variety of program areas suggested. Not only does the Constitution make reference to the education of adults, the education of children, concern for historical monuments, interest in the mass media, works of art, publications, exchange of persons, but indeed, "all branches of intellectual activity."⁶³ In

⁶¹Ibid., p. 3. ⁶²Ibid., p. 25.

⁶³Constitution of Unesco, Appendix A.

setting their sights on areas of effort that were broad and intangible, the delegates were setting themselves a far more extensive task than, for example, the FAO or the WHO.

The matter of educational reconstruction which had been avoided by some delegates and by the draft constitution produced in the previous summer, was re-opened. The French, on the one hand, with others of the war-torn nations and especially Poland, argued for immediate aid. The American delegation, on the other hand, urged that the new Organization should not become a relief agency for which function the U.N.R.R.A. had already a responsibility. It was a sign of the remarkable good will that permeated this brief conference that the matter was resolved by an instruction to the Preparatory Commission which was to follow the London Conference to coordinate offers of assistance and to report in 1946 to the First Session of the General Conference. It was further proposed that the Preparatory Commission should bring practical measures for reconstruction to the attention of governments, organizations and individuals. With this compromise, the limited plan was approved.

Helen Wilkinson, a member of the British delegation reminded the Conference of the pressure from the scientists and from the International Council of Scientific Unions in particular, to be included within the new Organization. Rather earlier, scientists had hoped for the creation of a separate science organization within the United Nations system: now they pressed for the inclusion of the word "scientific" in the title of this Organization. In the eyes of the delegates, there was merit in the inclusion of this new title in that scientific exchanges were already better organized internationally than those in any other intellectual field by virtue of the effort of the Union. Nor were these delegates, who were

meeting only a matter of months after the first military use of the atomic bomb, unaware of the urgent need for international cooperation in the development and application of scientific knowledge.

It was the opinion of the delegates that the mass media - press, radio and film - had a particular role and significance for Unesco. With the sponsorship of the United States, a resolution was approved, urging the Preparatory Commission to give special attention to these important means of creating a positive influence for peace.

It was understandable that when delegates gathered in London for the Conference, the phrases "the promotion of peace through international understanding," "the forwarding of human welfare," and "the expansion and circulation of knowledge," should have seemed proper and sufficient to be stated as the objectives of the Organization. The fact, however, that they were subject to such varied interpretation became subsequently, a major stumbling block to the development of the Unesco program. The Preamble to the Constitution in which these phrases came to find a place, was a moving piece of writing which was to prove rather less than useful as a guide to program at subsequent meetings of the Organization.⁶⁴ Delegates at the Conference ascribed more or less authority to this Preamble according to their national practice as they did following the Organization's inception. Too, the attempt to define precisely the purpose of Unesco was made difficult by the clearly different stages of development which characterized member states. Nor was there a clear-cut agreement whether Unesco should serve broad political purposes or limited technical ends. On the one hand, there was a view that Unesco in its program should contribute directly to peace and security. That is to say, each Unesco act-

⁶⁴ The Preamble of the Constitution resulted from a draft prepared by Archibald McLeish of the United States delegation and Etienne Gillson of the French delegation.

ivity should be chosen with a view to its direct contribution to peace. This would imply a close relationship between Unesco and the United Nations.

The second general view (shared intensely by Unesco's first Director-General, Dr. Huxley) was that Unesco's approach to peace should emphasize the indirect - that it should "further the welfare of mankind through education, science and culture."⁶⁵ The soundest approach to peace, it was argued, was the long-run method of strengthening education, science and culture. This approach lent itself to the adoption of long-range programs. It assumed that the task of maintaining peace was essentially a concern of the Security Council and the Assembly. The difference, in short, was between the long-run, indirect and subtle building of a climate of world opinion which would reject war as against the preparation of projects which would have had a positive and immediate impact on day-to-day political events. Neither view was entirely accepted at the London Conference and indeed, neither view, as it will be seen, completely captured the minds of General Conference delegates in later years.

In short, the London Conference had difficulty in finding clear and unequivocal language to describe the purposes of Unesco. As with political acts of many kinds it would seem that the Constitution of Unesco represented a compromise. It was vague and seemingly, deliberately so; its language was, as experience proved, not sufficiently clear to provide a firm guide in determining activity.

Delegates at the London Conference faced another critical issue in the decision as to whether the new Organization should be governmental or

⁶⁵Laves and Thomson, Unesco: Purpose, Progress, Prospects, pp. 25-45.

non-governmental in character. Was it to be an agency of scholars or was it to be an agency where "peoples speak to peoples."⁶⁶ It will be recollected that the League's Intellectual Cooperation Organization lent precedent to the suggestion that a group of distinguished individuals should be in the forefront of the Organization. On the other hand, Unesco's most immediate predecessor, the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education, had been wholly an organization of government officials. Certainly, the financial support of governments was necessary: the question was as to the degree of further relationship which was desirable. The French delegation proposed a tri-partite body comprising governments, world associations and national commissions, but by resolution, the London Conference concluded that only governments should be members of the Organization, each with the right to cast one vote in the General Conference. There was provision, however, as was the case with the Intellectual Cooperation Organization, that Unesco might consult and cooperate with non-governmental, international organizations, and as necessary, invite them to undertake specific tasks and assume advisory functions.

The question as to whether Unesco should serve the intellectual elite or the masses, was a subject of debate at the London Conference. The French took the view, as had the Intellectual Cooperation Organization, that Unesco should serve primarily the world's intellectuals. The United States and Canada, among others, on the other hand, argued strongly that the new Organization should serve all of the peoples of the world. Sr. Torres Bodet, later to become the second Director-General, emphasized that a means should be worked out and a program emphasis laid

⁶⁶ Ibid.

which would neither neglect the intellectual elite nor the needs of the masses. This third position was adopted by the Conference. Thus, the character of the Constitution adopted was such as to give Unesco a responsibility to the masses of the world as an inter-governmental organization.

The United Nations Charter, Article 63, provided the framework within which Unesco was to operate as a Specialized Agency. It established that the Economic and Social Council might enter into agreement with any agency established by inter-government agreement, defining the terms on which it should be brought into relationship with the United Nations. The Economic and Social Council further had responsibility to coordinate the activities of the specialized agencies. Thus, Unesco was to be relatively independent administratively.

In summary, the Conference had determined that the approach of Unesco would be basically indirect. It would function as a service agency to member states and as a stimulus to both government and private organizations. Its concern for educational reconstruction was to have limits. Its program was to be broad and indeed, grew in size during the Conference to cover a field ranging to all levels of education, the natural and social sciences, the humanities and the mass media. Its approach in its operation might be either direct or indirect. It was to be inter-governmental in character and was to concern itself with the masses of the world. A product of a compromise, the Constitution's stated purposes could be interpreted to cover almost any human interest or activity. Implicit in the Constitution, there would seem to have been the assumption that any or all activities in the field of education, science and culture might be equally apt to further "universal

respect for justice," for "the rule of law," for "human rights and fundamental freedoms." It implied that any type of knowledge was bound to advance the "common welfare of mankind." Nevertheless, with the acceptance of the Constitution by twenty signatory nations, Unesco was launched.

Succeeding pages will analyse the attempts of this fledgling Organization to formulate its philosophy, refine its objectives, provide meaningful criteria for its program and establish workable policies in operation.

CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNESCO'S PHILOSOPHY, PURPOSE, PROGRAM AND OPERATION, 1946-49

The basic documents of the United Nations and of its agencies, recall to citizens of democratic countries, many familiar faiths: faith in man, faith in the possibility of achieving a peaceful world through cooperation and international understanding, faith in the dignity of the individual, the capacity of man for education, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Above all, there is implied faith that problems could be solved by revealing the truth through the free exchange of knowledge and ideas. Unesco was established on the assumption that by mobilizing the resources of culture, science and education, an effective contribution could be made to international peace.¹

The mood of the 1945 Conference which created Unesco and of the first session of its General Conference was perhaps not unlike that which followed the First World War. World War II was finished; victory was complete. Victory had been achieved through unprecedented international military cooperation and solidarity. Fresh in the memory was the Fascists' capture of men's minds within a dictatorship. Unesco

¹W. H. C. Laves and C. A. Thomson, "Unesco: Purpose, Progress, Prospects" (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), p. xix.

was to be that agency which would contribute to peace and security "by strengthening the educational, scientific and cultural resources of the world and by stimulating the use of these resources in the maintenance of peace and the promotion of human welfare."²

Unesco was at once an old and a new concept. It was an old idea in that for many years there had been cultural interchanges among countries and because it had been preceded twenty-five years earlier by the League's Intellectual Cooperation Organization. It was a new concept in that it seemed assured of wide general support and because it would have to operate in a world markedly different than that following 1918. In the first few years of its inception, Unesco was to spend much of its time in general inquiry as to objectives, in a search for a sense of direction and for almost unlimited conscience-searching. Its spectrum of purpose was conceived as almost infinitely broad; as a result, its program was conceived as infinitely diverse. It was, in its first years, to reconsider and reshape its method of action. These struggles to determine purpose, program and method of operation distilled the inevitable by-product of mounting frustration.

As Laves and Thomson³ point out, the history of Unesco's development up to 1956 might be divided into three stages: 1947-49, which was a period of exploration and uncertainty and in which, seemingly, the optimism of member states as to the number and variety of activities which the Organization could carry on was limitless; 1950-52, a period of acute dissatisfaction with what appeared to be the scattered and ineffective character of Unesco's program, marked as well by mounting internal

²Ibid., p. xxi. ³Ibid., p. 46.

struggles and tensions which culminated in the resignation of the second Director-General; and 1953-56, which was a period marked by a growing interest in the Organization and increasing effort toward program concentration, a clearer structure and a more effective administration.

It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the struggle from 1945 to 1949 to develop a philosophy for Unesco, to set out its purposes, to establish an acceptable program and finally, to fashion appropriate operating principles.

The Development of a Philosophy for Unesco-
Evolutionary World Scientific Humanism:
Julian Huxley

The work of the London Conference of 1945 resulted, as has been noted above, in the development of a Constitution for Unesco. The Preamble and Article I of that Constitution dealt with the purposes of the Organization and the observer might be forgiven were he to assume that purposes had thus been established and that the Organization was free to set about the development of its program.⁴

This, of course, was not the case. Throughout the first decade of the Organization's life, the matter of its purposes, its functions, the philosophic framework within which it was to work, were matters of time-consuming debate in the sessions of the General Conference.

George V. Allen, the leader of the United States delegation at the Fourth Session of the General Conference remarked: "Unesco's multi-

⁴Unesco, Preparatory Commission, Conference for the Establishment of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ECO/CONF./29), November, 1945 (London: Unesco Preparatory Commission, 1946).

farious projects, some having apparently little relation to the general purpose of the United Nations, had caused one well-meaning critic to refer to Unesco as 'that Organization in search of a purpose'.⁵ Nor, he concludes "does our programme as a whole seem to be guided by a central purpose. I have said that I believe it should be."⁶

Julian Huxley, the first Director-General of the Organization noted too that critics of Unesco "deplore that it lacks a central idea or aim which the average citizen can understand and appreciate."⁷

As to the reason, he suggests that

if Unesco has not yet gripped the public imagination in the same simple way as has FAO or WHO, the primary reason is that its aims are not so simple. In the first place, it covers not one major field but four - science and culture, education and mass communications, and secondly, in none of these is there to be found a public appeal so obvious or immediate as that of FAO for adequate nourishment or of WHO for better health . . . but it is Unesco's duty to have found the way to such an appeal, to have forged a single compelling idea out of the complex material of its tasks.⁸

In the continuing struggle to develop a clear rationale for Unesco, some central contributions were made by several leaders in the Organization. Among these was that of Dr. Huxley. Of the need for such a philosophic skeleton he wrote that

in order to carry out its work, an organization such as Unesco needs not only a general set of aims and objects for itself, but also a working philosophy, a working hypothesis concerning human existence

⁵Records of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Fourth Session, (Paris, 1949), p. 61.

⁶Ibid.

⁷United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Report of the Director-General on the Activities of the Organization in 1948, presented to the Third Session of the General Conference, November-December, 1948, 3C/3. (Paris, 1948), p. 24.

⁸Ibid.

and its aims and objects, which will dictate, or at least indicate, a definite line of approach to its problems. Without such a general outlook and line of approach, Unesco will be in danger of undertaking piecemeal and even self-contradictory actions, and will in any case, lack the guidance and inspiration which springs from a belief in a body of general principles.⁹

It is useful at this juncture to summarize the main lines of thought developed in the work which contains his major thesis.¹⁰

Unesco from its title, Huxley points out, is committed to two sets of aims. It is, in the first place, international and must serve the objectives of the United Nations. Moreover, it must foster and promote all aspects of education, science and culture in the widest sense of these words. The Preamble to the Constitution, he recalls, commences with Mr. Attlee's oft-quoted inspiring words that "since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed."¹¹ Both in the Preamble and in Article I of the Constitution, the dangers of ignorance are stressed. War, they emphasize, is made possible by the denial of the basic "democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of man."¹²

⁹Julian Huxley, Unesco: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1948), p. 4.

¹⁰Ibid., passim.

¹¹Preamble to the Constitution of Unesco, Appendix A. On the enactment by Congress of a Joint Resolution accepting Unesco membership, President Truman said, "if peace is to endure, education must establish the moral unity of mankind." See G.E. Storm, "Acceptance of Membership in Unesco," Elementary School Journal, XLVII (September, 1946), 8.

¹²Ibid., Preamble to the Constitution of Unesco, Appendix A.

Starting with these assumptions, Dr. Huxley recalls that the Constitution suggests that a wide diffusion of culture is indispensable to peace and that it

draws the notable conclusion never before embodied in an official document, that a peace 'based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments' would be inadequate, since it could not again 'secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world', and that 'the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind'.¹³

States which are parties to the Constitution, assert their belief in equal opportunities of education for all, the unrestricted pursuit of objective truths, the free exchange of ideas and knowledge and the betterment of the means of communication between peoples.

Article I of the Constitution broadly defines (and not too helpfully) the methods of realizing these aims. Foremost is the work of advancing mutual understanding of peoples through mass communication. Next listed is that of giving "fresh impulse to popular education and to the spread of culture."¹⁴ And finally, Unesco is intended to realize its aims through the maintenance, increase and diffusion of knowledge.

The broadness of these aims clearly demands clarification. But in that clarification and in the development of a philosophy, certain principles, Dr. Huxley declares, are debarred.¹⁵ For example, Unesco cannot be based on any one of the competing theologies ranging through Islam, Roman Catholicism, Protestant Christianity, Buddhism, Unitarianism, Judaism or Hinduism. It cannot espouse one or other of current

¹³Huxley, Unesco: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy, p. 1.

¹⁴Article I of the Constitution of Unesco, Appendix A.

¹⁵Huxley, Unesco: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy, p. 4.

politico-economic doctrines. In similar vein, since the Constitution emphasizes human dignity, it could not adopt the view that the ends of the state are more important than the individual. It could not accept any rigid class theory of society, or for that matter, any belief in inferior races. Moreover, he concludes whimsically, since Unesco is clearly pointed at the concrete tasks of education, science and culture on this planet, it is thus debarred from exclusive concern with the next world. In essence, he argues, not to take these prohibitions into consideration, would put Unesco at odds with its constitutionally non-sectarian nature. Further, the adoption of any of these would incur the hostility of some of the world's nations.

What then is left?

Since Unesco is concerned with people, Dr. Huxley concludes that as a movement, it is a sort of humanism. Unesco's world-wide responsibilities make it a world humanism. Since science provides the material basis for human culture and because science must be integrated with other human activities, it is a scientific humanism. Nor, in his view, can this philosophy be static. On the contrary, it must be evolutionary and dynamic.

At this juncture in the development of his "evolutionary world scientific humanism" Dr. Huxley raises the principle of "leveling up" the educational, scientific and cultural facilities of backward sections of the world. As to the reason, he maintains that

it will be impossible for humanity to acquire a common outlook if large sections of it are the illiterate inhabitants of a mental world entirely different from that in which a fully educated man can have his being, a world of superstition and petty tribalism in place of one of scientific advance and possibly unity.¹⁶

¹⁶Ibid., p. 18.

In a chapter entitled "The Principle of Equality and the Fact of Inequality," the first Director-General of Unesco discusses the varieties of human difference, concluding that

the fact of human difference has another implication for Unesco. Every encouragement should be given to the study of distinct psychological types . . . This does not mean of course, that Unesco should aim at labelling, docketing, or dragooning humanity. It means that it should encourage all studies and all methods which can be used to ensure that men find the right jobs and are kept away from the wrong jobs - to ensure that individuals find outlets satisfying to their temperament, and work appropriate to their talents, while at the same time ensuring that society is not overburdened with people in positions for which they are inadequate or, still worse, which they are likely to abuse.¹⁷

The reader learns in passages immediately following that Unesco should "see that the eugenic problem is examined with the greatest care, and that the public mind is informed of the issues at stake so that much that now is unthinkable may at least become thinkable."¹⁸

Turning more specifically to a program for Unesco, Dr. Huxley points out that by reason of its Constitution, Unesco is concerned with the whole of humanity, not just with the highly educated elite. Further, Unesco has the responsibility for advancing the common welfare of mankind and that as the Constitution implies, it cannot thus confine itself to the "pure" sciences or "fine" art.¹⁹

Unesco, he maintains, should pursue three main objectives. First, it should find out what applications of science and art are not being studied by other of the United Nations organizations and select from among these, those which it thinks most important to study. In the second place, he argues, Unesco should study the reasons which frustrate or distort or

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 22-23.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 23.

¹⁹Preamble and Article I (2) of the Constitution of Unesco, Appendix A.

prevent the practical applications of science and art.²⁰ The third objective is the relation of the "application of science and art to each other and to a general scale of values, so as to secure a proper amount and rate of application in each field."²¹

Of education as a major area of Unesco's interests, Huxley suggests that this is "a field which has never been adequately cultivated on the international level, and one whose international possibilities can still hardly be guessed at."²²

Huxley argues that education should equip a person to earn a living, that it should equip him for the society or the community in which he lives, that it should be on a continuing lifelong basis and that provision for adult education should be made both as a social and an individual function. Scientific research, he suggests, is capable of improving educational technique and should be given every encouragement. Unesco should reach towards a means of assisting the world to become one. Education must go beyond any confining knowledge, skills, habits or outlook to the development of an individual's inherent qualities and aptitudes; it should help him to realize his fullest potential. Education must go beyond that which produces immediate utility and include as well those intellectual, aesthetic and moral activities which are to be valued for their own sake.²³

The reader will recall Dr. Huxley's argument that education must be "levelled" internationally.²⁴ He warns, however, that Unesco must be careful not to confine its educational efforts towards those who already

²⁰Huxley, Unesco: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy, p. 30.

²¹Ibid. ²²Ibid., p. 31. ²³Ibid., pp. 31-33. ²⁴Ibid., p. 18.

have some education or alternatively, to those who have none. Rather, there is need to pursue a program which would ensure that all people have the opportunity of such education as they require. Unesco should study intelligence distribution, aptitudes, the application of psychoanalysis to education and the group method as a technique in education.²⁵

As a natural scientist, Dr. Huxley is quick to point out that

Unesco must see that its activities and ideas are not opposed to the body of established scientific doctrine, just as it must encourage the use of scientific method wherever it is applicable. Thus it cannot and must not tolerate the blocking of research or the hampering of its application by superstition or theological prejudice. It must disregard or, if necessary, oppose unscientific or anti-scientific movements such as anti-vivisectionism, fundamentalism, belief in miracles, crude spiritualism, etc. In order to do this effectively, widespread popular education is required in the facts of science, the significance of the scientific method and the possibilities of scientific application for increasing human welfare.²⁶

Commenting on the place of philosophy and the humanities in Unesco's program, Huxley suggests that

Unesco must promote the study of philosophy as an aid in the clarification of values, for the benefit of mankind in general. It must also do so in order to have its own clearly thought out scale of values to guide it in its own operations, both positively in what it should undertake or assist, and negatively, in what it should avoid or discourage.²⁷

It will be a major task of the philosophy division of Unesco "to stimulate the quest, so urgent in this time of over-rapid transition, for a world philosophy, a unified and unifying background of thought for the modern world."²⁸

He returns to this theme in discussing an implicit task of the mass medium. Unesco, he argues, "can achieve a good deal more if we can give people the world over some simple philosophy of existence of a positive nature which will spur them to act in place of the apathy,

²⁵Ibid., pp. 34-37. ²⁶Ibid., p. 41. ²⁷Ibid., p. 45. ²⁸Ibid., p. 46.

pessimism or cynicism which is so prevalent today, and to act in common instead of in separate groups."²⁹ Or, as he remarks in conclusion, the task is "to help the emergence of a single world culture, with its own philosophy and background of ideas, and with its own broad purpose."³⁰

The time, he says, is opportune; the mechanisms for world unification are available. Science has provided a means of laying a worldwide foundation and of ensuring minimum physical welfare. The need, in his view, is pressing for

at the moment, two opposing philosophies of life confront each other from the West and from the East, and not only impede the achievement of unity but threaten to become the foci of actual conflict.

You may categorize the two philosophies as two super-nationalisms; or as individualism versus collectivism; or as the American versus the Russian way of life; or as capitalism versus communism, or as Christianity versus Marxism; or in half a dozen other ways. The fact of their opposition remains and the further fact that round each of them are crystallizing the lives and thoughts and political aspirations of hundreds of millions of human beings. Can this conflict be avoided, these opposites be reconciled; this antithesis be resolved in a higher synthesis? I believe not only that this can happen, but that, through the inexorable dialectic of evolution, it must happen - only I do not know whether it will happen before or after another war. Since another war would be so appalling as to set back the march of human progress by centuries, I am convinced that the task of achieving this synthesis in time to forestall open conflict must be the overriding aim of Unesco.³¹

The solution is that of evolutionary humanism "in which though the full development of the individual is recognized as the central aim and criterion of further evolutionary progress, the proper organization of society is recognized as the indispensable mechanism of that progress."³²

This philosophic skeleton for Unesco proposed by Dr. Huxley, far from being acceptable to its chief organ, the General Conference, was the

²⁹Ibid., p. 69. ³⁰Ibid., p. 72. ³¹Ibid. ³²Ibid., p. 73.

subject to sharp criticism and bitter denunciation.

In the view of the Danish delegation, "considerations of such general nature, inspiring and stimulating though they certainly are, should not be in the foreground of our discussions at this early stage in Unesco's life. Unesco will be judged not by its philosophy nor even by its program, but by its achievements."³³

Or as the delegate of South Africa acidly observed:

It is my earnest prayer that we do not waste unnecessary time in the multiplication of theoretical formulae for the bringing about of the millenium. It seems to me better to concentrate on practical problems, however humble.³⁴

The sharpest challenge came from the Yugoslavian delegate, Mr. V. Ribnikar. Could Unesco, he reasoned, be true to its image of cultural diversity and at the same time "reject a philosophy and scientific conception, namely dialectic materialism, whose principles and even scientific forecasts are confirmed in practice?"³⁵

The Honorable William Benton, the leader of the United States delegation postulated that peace is not to be obtained through the intellectual and cultural subjugation of the world by any single political philosophy or through the conversion of the world to any single religious faith.

The cultural democracy which Unesco proposes is a democracy of mind and spirit in which every culture shall be free to live and develop in itself and in the great community of common culture.³⁶

World scientific evolutionary humanism was clearly not acceptable as a philosophy for Unesco. Of the need for some mutually agreeable

³³Unesco, General Conference, First Session, Unesco/C/50 (Paris, 1947), p. 35.

³⁴Ibid., p. 43. ³⁵Ibid., p. 40. ³⁶Ibid., p. 64.

philosophy, there can be little doubt. But in espousing a single super-culture,³⁷ Huxley negated a professed concern for the values of a "fruitful diversity of cultures" commended in the Unesco Constitution.³⁸ Nor was his concern for eugenics, para-psychology, yoga and population control calculated to win the minds of the utterly diverse representation which characterized Unesco's first session of the General Conference. In short, he performed the incredible feat of alienating the Marxists and the Catholics simultaneously.³⁹ Such was the force of the Organization's disclaimer that his views when published were circulated as a personal statement only.

The Principle of Practical Action -
Jacques Maritain

A sense of urgency and frustration dominated the first session of the General Conference and its speculation on Unesco's raison d'etre. It was perhaps inevitable that in the succeeding year delegates should have given much thought to a working philosophy for Unesco. Foremost among the contributions to the Second Session of the General Conference was that of M. Jacques Maritain of France. From the President's chair on the opening day of the Second Session, he outlined an approach for Unesco.

³⁷W.R. Sharp, "The Role of Unesco: A Critical Evaluation," The Academy of Political Science Proceedings, XXIV (January, 1951), 252 ff.

³⁸Constitution of Unesco, Article I, Section 3, Appendix A.

³⁹R. Calder, "Unesco's Task," Political Quarterly, XVIII (April, 1947), 123 ff.

The conditions of a just and enduring peace, he said, are related to the idea of a supra-national organization. Clearly the obstacles lying in the path of such an organization were immense and as he confessed at that time, it was beyond the realm of possibility.

A philosopher would fail in his duty were he not to add that this task, today impossible, is nevertheless a necessity; and that, without it, the creation of a just and enduring peace cannot be conceived. Hence, it follows that the first duty incumbent upon the men of today is that they work with all their might to make possible that which is thus revealed as a necessity.⁴⁰

Among other problems Maritain concerns himself with in his dissertation is the advance of technical knowledge and its relationship to human values. Modern science, he says, has it within its power to end the world. Fear is not enough to prevent the catastrophe nor, he argues, is it sufficient simply to tell the peoples of the world of the vistas of prosperity and freedom open to the human race should these technical developments be used in other ways.

What is required of human intelligence is that it recognize that we have entered a crucial age in our history, an age in which, under pain of death, the tremendous sources of power secured by scientific mastery of matter must be made subject to reason by overcoming the irrational temptations to which man is prone, especially in his collective existence.⁴¹

Turning to Unesco, he points out the paradox in its task: that it implies intellectual agreement between men whose views of the world, of culture, of knowledge, are different and even opposed.⁴² Never, he says, have minds been so profoundly divided.

How can sufficient agreement be achieved to accomplish a common task?

⁴⁰United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Report of the Director-General on the Activities of the Organization in 1947, presented to the Second Session of the General Conference at Mexico City, November-December, 1947, 2C/4 (Paris, 1947), p. 28.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 30. ⁴²Ibid.

Is Unesco to ignore its inspiring Preamble and content itself with the routine work of compiling documents, instituting surveys and the collection of statistics? Or alternatively, should it "attempt to establish an artificial conformity of minds and to fix upon a common doctrinal denominator which would be likely in the course of discussion, to diminish and finally disappear altogether?"⁴³ What of a solution? This, he says, must be sought in another direction

because, . . . the goal of Unesco is a practical goal, agreement between minds can be reached spontaneously, not on the basis of common speculative ideas, but on common practical ideas, not on the affirmation of one and the same conception of the world, of man and of knowledge, but upon the affirmation of a single body of beliefs for guidance in action. No doubt, this is little enough, but it is the last resort of intellectual agreement. It is, nevertheless, enough to enable a great task to be undertaken, and it would be much to crystallize this body of common practical convictions.⁴⁴

Thus, at a time in Unesco's history when disappointment and uneasiness over Unesco's failure to formulate an acceptable rationale, Maritain's proposal was received with relief. While not an answer, it did provide a necessary modus operandi. For the moment, he pleads, let us not concern ourselves with a philosophy; let us instead find harmony in the working out of acceptable solutions to immediate problems. Dr. Huxley gave ready support to this view. Pointing to fundamental education in which, he said, a program had been established with generally agreed success, he suggested that if the various nations had been called upon to give their reasons for their agreement to projects in this area, they might well have found themselves in serious disagreement.

⁴³Ibid., p. 31. ⁴⁴Ibid.

The Development of World Community-
Reinhold Niebuhr

As early as the Second Session of the General Conference, the idea of a special debate on a point of philosophy or policy was introduced. On such an occasion in the Fourth Session of the General Conference held in Paris, Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, as a delegate of the United States, presented an interesting essay on the development of world community.

Although political integration of the world appeals to one's sense of the dramatic, nonetheless, Dr. Niebuhr suggests the establishment of world community through culture is a primary task for the nations. The reason, he maintains, is that community must precede all these political instrumentalities which otherwise will be ineffective.⁴⁵

There are those, he remarks, who would create a world community through constitutional means or who, when conscious of the fact that laws do not enforce themselves, dream of a world police force by which they would enforce law. But Dr. Niebuhr argues, a police force cannot enforce law if there is not a community that wants to obey it. That is to say,

behind the power of a State there is not merely law and the police, but the authority of the community itself, its willing and implicit acceptance of certain standards of justice. The community comes first and we can create it only by the gradual growth of mutual forbearance within this multi-colored world society.⁴⁶

He does not suggest that the process of cultural cooperation obviates political arbitration. Frictions will continue which will require the in-

⁴⁵United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Report of the Director-General on the Activities of the Organization in 1949, presented to the Fourth Session of the General Conference, September-October, 1949, 4C/3 (Paris, 1949), p. 118.

⁴⁶Ibid.

tervention of the police or the courts. Indeed, he confesses, on occasion, the world community finds itself in a position in which peace can be maintained only by the preponderance of power on the part of those who want peace as against those who would break it.⁴⁷

Clearly, there are obvious difficulties in the way of the construction of world community. Every community we have known in history, he remarks, has had some core of homogeneity. But the world community, "a hopelessly pluralistic community" has no such core - no common language, common culture, common religion. Nor, he suggests, is the solution to create a synthetic world culture to take the place of all the historic cultures of mankind.

Dr. Niebuhr's position, it would seem, is this: a clearly homogeneous world community does not now exist; individual nations, indeed, are much less homogeneous in themselves than ever before; and while nations don't always get along well, they do get along. This, he says, marks the path and makes it possible for the international community to do three things.⁴⁸

In the first place, international communications should be encouraged by way of destroying barriers and so that "the encounter between nation and nation, culture and culture, will take place in broader and broader and deeper and deeper terms." Does the process of communication, he asks, itself destroy conflicts? The basic problem of Unesco, he says, is to increase the knowledge of each nation of the other. Knowing more about each other as nations is not necessarily a guarantee of peace.⁴⁹

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 118.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 119.

⁴⁹Rev. E.J. Tinsley, CBC Times, XIII, No. 26 (June 26, 1960), 34. "It is not the case that the more educated and cultured we become, the less capable we are of what religion calls sin. On the contrary. It may be true that we have greater facility in recognizing our motives and prejudices, but we are also now much more subtle in rationalizing and justifying them."

In the encounter of one nation with another, there are always three possibilities - domination, conflict and mutual accord. While mutual accord is not the only possibility of the encounter, there can be, he says, no mutual accord without the encounter. Thus, the assuaging of national prejudices and creating areas of tolerance is of prime concern.

Niebuhr's second major point is that there already exist "trans-national communities" which are the fabric of a world community, such as the trans-national communities of world religion, of science, of education and of labour. Unesco, he suggests, can facilitate and encourage the growth of these.⁵⁰

And finally, Dr. Niebuhr maintains, "we must find some minimum common ground if we would cultivate this world community."⁵¹ We must, for example, have some minimum common conceptions of justice.

In summary then, Dr. Niebuhr's position would seem to be that integrating a world community is a task of prime importance, that encounters between nations through communications must be encouraged, that existing trans-national communities must be facilitated and that the search must begin for some minimal measure of common agreement as a point of departure.

The Advance of World Civilization-
Julian Huxley

In his second and concluding report as Director-General of Unesco,

⁵⁰General Conference, Fourth Session, p. 120.

⁵¹Ibid.

Dr. Huxley points out that in the 1947 program, much agreement and cooperation was reached "not, however, on the basis of any explicit statement of Unesco's philosophy, but on that of a series of concrete and limited practical projects." But every concrete project, however practical and immediate, he suggests, "inevitably carries certain theoretical and philosophical implications; we might expect that with time, these implications might become capable of explicit formulation."⁵²

What is needed, Huxley maintains, is a single unifying idea for Unesco; this should be an immediate task. He suggests that "the advance of world civilization" best expresses the underlying ideas behind all of Unesco's activities.

This idea of the promotion of civilization on a world basis has in the first place the advantage of being practical and concrete. However vast in scope, however vague at the edges, it adds up to a series of definite and limited tasks, it introduces no note of ideological theory. Furthermore, it lends itself to the great majority of people, whatever their underlying philosophy. It commends itself immediately to the educated portion of the world's population, and can readily be made intelligible and desirable to the rest."⁵³

No details of this idea of a "unifying and general appeal" are provided. That, Dr. Huxley suggests, is a matter for the world's leading thinkers to hammer out for Unesco over a period of years.

The Interpretation of Unesco's Purpose

Quite apart from the central contributions briefly outlined above, there was in the course of the first four years of its life a continuing debate on Unesco's purpose conducted by delegates to Sessions of the

⁵²General Conference, Third Session, p. 25.

⁵³Ibid., p. 27.

General Conference.

To Dr. W.H.C. Laves, an observer at these meetings and Associate Director-General,

the purpose of Unesco would be to contribute to peace and security by strengthening the educational, scientific and cultural resources of the world and by stimulating the use of these resources in the maintenance of peace and the promotion of human welfare.

It would actually try to come to grips with one of the central problems of peace: the attitudes of people toward each other and their understanding of the role of international cooperation in the promotion of human welfare.⁵⁴

Dr. Huxley, in a statement which emphasizes his broad-gauge conception of Unesco asks: "How can an international organization best envisage the ways in which it can influence or aid all the higher creative activities of man, and all their applications, so as to promote the welfare of the human species most effectively and most enduringly?"⁵⁵

Unesco's aims, as laid down by the Constitution, he points out, are twofold - to contribute to peace and security and to promote the general welfare of mankind. Each of these two purposes must be carried out in relation to four fields of activity - education, science, culture and mass communications. Moreover, he continues,

the Constitution further lays down that we must operate without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, and on the democratic principles of the equality and mutual respect of man; that any philosophy of racialism, involving the idea of the superiority of any particular nation or ethnic group, must be combatted; we must aim at full and equal opportunities of education for all, at the unrestricted pursuit of knowledge, and the free exchange of ideas and knowledge; and that we must think in terms of influencing the great masses of humanity, the peoples of the world - which immediately implies that we must not confine our efforts to academic fields or to the intelligentsia.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Laves and Thomson, Unesco: Purpose, Progress, Prospects, p. xx.

⁵⁵ General Conference, First Session, p. 19.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 21.

Turning from the multi-sided approach advanced by the first Director-General, the Conference records suggest a feeling of need for some order of priority in purposes. The Indian delegate made the point in this way:

I take it generally speaking there are two main objects before Unesco (1) the establishment of peace and security through utilizing all the resources of education, culture and science and (2) the advancement and diffusion of knowledge amongst all the peoples and countries of the world. Which of these is to have immediate priority? And I mean from that not merely financial priority but priority in time and significance. If I could venture to submit my personal view on this behalf I would suggest that the greatest issue of the modern age is the establishment and maintenance of peace, not only because it is intrinsically desirable but because it is the pre-condition of all creative work and progress and, therefore, every item of our program should directly or indirectly be integrally related to the central purpose.⁵⁷

The United States delegation in its turn argued that human understanding can be achieved on one, and only one, basis - that of democracy. And we mean by democracy that body of concepts of human liberty and respect for the dignity of the individual personality which the word has always meant to us.

Human beings everywhere must be given full freedom, either to approve or to criticize the economic system in force or the administration in power.⁵⁸

That the terms used by the American delegate and so familiar to Western ears were not unequivocally clear was forcefully argued by the Turkish delegate.

Now we come to a very important question which touches the very foundations of our Organization. What is our aim? What do we want to do? The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to security by promoting collaboration among the nations, through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 21.

⁵⁸ General Conference, Third Session, p. 64.

for justice, for the rule of law and for human rights and fundamental freedoms. But have we agreed, are we united on the meaning of these words: What do justice, law, human rights and fundamental freedoms mean? Do we all understand them the same way? . . . We believe we are in agreement but when it comes to practice we find that everyone interprets the same words in different and contrary ways. How are we to fulfill that purpose: "universal respect for justice?" What justice? Is justice in Russia the same as justice in the western countries? Is freedom understood and applied the same way? No! What shall we then do? Have we thought how much time we shall need to attain the aims we have set ourselves? Will life tarry for us?⁵⁹

But, he continues in a conclusion remarkable in its implication:

That does not mean that Unesco is useless; on the contrary I am convinced of the need for Unesco. But what can Unesco do? Unesco can gather together the civilized western world . . . Unesco can unite us because we think in the same way; we have the same standards and morals, liberty and justice. We, the civilized of the western world, must stand together, and that is where Unesco can be useful.⁶⁰

To this already impressive array of objectives for Unesco, we might add the point of view of Mgr. Maroun of Lebanon, who urged that Unesco give emphasis to "non-intellectual manifestations" of the spirit, such as intuition, moral sense and above all, the sense of what is sacred."⁶¹ In an assembly which would doubtless represent many of the great religions of the world, he pleaded for a common meeting ground in "the living God of the Bible."⁶²

It might well have amazed the cordially cooperative delegates to the 1945 London Conference that at the Fourth Session, questions of purpose, fundamental in importance, were still being raised. It will be

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 82. See R. Niebuhr, "Theory and Practice of Unesco as an Organization," International Organization, IV (February, 1950), 4. Speaking of difficulties in semantics Niebuhr writes that a Conference called by Unesco on fundamental concepts, reported at its conclusion that "fortunately all men believe in 'democracy' today but that unfortunately they have varying concepts of democracy."

⁶⁰General Conference, First Session, p. 83.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 37. ⁶²Ibid.

recollected that the Preamble and Article I emphasize the relation between peace and mutual understanding. But the Australian delegation was not prepared to accept this without qualification.

It may well be true that ignorance breeds indifference, you cannot love what you know nothing about. But does it follow that knowledge is necessarily followed by liking? Is the colour bar, where it exists, broken down by mutual knowledge and understanding? Do anti-Semites come to live on friendly terms with the Jews when they get to know them better or when more of them come to live in their country? I do not think you can answer these questions outright in the affirmative.⁶³

Dr. Torres Bodet, as Director-General, in adding his own interpretation of Unesco's purpose, rightly anticipated the reaction of the Conference when, in his first report, he said:

Surprise may be expressed that these program criteria do not include peace or international understanding. It goes without saying, however, that all Unesco's actions are directed toward peace and international understanding. The question is to decide what type of project contributes most to that end. It seems to me that the best type is that which does something for men rather than merely discussing him. . . . The greatest contribution we can make to peace is therefore by enlisting the largest possible measure of cooperation from those in whose hands these powerful resources lie, with a view to satisfying humanity's essential needs, and in the first place, the most pressing needs of the greatest number of people.⁶⁴

The foregoing pages by no means contain an exhaustive review of the virtually unlimited interpretation placed on the constitutional purposes of Unesco during its first four years. They do, however, suggest their range and diversity. But despite this lack of agreement on the immediate purpose of Unesco, delegates might perhaps have agreed with

⁶³General Conference, Fourth Session, p. 160. For an interesting review of this point, the reader is referred to Frederick S. Dunn, War and the Minds of Men (New York: Harper Bros. 1950). See also Otto Klineberg, "Unesco and the Cultural Basis for Peace," The Academy of Political Science Proceedings, XXV (January, 1953), 187-197.

⁶⁴General Conference, Fourth Session, p. 4.

the character of the society which Sr. Emilio Abello of the Philippines suggested could be the result of Unesco effort.

Unesco must strive so that the generation to which we shall bequeath the International Organization has, first, a social background, where cooperation among men is the rule instead of the exception; second, an education upholding peace and international friendship among its main tenets; third, a cultural pattern richly diversified yet basically unified; fourth, a thorough scientific grounding, which will mean not only man's mastery of his natural environment, but also man's acceptance of the dispassionate methodology of science as his basic intellectual equipment, thus eliminating those ignorant prejudices and emotionalized reasonings which are the ready tools of those who would create tension and war.⁶⁵

Program Principles and Criteria

In their review of the development of Unesco, Laves and Thomson⁶⁶ refer to the needs which the nations joined together in the 1945 London Conference were proposing to meet. These were reconstruction, building for peace through understanding, the exchange of useful knowledge and aid to economically less developed countries.⁶⁷ But in virtually unlimited variety following Unesco's inception, Conference delegates suggested refinements of these needs ranging from the narrowly specific to the broadly nebulous. As one delegate stated:

Two kinds of achievements are expected from Unesco. . . . On the one hand, precise, methodical and progressive enterprises in a number of essential technical spheres; on the other hand a general combined action affecting what I may call the spiritual condition

⁶⁵ General Conference, Second Session, p. 61.

⁶⁶ Laves and Thomson, Unesco: Purpose, Progress, Prospects, passim.

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 4-8.

of peoples and individuals.⁶⁸

By way of introduction to a statement of program principles, Dr. Huxley speaking to the First Session of the Conference, outlined the chief characteristics of the world which had particular relevance to Unesco's work. In the first place, he said, the world had shrunk, making it possible to think in terms of an efficient world-wide organization. But, he recognized the world is, in fact, organized into nations and the spirit of nationalism is rampant. Of science, Dr. Huxley said that it had reached a point where now an adequate minimum standard of living could be provided for every human being in the world. "Laissez-faire individualism" alone is, he remarked, today demonstrably inadequate to deal with community problems and "some degree of planning is necessary."⁶⁹

A significant factor for Unesco was that the peoples of the world were at very different levels or stages in their social, economic and cultural development. More positively, in the field of mass communications, the world had at its disposal "what are really new organs of society in regard to the functions of diffusing information and influencing men's attitudes."⁷⁰ And finally, he pointed out that the world views two opposing powerful ideologies; that is to say the political world is

⁶⁸ General Conference, First Session, p. 18. See R. Calder, "Unesco's Task," Political Quarterly, XVIII (April, 1947), 123-136. "Indeed, it might be said that at the outset not only every delegation, but every member of every delegation had a different notion of what Unesco's functions were and how it could best serve those things in which he was interested . . . Unesco's range of possibilities are so great that it will take generations to compare them."

⁶⁹ General Conference, First Session, p. 18.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 24.

bi-polarized.⁷¹

A year later, in his report to the Second Session of the Conference, he elaborated further.⁷² Not only should individual cultural expression be encouraged but mutual understanding of different cultures should be ensured.⁷³ Further free cultural development within a nation, he argued, is a positive antidote to aggressive nationalism.

Dr. Huxley noted that Unesco is enjoined in its Constitution to promote the free flow of ideas. Essentially this could be achieved in two differing ways: through the essentially negative method of abolishing or reducing barriers to communication or through the building up of new channels and agencies of information within nations and thus assisting their cultural self-determination.

"The diversity of culture has as its complement the unity of knowledge and science."⁷⁴ Unesco's concern in science, Dr. Huxley remarked, is to promote unity and to recognize that diversity is to be encouraged only as local differences demanded. There is, in other words, no such thing as "German science" or "Nordic physics".

He noted the agreement of an earlier Conference that Unesco should undertake some activity in as many as possible of the fields of each of its four main subjects and devote roughly equal attention to short range

⁷¹Ibid., p. 24.

⁷²General Conference, Second Session, pp. 12-17.

⁷³The word "culture" is used in the Constitution of Unesco in two senses: that of the refinement of mind and in its socio-anthropological meaning as, for example, "the spread of culture" and "the diversity of cultures."

⁷⁴General Conference, Second Session, p. 14.

projects.⁷⁵ Further, he suggested, there must be a reasonable balance between all of the different subjects within Unesco's field of competence, although the phrase "reasonable balance" is not defined.

Finally, in view of Unesco's obligation to take account of all aspects of science, all aspects of culture, all means of preserving and transmitting these, all techniques of mass communications, he says, the Organization's program must emphasize "the unity of human thought and creation, the inter-connection of all the higher activities of man. They form a whole which is indivisible, or at least one which suffers from being divided."⁷⁶

Among those highly critical of some of the Director-General's concepts was the delegation from Yugoslavia which suggested the following principles:

- (1) Absolute respect for the individuality of the culture of every country and for its independence and integrity.
- (2) Effective support for the natural development of the culture of every people.
- (3) Prevention of all activity directed against peace or against international cooperation.⁷⁷

To secure general agreement on program formula, the Conference was reminded, is one thing and implementation is quite another.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 18.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 16. With reference to diversity of program and speaking of the one hundred and fifty different program activities proposed by Huxley to the Preparatory Commission in 1946, Sharp says "This set a pattern of program diversity and diffuseness which, despite recent lip service to the need of concentration, still characterizes most of the work of the Organization." W.R. Sharp, "The Role of Unesco: a Critical Evaluation," The Academy of Political Science Proceedings, XXIV (January, 1951), 252-62.

⁷⁷General Conference, First Session, p. 81.

Difficulties which arise stem from the use of technical terms - "democracy," "freedom," for example - which are not universally accepted.

Speaking of the breadth of the Unesco program, the Indian delegate made clear that "we should not make the mistake of assuming that the world consists of only Western Europe and North America." That is to say, Unesco should avoid "the tempting discourtesy of envisaging the world in only Anglo-Saxon or European terms."⁷⁸

In reporting to the delegates of the Second Session of the General Conference in Mexico, Dr. C.E. Beebe, the Chairman of the New Zealand delegation, made mention of the profound unease of his countrymen with respect to Unesco. The most important thing they will ask he suggested

is whether we have a program which is crisp, concise, practical, in the sense that it deals in terms of ways and means and not just in terms of desirable things - a program, above all, which is limited in scope and is within the powers of an immature organization to carry out.⁷⁹

Far from being abusive of what he feels is Unesco's lack of success in defining the character of a program, he confesses that

Any of us who in the quiet of our studies has sat down, in order to clarify our minds, and tried to think out what we would have as a programme for Unesco, have come back, I think, from a somewhat chastening experience.⁸⁰

His central criticism was that some parts of the program were beyond the field of Unesco, that others were impractical, and that there were others, on which no judgment could be passed because of the way in which they were expressed. Too many projects had been put forward, however

⁷⁸General Conference, First Session, p. 28, p. 54. This charge was leveled, and perhaps justifiably, at the League's Organization for Intellectual Cooperation.

⁷⁹General Conference, Second Session, p. 80.

⁸⁰Ibid.

good they might be individually. Indeed, he cautioned, Unesco will show its wisdom and strength by the number of projects which "it can steadfastly leave untouched because it has more important ones to do."⁸¹

It is supremely important, he remarked, that Unesco do a few jobs and do them superlatively well. Moreover, the General Conference had a special responsibility "not to lead the Secretariat to feel that they must turn out quick results on all projects, whether they are ripe or not."⁸²

The delegate from India, Mr. Saiyidian, put his finger on an obvious uneasiness among delegates when he said, "if there is one criticism . . . it would be that I find no clear and definite criterion for judging the urgency and the priority of the various proposals that have been placed before us."⁸³

The matter of program criteria was, throughout this period, a matter of central concern to Unesco. Note, for example, an initial statement of program criteria struck by the Programme Commission at its first meeting. These concerned themselves with

- (1) The relation of the project to the purpose of the Organization.
- (2) The overall coherence of the program.
- (3) The financial feasibility of the particular project.
- (4) The feasibility in terms of staff of a particular project.
- (5) The appropriateness of any given project to the end in view.⁸⁴

To this, Dr. Huxley added the advice that "our programme must not be too general, but must be closely related to the particular conditions of our present-day world in which Unesco must operate."⁸⁵

⁸¹Ibid., p. 81.

⁸²General Conference, Second Session, p. 81. Dr. Beebe, who was elected to the Chairmanship of the Programme Commission at the Second Session confessed, "I have no ideas on programme whatever."

⁸³General Conference, First Session, p. 54.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 219, Annex 1 - Report of the Programme Commission as adopted by the General Conference. See also the Programme of Unesco proposed by the Executive Board, Document 5 C/5 (I) REF. Paris. (April, 1950).

⁸⁵General Conference, First Session, p. 24.

His successor, Dr. Bodet, with the advantage of three year's experience of Unesco, recommended in his first report, that projects to be selected should have

- (a) practical value as regards raising the standard of living of the ordinary peoples;
- (b) more likelihood of securing the cooperation of leading intellectuals and professional people in the Secretariat's work;
- (c) more likelihood of achieving tangible results fairly quickly.⁸⁶

The New Zealand delegation had earlier suggested as the test for each project to be undertaken, the questions "is this good?", and perhaps more important, "is it a project that some national body or bodies could possibly undertake?" "Would it interfere with the small solid core of tasks that no one else can do and that are essential if Unesco is to justify its existence to the world?"⁸⁷

D. R. Hardman, M.P., Head of the United Kingdom delegation, on the following day, took up this theme:

We have some simple tests by which to measure the proposals put before us. We must ask of each project, is it creative, will it help to release creative powers among men and among the children of men, in their communities, their societies and their schools? Will it release powers of the spirit, of the heart or of the mind in the worlds of art, science or education?

We must look at each project to discover whether it is related to something already vital and creative in the world as we know it. True to our common cooperative ideals, we must ask if the project will make the community more of a community within the national society and still more within the society of nations.⁸⁸

At the time of the Second Session in Mexico, the Canadian

⁸⁶General Conference, Fourth Session, p. 3.

⁸⁷General Conference, First Session, p. 44.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 50.

delegation indicated its concern about the program. Unesco's activities, said Mr. S.D. Pierce, should be of immediate and recognizable benefit to the peoples of the world. Moreover, he said, Unesco must not be permitted to spread its limited resources too wide nor can it "afford to dash off in all directions."⁸⁹

One of the most vigorous critics of the Second Session of the General Conference was the Polish delegation, whose concern was that Unesco should encourage international contact and coordination of efforts in its three title fields, education, science and culture, and as well, direct activity in the member states based on the National Commission. This balance, between passive and active, they insisted, had become completely distorted in favour of the former.⁹⁰

It was perhaps understandable that during the 1945 London Conference and in the early years of Unesco's life, many projects should have been put forward as suitable for Unesco's program. The fact that the objectives of Unesco noted in the Preamble and Article I were somewhat vague did nothing to inhibit the growth of a multi-faced program. These growing demands on Unesco were a source of great concern to delegates.

A debate on program concentration - whether or not, that is to say, Unesco should concentrate its program in a narrow front or extend it in

⁸⁹General Conference, Second Session, p. 70.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 97. M. Stephan Wierblosski points to his fear that Unesco is moving in the same way as the Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, a "feeble organization" divorced from the masses of the people, which did not even include all of the great nations.

a broad front - continued with growing rancor from the First Session of the General Conference. Indeed, on the second day of the First Session, when the first Director-General of Unesco intimated that the program as planned and presented might seem too diverse and incoherent to the delegates but that in fact it was not, the tart reply of the Australian delegation's representative, Dr. R.C. Mills, was that the program not only was diffuse and scattered but demonstrated no unity of purpose behind its multiplicity of detail.⁹¹

It might be noted in passing that in general the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Scandinavian countries, Australia and New Zealand generally endorsed the idea of program concentration, whereas France, the South American countries and the Asian countries, did not.

Initially, "the broad front" program stemmed from demands made on Unesco by member states. But strong encouragement for this approach came from Director-General Huxley. "In spite of the brevity of its active existence," he reported, "Unesco has already begun operations at almost every point along its broad front of international education, science and culture."⁹² This was a concept which he was to maintain, and defend until his resignation in 1948.

In its support, the Chinese delegation argued that "increase and variety in richness of program content would contribute towards solidarity rather than division."⁹³ Similarly, Professor Photiades of Greece took the view that Unesco's program should not be restricted or confined

⁹¹General Conference, First Session, p. 35.

⁹²General Conference, Second Session, p. 6.

⁹³General Conference, First Session, p. 33.

in its outlook to over-concrete aims. Ideas, such as those in which Unesco was involved, he pointed out, took time to mature.⁹⁴ To the critics of the multi-faced program, D. R. Hardman, M.P., of the United Kingdom, replied that it was impossible for Unesco to concentrate all its activities on one or two subjects. "If anyone is inclined to disagree, let him tell us how we could convince any specialist in any field of human endeavour that his specialty is less important to mankind than any other."⁹⁵ Unesco, he continues, will neglect at its peril, any aspect of its work. (It is interesting here to notice a change in his point of view in the Conference one year later, in which he stated emphatically the need to consolidate and realize current obligations before looking towards expansion.)⁹⁶

On the other hand the Netherlands delegate related local criticism and disinterest in Unesco to its diffuse program ⁹⁷ while the New Zealand delegation reported that its government was critical of the "extensive and hazy programme which this Organization has adopted."⁹⁸ The leader of the American delegation was particularly critical of Huxley's insistence on a range of activities for Unesco as comprehensive as possible. Such a range would not serve Unesco well and if

⁹⁴General Conference, Third Session, p. 68.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 87.

⁹⁶General Conference, Fourth Session, p. 80.

⁹⁷General Conference, Third Session, p. 68.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 73.

Unesco failed, he declared, the United Nations itself could not succeed.⁹⁹

And finally, the Canadian representative urged Unesco to avoid the dispersion of its energy and resources over too many projects and activities. Unless Unesco were to become "more realistic" and reduce its overhead, it would be difficult, he claimed, to persuade the public in the various governments to continue their support for Unesco.¹⁰⁰

The Operation of Unesco: Methods and Policies

Not only was there concern with the program of Unesco but there was uneasiness among delegates to the various sessions of the General Conference as to the functioning of the Organization - its operation, methods and policies. Even the smaller countries represented were aware and articulate. The delegate from Uruguay, for example, suggested that a small committee of administrative specialists be set up to "assist" the Director-General" in the large and difficult task of organization on a rational basis" taking into account the experience of the past and anticipating the future.¹⁰¹

W. H. C. Laves, a senior officer of Unesco, notes three factors affecting the operation and implementation of the Unesco program.¹⁰² In the first place - and this is evident from the above noted

⁹⁹Ibid., pp. 63-64.

¹⁰⁰General Conference, Fourth Session, pp. 92-93.

¹⁰¹General Conference, Second Session, p. 90.

¹⁰²Laves and Thomson, Unesco: Purpose, Progress and Prospects, pp. 1-44.

debates on purpose and program - there were "uncertainties" in the Constitution which inhibited clear-cut action. The varied interests, requirements, capacities and levels of member states of course were by no means uniform and this in itself made Unesco operation difficult. And finally, Unesco - as indeed any world organization - operated in a fast-moving world, politically, and its operation thus was vulnerable to change.

Under its Constitution, Unesco is debarred in its international operation from any interference with matters of essentially domestic concern. In such matters, then, Unesco must operate indirectly, first by communicating its ideas to the National Commissions or other cooperating body, by preparing comparative studies of how particular problems are being attacked and solved elsewhere in the world, and thirdly, by affecting public opinion through books, pamphlets and other presentations via the mass media.

The principle of cooperation with other agencies was to become an important issue of debate within Unesco. As Huxley pointed out, the necessity was obvious. Unesco could never hope to undertake all tasks itself; the duplication of effort would be grave and the problems of staffing - of finding enough good people to do the various jobs - would be enormous. Moreover, it was his feeling that "people should help themselves, rather than transfer all their responsibilities to some remote overgrown organization."¹⁰³

The Director-General was aware too that another type of cooperation was necessary - that with other of the United Nations organizations - the

¹⁰³General Conference, First Session, p. 21

nature of which would vary from situation to situation.

The principle of decentralization of Unesco also occupied Dr. Huxley's attention.

We shall never be able to operate satisfactorily as a single headquarters organization. We must go out into the field and adapt our ideas and our practices to the different cultural regions of the world.¹⁰⁴

Standardization, Dr. Huxley felt, was also an important concern of Unesco and it must be achieved wherever possible. In scientific fields for example, in matters of terminology, legal conventions and practical measurements, it was vital to have commonly understood terms.

It will be recollected that the League's Organization for Intellectual Cooperation concerned itself largely with its coordinative function. Unesco, too, Huxley cautioned delegates, would "have to devote a great deal of its energy to the unspectacular but essential tasks of coordination and exchange in every field."¹⁰⁵

A further working principle which has been referred to earlier is that of "equalization." That is, Unesco's operation must contemplate raising the capacities of the backward states significantly "to enable the nations that have been less favored, either in war or peace, to take their places as equals in a single world advance."¹⁰⁶

But this careful anticipation of problems and formulation of policy by the Director-General was not enough to ward off criticism at the Second Conference. The United States delegation in particular, was clearly dissatisfied with Unesco's operations. As a preface to his

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 22. ¹⁰⁵Ibid. ¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 23.

remarks, William Benton, the spokesman of the delegation remarked that

if the American people, deeply moved by their new-found opportunity to contribute to a lasting peace, should now become disillusioned by Unesco, and their hopes again turned to ashes, I need hardly remind you how profoundly affected American foreign policy might be.¹⁰⁷

Was the structure and the program of the Organization sound, he asked, and if not, why not? Of the first report presented by the Director-General, he bluntly observed that it was necessary to "distinguish between what has actually been done and is being done and what is projected for the future."¹⁰⁸ Of the Executive Board he inquired, was it not time that their operations should be reviewed? Were there too few men on the Board? Were too few doing the work? This should be carefully examined he emphasized, before Unesco administratively "freezes into a pattern."¹⁰⁹

Nor was this concern over operations confined to any one year or to any one delegation. At the Fourth Session of the General Conference, a delegate from Iraq, Dr. K. M. El-hashimi wagged an admonitory finger at "the danger of slackness," "being too preoccupied with unimportant details rather than with vital and important issues," "the danger of bureaucracy," of publications designed as mere show, of departments of Unesco working as if independent of other sections, of overlapping and lack of coordination, of insufficient concentration of responsibility.¹¹⁰

But the concern for operational principles and policy was of course not wholly negative and throughout all of the Sessions of the Conference, some notable contributions were made. One might, for example, turn to

¹⁰⁷General Conference, Second Session, p. 75.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 7. ¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 75.

¹¹⁰General Conference, Fourth Session, p. 52.

suggestions of the Honorable William Benton of the United States delegation.¹¹¹ In the course of his remarks he pointed to an implication of what he considered to be Unesco's primary goal "a firm peace built on genuine understanding: that there should be no "loose federation of specialized groups, each pursuing its own interests on the quite human assumption that each holds a master key to world understanding."¹¹² The dangers of such departmentalization were obvious. His clear concern was for integration which would "protect us against the dividing forces that beset us."¹¹³

His second principle was "that the means employed by Unesco should be adapted to the ends."¹¹⁴ This point of view developed by the National Commission for Unesco of the United States, emphasized that the present crisis was so great and problems were so pressing that Unesco should not hesitate to employ any proper means, no matter how costly or novel, which gave promise of success. Unesco that is, must be daring and imaginative.

And thirdly, he argued "the scope of our program, over the years ahead, must be proportioned to the task."¹¹⁵ Essentially, his fears were not at the lack of instruments available to Unesco nor the absence of interest or capacity on the part of peoples. His fears were that Unesco itself would not set its sights high enough for the long range and that it

¹¹¹General Conference, First Session, p. 63.

¹¹²Ibid.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 64. The nature of the Organization against which Mr. Benton warned would seem to be roughly comparable to that of a typical North American University.

¹¹⁴Ibid. ¹¹⁵Ibid.

would not see its own true potential.¹¹⁶

At the time of the Fourth Conference, the Belgian delegate, Mr. Mundeleer pointed specifically with other delegates towards the problem of apathy towards Unesco. He recommended specifically the dissemination of more information, which propaganda, he said "is absolutely necessary to persuade the skeptics and rally them to our cause."¹¹⁷ Again, with other delegates, he approved of what he saw to be the synthesizing of the working program which had occurred over a period of four years and endorsed the repeated insistence of the Director-General that the National Commissions in their respective countries should undertake more active support.

D. R. Hardman, M.P. of the British delegation, too, was concerned with the problem of "making Unesco live in the minds of ordinary men."¹¹⁸ Not only have ordinary people not been reached by Unesco's ideals but, he said, these ideals have failed to reach the minds even of teachers and educators. The implication for Unesco was that it should concentrate on projects which would make an immediate contribution to the world of today. He underlined in this connection, the imaginative development and use of the mass media towards bringing "Unesco excitingly into the hearts and before the minds of men."¹¹⁹

Unesco, it was pointed out at all of the Sessions, must enlist as many contributors from as many fields and as many countries as possible

¹¹⁶General Conference, First Session, p. 65.

¹¹⁷General Conference, Fourth Session, p. 75.

¹¹⁸General Conference, Second Session, p. 72.

¹¹⁹Ibid.

in its program. That is to say, it will be successful to the degree that it is able to involve both member states and their intellectuals. Unesco, too, could not afford to be simply a Secretariat in Paris. The National Commissions and other cooperating bodies must play an important role in Unesco's operation; a much broader role than was ever possible to the former Organization for Intellectual Cooperation. And a frequently uttered warning is that Unesco, charged as it is with communicating ideas, must be successful in conveying more than simply words, an observation which is of course as difficult of carrying out as it is pertinent.

M. Cassin of France summed up what would seem to have been in many delegates' minds when he emphasized that Unesco's role should not be limited to that of a coordinating agency. On the contrary, it must be original and the essence of creativity; Unesco must become a centre of thought, he said, and "an initiator of useful and effective action."¹²⁰

At this time, too, the Canadian delegation had some observations to make about operating principles which perhaps many Canadians would recognize as not altogether untypical. They were that Unesco should proceed slowly rather than to trip over its boots in its haste. "It is to be hoped," Mr. S. D. Pierce said "that we shall find the wisdom to keep in step with the people, that we shall recognize the need of speaking a common language, the need of making the aims and activities of Unesco always readily comprehensible, not only to the chosen few but to the great masses of the people of the world."¹²¹ This was reinforcement of Huxley's

¹²⁰General Conference, First Session, p. 83.

¹²¹General Conference, Second Session, p. 70.

view in the First Conference that "if we are to build solidly, we must be content to build slowly."¹²²

As has been indicated, there existed a variety of criticism of Unesco operation. It might not be unfair to suggest that the criticisms which came from certain of the Eastern European countries including Poland and Czechoslovakia were particularly ideologically oriented. In the Second Session of the General Conference, for example, the Polish delegate argued that Unesco should give equal parts of its strength to the three subjects mentioned in its title. It distressed him, he said, to see Unesco choosing the passive role rather than the active with the emphasis on coordination rather than creative projects actually in the field. Further, in referring to Unesco's seeming lack of success, he professed as an answer that a vast, rich and powerful country has sought, not without success, to dominate the administration of Unesco. This domination is of course only a first step toward total control of Unesco and of bending its program to certain political aims. It is obvious that in such an Organization as Unesco, rather a good deal of its effort would of necessity be in the direction of administration, particularly in its first few years. This was the case, and as a result, there were cries of alarm from a good many delegates. M. Kuypers took exception to the "enormous disproportion as regards costs of administrative and of material kind"¹²³ in the first budget of Unesco. His criticism was echoed by the Danish delegation which, speaking of the third budget, gave its opinion that forty percent of the whole staff of the Secretariat were involved in more or

¹²²General Conference, First Session, p. 25.

¹²³Ibid., p. 38.

less administrative duties.¹²⁴

The forty percent of the 1949 budget directed towards establishment and administrative charges, the New Zealand delegate, R. G. Ridling suggested was a fact which was susceptible to serious criticism.

D. R. Hardman, M.P., the leader of the British delegation, came to the defence of Unesco and was sharply critical of such comments. "I am not," he said, "going to follow the irresponsible critics who manipulate the capital budget figures in attempting to prove that over half our income is devoted to administration."¹²⁵ But he did remark, however, that he would like to see "more engine power and less brake power in Unesco."¹²⁶

A problem which should be mentioned in passing and which in four years' time had not been resolved, was that of the short-term versus the long-term approach. With every session of the Conference there was an increasing clamour from the nations for practical immediate results from the Unesco effort and of course, there was grave disappointment when these could not be shown. Dr. Huxley made it very clear that Unesco, as he saw it, could not avoid taking activities which only directly or in the long run, were related to peace and security. And further, he said, "as has already been said in our draft program, peace cannot be taken by storm. It can only be fully realized in the long-run by the practice of developing mankind in the actual ways and practices of peace."¹²⁷ This was also the view of Dr. Jaime Torres Bodet, as was evident in his speech

¹²⁴General Conference, Third Session, p. 71.

¹²⁵Ibid., p. 88. ¹²⁶Ibid.

¹²⁷General Conference, First Session, p. 55.

on taking over Unesco in 1948: "It is clear, however, that emergency measures are not enough: we must attack the evil at its roots."¹²⁸

International Cooperation

It will be recollected that it was the decision of the London Conference that Unesco should be basically an inter-governmental organization and that, as was provided in the Constitution, the new agency would consult and cooperate with international non-governmental organizations and would call on them to carry out specific tasks.

The Director-General put the point in this way: "I personally believe that it will be difficult to make much immediate progress . . . by a frontal attack; and that more will be achieved by securing the cooperation of peoples and nations and individuals representing different ideologies, on specific common tasks."¹²⁹

The view of the Australian delegation was perhaps typical of the thinking of the Conference: "The Australian government attaches the greatest importance to the coordination of the many separate international organizations that have been and will be established."¹³⁰

Dr. E. R. Walker, its leader at the Second Session, reinforced this view. Moreover, he was critical of the Director-General's Report in which he speaks of relationships with member states under the heading

¹²⁸General Conference, Third Session, p. 88.

¹²⁹General Conference, First Session, p. 24. See also Article I, Para. 2, Sub-sections (a) (b) (c) of the Constitution of Unesco, Appendix A.

¹³⁰Ibid., p. 35.

"external relations."¹³¹ In Dr. Walker's view, member states are in fact merely different parts of Unesco. This criticism is perhaps unwarranted since Dr. Huxley had gone on to point out that Unesco's program was not a series of operations centrally directed and executed by the Secretariat in Paris but a combined effort to which any country could contribute.¹³²

The Role of the National Commissions

On the importance of one principle of operation - that of National Commissions - there was universal agreement, at least in theory, among members of Unesco. As the Poles put it at the Second Session of the General Conference, without National Commissions "Unesco's existence cannot be other than artificial."¹³³

But perhaps the most poignant reminder to the nations of their responsibility to maintain effective cooperating bodies came from the Director-General at the Beirut Conference of 1949.

This, gentlemen, is my real report to you. The document you have in your hands details our work in these past months; it is the Director-General's account. But I am now adding to my report to you as a man; and this I can do in a handful of words: Unesco is still for the most part a blueprint . . . but Unesco is not a Secretariat alone; it is an institution whose influence must extend over the whole world, the Secretariat being no more than as it were the nerve centre . . . it should help the other participants, above all the member states, to play their part. Its tasks are to receive and pass on the views for the National Commissions. . . . We cannot conceive a nerve centre except in terms of the

¹³¹Report of the Director General, Second Session, p. 74.

¹³²Ibid.

¹³³General Conference, Second Session, p. 97. See also Kenneth Lindsay, M.P., "Unesco's Future," Spectator, (July 9, 1948).

living organism whose cohesion and action it ensures. Yet in our case it is often as though by some strange physiological paradox,¹³⁴ the nervous system were still in search of its physical organism.

The Australian and South African delegations, among others, pointed to the need for National Commissions if they were to function effectively, to have full and complete liaison with the Paris Secretariat. The Australian delegate, Dr. E. R. Walker, reminded Unesco members that

of all the Specialized Agencies, Unesco is the one which, in its constitutional structure provides machinery reaching back through governments to the peoples of the member states.¹³⁵

The New Zealand representation to the Third Session pointed out that

no educational enlightenment or resuscitation can be brought about by external action. It will come only through an awakened desire among the common people of any country.¹³⁶

Other witnesses to the importance of an effectively functioning National Commission system included M. Bidault of France who related the lack of National Commissions to apathy of both press and public. Dr. Huxley, the Executive Board and the delegate of Greece, as well as the representative of the United States, G. V. Allen, reiterated again and again the close relationship necessary between the administrative heart of the Organization in Paris and its operating arms throughout the world.¹³⁷

¹³⁴General Conference, Fourth Session, p. 46.

¹³⁵General Conference, Second Session, p. 85.

¹³⁶General Conference, Third Session, p. 74.

¹³⁷Canada established a National Commission in 1957. Currently, the Canadian National Commission for Unesco operates in conjunction with the Canada Council. See "Inaugural Handbook" of the Canadian National Commission for details of the Organization.

Unesco's Relationships With the United Nations

It will have been noted that one of the basic questions facing delegates at the London Conference was the nature of the relationship, in operations, which should exist between Unesco and the United Nations Organization.¹³⁸ It was expected that time and experience would solve this problem. But after four years there was still not clear agreement on it among delegates to the General Conference.

Dr. Huxley, in his 1947 report to the General Conference spoke optimistically of developing relations between the United Nations Organization and Unesco. There were, in his view, matters of common interest to Unesco and the United Nations on which common action was desirable.¹³⁹

But at the time of the Fourth Conference, the leader of the United States delegation, George V. Allen, felt it necessary to point out that there had been considerable criticism of Unesco in the United States due in part to "Unesco's multifarious projects, some having apparently little relation to the general purpose of the United Nations."¹⁴⁰

Further, he said "Unesco's primary need is to integrate itself more closely into the general United Nations structure."¹⁴¹ And later, "would it not be well for the Director-General to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the heads of the eight sister agencies

¹³⁸For a summary of the discussion, see Laves and Thomson, Unesco: Purpose, Progress, Prospects, p. 40.

¹³⁹General Conference, First Session, p. 22. Dr. Huxley's optimism was not shared by other members of the Conference who felt that Unesco's collaboration thus far tended to be formal rather than substantial.

¹⁴⁰General Conference, Fourth Session, p. 61.

¹⁴¹Ibid.

of the United Nations to submit, for his consideration, three or four projects which Unesco, as the educational arm of the United Nations, might well undertake in order to advance the interests of the whole system? Could he not by such a request at once make clear that Unesco accepts its responsibility to the world community, and at the same time ensure the support and cooperation of the other agencies?"¹⁴²

This was at odds with the French view. As M. Cassin pointed out in the First Session of the General Conference, while Unesco should not be isolated in spirit from the United Nations, it must at the same time "be independent in its choice of methods."¹⁴³

Of the urgings of the American delegation for closer integration, M. Bidault took quite a different view. It would he says,

be unreasonable . . . to make our advance dependent upon the way being cleared by organizations which are hampered more than we are by difficulties of a political nature. Let us therefore act by ourselves, in conformity with the main principles of the United Nations, as an organ dependent upon, and related to that organization, but having nevertheless its own life, its own aims and intentions; its own desires, and, I maintain, its own duties."¹⁴⁴

Staffing

One of the practical administrative difficulties which plagued Unesco particularly in its beginning years was that of staff. This, too, was a matter of concern to member states. It was the earnest wish of many states, particularly the Asian, Eastern European and South American countries that more of their nationals should be invited to join the Unesco Secretariat. The point of view of Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan of India

¹⁴²General Conference, Fourth Session, p. 62.

¹⁴³General Conference, First Session, p. 83.

¹⁴⁴General Conference, Fourth Session, p. 71.

is not untypical:

We should not repeat the mistake of assuming that the world consists only of Western Europe and North America. In making appointments to the Secretariat, we should realize that there are large parts of the world with immense manpower, and abundant natural resources. India and China, for example, have their great traditions, and these countries must be encouraged to take a larger part in the activities of the Organization of Unesco than has been done hitherto.¹⁴⁵

He goes on to add his feeling (somewhat in contradiction, it is suggested) that

salaries to the staff must be based on needs and should not be such as to encourage careerists. Loyalty to the ideals of Unesco, personal fitness, technical efficiency and geographical distribution must be taken into account.¹⁴⁶

In his Report of 1948, Huxley mentioned the practical difficulty in the effective working together of new staff members.

Difference in background, habits and outlook is a serious problem, the quick directness and free-and-easy outspokenness of Americans is regarded as brusque by many peoples accustomed to a more formal politeness: the British preoccupation with working compromise often shocks Latin logic: Anglo-Saxon methods of running committees are not familiar in Eastern Europe and many other regions: the entire background of thought and method of action may differ radically as between, say, South Americans, Indians, Arabs and Australians. Incomprehension and delay sometimes result and efficiency is reduced.¹⁴⁷

E. R. Walker, the Australian delegate, in the Second Session of the General Conference, urged the Conference to be realistic about the difficulty of finding first class people for Unesco's various projects, having in mind appropriate geographical distribution. What was wanted were people who were not only professionally competent, who had

¹⁴⁵General Conference, First Session, p. 28.

¹⁴⁶Ibid.

¹⁴⁷Report of the Director-General, Third Session, p. 6.

a sincere devotion to Unesco but who also had a knowledge of special techniques which are not now widely known or developed. He did urge, however, that Unesco slow down its rate of expansion "since the success of Unesco depends on staff and that better results are achieved with staff selected with care."¹⁴⁸

Membership

In its first years, Unesco was temporarily hampered by its limited membership. The U.S.S.R. for example, was not represented either by a delegation or a corps of observers and as the Director-General observed: "this we all regret, since it will be impossible to establish Unesco as a truly global agency if one of the most powerful and most culturally advanced states, controlling about one-sixth of the world's land surface and one-twelfth of the world's human population, is not a member."¹⁴⁹

Dr. R. C. Mills of the Australian delegation, in his usual pungent fashion, put the problem this way: "Let us not delude ourselves into thinking that our limited membership can be compensated for by our enthusiasm . . . it cannot achieve its main purposes so long as its support is confined to one-half of even two-thirds of the United Nations."¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸General Conference, Second Session, p. 88.

¹⁴⁹General Conference, First Session, p. 19. Stephen Spender writes: "For without the Soviet Union, Unesco is in danger of becoming or being represented as a cultural agency of a capital Western bloc, directed against the East." "United Nations: Cultural Division; Unesco's Program and problems." Commentary, III, (April, 1947), 336 ff.

¹⁵⁰General Conference, First Session, p. 34.

Professor Stranski, the Czechoslovakian delegate urged Unesco to indulge in a little self-criticism and not over-estimate its position; many nations were not members because they do not wish to be and it behoved Unesco to act in such a way as to encourage these to join.¹⁵¹

Summary

The pages preceding record some of the central problems of organization and administration with which Unesco was faced during the period 1946-1949.

There was, during this period, a sense of need both on the part of the Director-General and delegates for an acceptable philosophy which would encompass the broad aims of the Organization suggested in its Constitution and springing from the pre-conceptions of its members. There was evident need during these first four years for a crisp, clear and realistic statement of its objectives.

The reader notes with sympathetic interest the attempts of Unesco members to harmonize, to reconcile the objectives of peace, security, welfare, human rights, the advancement of knowledge in one broad statement.

Directly related and stemming from the debate on philosophy and purpose, was the matter of program, its character and emphasis. Much thought was given to the establishment of some workable principles of programming. There was continuing concern over criteria by which to measure the suitability of program proposals. The problem of program concentration was of critical interest throughout this period.

¹⁵¹Ibid., p. 29. Member States of Unesco as of December 30, 1956, Appendix C.

Problems of operating policy discussed included the nature of co-operation between the Secretariat and member nations, the relationships of Unesco to the United Nations Organization, the crucial need for National Commissions or cooperating bodies in each of the nation members. The recruitment of staff for this new Organization presented difficulty and operation was made awkward because of a membership which initially was small.

CHAPTER IV

THE 1950-52 PERIOD

At the opening of the Fifth Session of the General Conference at Florence, delegates were sensitive to the fact that Unesco was at a pivotal point. After five years of endeavour and experiment, of success and failure, which the Italian President H. E. Count Stefano Jacini, wryly suggested had been both useful and instructive, Unesco had come

as it were, to a turning point in its history; I think I am right in saying that we must now adopt once and for all, a particular line and method, that we must pick a star to steer by and plot our course in successive stages planned in advance with full regard for the means at our disposal.¹

If, indeed, it had ever been thought that Unesco's initial problems had been ironed out at the 1945 London Conference, members of Unesco were now aware with the Netherlands delegation that

an organization seeking to execute a bold design must necessarily go through many critical moments in its existence. Unlike the ordinary bureaucracy, it will have no beaten path to traverse, with the unexpected reduced to a minimum but must continually bring into play originality and imagination to overcome a succession of major obstacles.²

For the Austrian delegate who had attended five of the six General Conferences of Unesco, a change of atmosphere he noted from the doubt,

¹Records of the General Conference of Unesco, Fifth Session, (Florence, 1950). pp. 50-51.

²Ibid., p. 82.

heart-searching, experimentation and frustration of Unesco's first few years was a happy one.³

But the attitude at the beginning of this period was by no means one of smug self-satisfaction. Undoubtedly some of the delegates felt with the Swedish representative that the Director-General's Report and the discussion of the Report had become more realistic and business-like. But problems, he said, "cannot be solved by eloquent speeches, but by action."⁴ Or as Professor Jean Piaget of Switzerland exclaimed in exasperation:

Why can we not act more speedily? How are we to explain that at each new Conference we have not some decisive success to chalk up to our credit? Why is it unhappily always the fact within our knowledge that whenever we have something to set down on the credit side, a publication, a conference, a lecture, a pilot project, a seminar, a broadcast, etc., a section of public opinion remains unconvinced. There are, I think, two reasons . . . the way in general in which the program is conceived and above all, our methods of work.⁵

Nor did the Director-General himself in his Report to the General Conference provide any grounds for complacency. On the contrary, his Report records the necessity of seriously taking stock of Unesco's resources and its responsibilities. What is Unesco's position he asks? How useful is it? What can it do to fulfil its purposes? What should

³Records of the General Conference of Unesco, Sixth Session (Paris, 1951), p. 96.

⁴General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 118.

⁵Ibid., p. 84. By way of answer to Prof. Piaget's question, B.M.H. Tripp suggests fifteen common public criticisms of Unesco under the headings of Ideology, Structure and Program. "Unesco in Perspective," International Conciliation, No. 497, (March, 1954), pp. 380-381.

Reinhold Niebuhr in his article "Theory and Practice of Unesco," International Organization, IV (February, 1950), 3, points to Unesco's quandry: that of performing most useful and necessary functions but of giving very implausible reasons for their performance.

The Turkish camp was still perplexed about their Organization as their leader made clear: "The fact that for four years we have been concerned with matters of procedure and the preparation of the program proves that it has not been possible to determine exactly what this Organization's true function is."⁹

Clearly, the need felt by many delegates for a precise statement or organization purpose had not been met despite the time and effort of four preceding Sessions. Speaking of this lack of success, a Middle-Eastern delegate felt moved to complain that

most of these meetings, that began so auspiciously with a succession of fine speeches, have accomplished little of value; and many organizations with promising programs have floundered in sterility and general apathy. It is obvious that conferences and commissions, fine speeches and learned discussions, programs and paper work are meaningless unless they are instruments for the achievement of some definite goal.¹⁰

To the Pakistani delegate, it was almost as if the members had stubbornly refused in their meetings to face up to this need.

To quote a Persian saying - with the permission of the Persian delegation - 'they sat down, they talked, they dispersed.' I am afraid this is the description which could apply to many of our Conferences. Therefore, I would in all humility, urge that Unesco should change its outlook, that Unesco should realize that it can only achieve its purpose if it arouses the conscience of the world and compels us, as it were, to carry out these objectives.¹¹

More positively the Dutch delegate, Dr. Rutten, took the position that it was better to concentrate on refining the essentials of the Organization.

I have sought to make it clear that the task of this General Conference consists less in giving the final polish to the program than

⁹General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 98.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 97.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 102-103.

in trying seriously to arrive at a better notion of Unesco's general policy.¹²

The Italian delegation, on the other hand, urged the Conference to press forward to the formulation of an acceptable philosophy.

The Italian delegation is fully aware of the great difficulty of abandoning vague and general tenets for a precise definition of the fundamental principles guiding our Organization, but it is nevertheless convinced of the absolute need for us to neglect nothing which may help us to reach such a definition. Of course, as the Director-General said this morning, there can be no question of producing an artificial Unesco philosophy - a ridiculous eclecticism - or of securing general acceptance of a single conception of the world and of human life among peoples who each have their own conception of the problems of the world, all alike deserving a respect.¹³

In making reference to "an artificial Unesco philosophy," the Italian delegate touched on a matter debated at earlier Conferences and a sore point to the Iron Curtain countries.¹⁴ Once again, in reference to his earlier expositions on the subject, the Yugoslav delegate said:

It was obvious that the sponsors of the program intended to make Unesco a sort of a world missionary organization responsible for propagating a particular culture and ideology or even a particular philosophy among the peoples, to bring about a 'spiritual renaissance of mankind.'¹⁵

And again, if somewhat more mildly in the following year, he said:

It would be a grave error, prejudicial to international cooperation, for Unesco to make a stand upon one scientific method, any one philosophical conception, any one ideology. Besides, what ideology could Unesco adopt that would allow it to develop international cooperation whilst deferring to cultural independence and national serenity?¹⁶

Not only must Unesco's activities not be adapted to an ideology, espe-

¹²Ibid., p. 83. ¹³Ibid., p. 79.

¹⁴General Conference, First Session, Unesco/C/30. (Paris, 1947), p. 40.

¹⁵General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 70.

¹⁶General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 86.

in trying seriously to arrive at a better notion of Unesco's general policy.¹²

The Italian delegation, on the other hand, urged the Conference to press forward to the formulation of an acceptable philosophy.

The Italian delegation is fully aware of the great difficulty of abandoning vague and general tenets for a precise definition of the fundamental principles guiding our Organization, but it is nevertheless convinced of the absolute need for us to neglect nothing which may help us to reach such a definition. Of course, as the Director-General said this morning, there can be no question of producing an artificial Unesco philosophy - a ridiculous eclecticism - or of securing general acceptance of a single conception of the world and of human life among peoples who each have their own conception of the problems of the world, all alike deserving a respect.¹³

In making reference to "an artificial Unesco philosophy," the Italian delegate touched on a matter debated at earlier Conferences and a sore point to the Iron Curtain countries.¹⁴ Once again, in reference to his earlier expositions on the subject, the Yugoslav delegate said:

It was obvious that the sponsors of the program intended to make Unesco a sort of a world missionary organization responsible for propagating a particular culture and ideology or even a particular philosophy among the peoples, to bring about a 'spiritual renaissance of mankind.'¹⁵

And again, if somewhat more mildly in the following year, he said:

It would be a grave error, prejudicial to international cooperation, for Unesco to make a stand upon one scientific method, any one philosophical conception, any one ideology. Besides, what ideology could Unesco adopt that would allow it to develop international cooperation whilst deferring to cultural independence and national serenity?¹⁶

Not only must Unesco's activities not be adapted to an ideology, espe-

¹²Ibid., p. 83. ¹³Ibid., p. 79.

¹⁴General Conference, First Session, Unesco/C/30. (Paris, 1947), p. 40.

¹⁵General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 70.

¹⁶General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 86.

cially, he emphasized wryly, an outworn ideology, but also Unesco must take a firm hand in "strenuously suppressing domination by any one group - the main obstacle to all cooperation."¹⁷

As might be expected, the chief executive officer of this fledgling Organization contributed much towards a gradual sharpening of unesco's purposes. No uniformity, he pointed out, could be imposed on the infinitely diverse and spontaneous life of culture. This imposition could only serve to sap the originality and individuality of different national cultures. How much better, he argued, for Unesco "to serve the creative minds among mankind by putting them in more direct relation with the problems of the masses, and at the same time to serve those masses, who, in the longing of the unsatisfied needs, aspire towards education, and through it, towards freedom . . . we seek to open the channels of communication with the people in every domain of culture."¹⁸

To the new Director-General, Jaime Torres Bodet, Unesco was an institution whose guiding purpose it was to ensure peace through international understanding and to promote international understanding by means of education, science and culture. These, he said, were the ultimate aims of Unesco. But, he continued, Unesco must admit that peace would not be won in this way alone since "our authority is only a moral character, and it cannot by itself produce the political and economic decisions which could limit armaments and halt operations for war."¹⁹

From the reports of the Conferences it is clear that the new

¹⁷Ibid., p. 87.

¹⁸General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 63.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 64.

Director-General's articulation of purpose had caught the imagination of at least some of the delegates. Almost in echo, the Australian representative reaffirmed that the significant task of Unesco was the relation of all of its work to the problem of peace.²⁰

For at least one member of Unesco, this specific emphasis on peace had not come quickly enough. Indeed, at the Florence Conference, the Yugoslav delegation formally presented a resolution which, had it been accepted, would have instructed the Director-General to call "a Congress on Intellectual Cooperation" with the purpose of reducing "the danger of a war psychosis and the belief in the inevitability of armed conflict between countries with different social systems."²¹

Less highly charged with tension was Cuba's contribution to the development of Unesco purpose:

Unesco's true universal importance lies in its power to establish standards rather than to accomplish actual reforms. To establish standards, only certain authority is needed; it is when we come to the practical field that political power also becomes necessary.²²

²⁰Ibid., p. 145. W. H. C. Laves in an article, "How Far Has Unesco Come?", World Affairs, (Summer, 1950), 113, 48-50, offers his opinion that "everything the Organization is authorized to do must be by way of contributing to peace and security."

However, Reinhold Niebuhr argues that Unesco must find its justification in the contribution it makes to the integration of the emergent world community rather than in its supposed but usually illusory contributions to "peace." "Theory and Practice of Unesco," International Organization, IV (February, 1950), 3-11.

²¹General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 73.

²²General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 107.

To another of the American countries less directly involved, perhaps, in the manipulations of the great political blocs, Unesco's task had a somewhat different emphasis. In the view of the Colombian delegate,

Unesco's essential task was the equitable and world-wide sharing of the heritage of human culture, what, in a phrase already becoming hackneyed, has been termed 'the democratization of culture,' and what I should venture to call (as I think, more properly), 'the universalization of fundamental education.'²³

The Canadian spokesman found himself in substantial agreement:

Its Unesco's primary duty is to help the cultures of the different nations to develop fruitfully, and later to open up channels of communication by which the contributions each can make to the progress of all may pass from one to another. Everything extraneous to this already extensive program should be struck out.²⁴

And almost like a hand reaching out of the dead past, one notes what appears to be a reference by the Lebanese delegate to Dr. Huxley's discarded philosophic skeleton:

We have before us today a clear and realistic program, reflecting Unesco's resolve to strive by the most effective means for the building of a better world. The clearly defined aims to work out what might be termed 'a new scientific humanism,' which, we trust, may enable the men of today to cope more effectively with the present scientific revolution.²⁵

Thus, while it is evident that there was far more unanimity on

²³General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 99. Waldo G. Leland suggests that some people feared a sort of reverse snobbishness on the part of Unesco because of its concern with the "grass roots."

"Symposium on Unesco and American Participation in its Activities," American Philosophic Society Proceedings, 90, No. 4, (1946), 295-317.

²⁴General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 76.

²⁵Ibid., p. 93.

on any comprehensive statement of Unesco purpose, there was sufficient agreement to make possible the development of a program.

From time to time, new delegates turned up as representatives of their countries to the General Conference and it was perhaps to be expected, even though Unesco was gaining in years, that they should want to establish their conception of Unesco's purpose. This was perhaps the position of the new head of the British delegation, Miss Florence Horsburgh. Unesco, in her view, had three purposes: firstly, that of ensuring within the limits of political and economic possibility that the best work of any country should be quickly and easily accessible to every other country. "To secure among the developed states of the world the maximum mutual knowledge of each other's education, science and culture, and the maximum free interplay of thought," she suggested, "is the first and perhaps the most obvious of Unesco's duties."²⁶ To her, a second purpose of Unesco was "the extension of cultural consciousness and activity," and a third function was to make it possible for each country "to know and to show that its own educational, scientific and cultural activities are stimulated by Unesco, and that its contribution to Unesco is a measure of its maturity and its competence."²⁷

She proposed, it would seem, the development of a sense of partner-

²⁶General Conference, Seventh Session, p. 79. "It seems inordinately difficult for the vigorous American mentality to conceive of a mutually beneficial two-way exchange. We are open-minded enough, even glib in our discussion of other values, yet we are curiously provincial about what we are willing to adopt from other cultures." Ben M. Cherrington, in "A Dynamic Unesco," The Journal of Educational Sociology, 20, No. 1 (September, 1946), 11.

²⁷Ibid., p. 79.

ship of the nations of the world, a sentiment accepted by a New Zealand delegate, Mr. Marsden, also a newcomer to the General Conferences, who said that

what is even more important is that Unesco should become increasingly the Organization under whose aegis all able, sincere men will find an outlet for their desire to serve mankind according to their special abilities, opportunities and resources.²⁸

Program Development

It will have been noted that the Preamble and Article I of the Constitution of Unesco, free-flowing and lyrical as it was, tended to make a pin-pointing of Unesco purpose difficult indeed, a difficulty which was to be reflected in the making of the program. Indeed, as was suggested by an American officer of the Secretariat in speaking of its Preamble, "If Walt Whitman was not present to compose this 'salut au monde', one of his eminent successors, Mr. Archibald MacLeish of the United States delegation is generally credited with a major hand in it."²⁹

One of the two central parts of the Unesco Constitution which implies purpose, the Preamble, speaks of "the wide diffusion of culture," "the education of humanity," "the denial of the democratic principles of dignity, equality and mutual respect of men," "the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind," "the ignorance of each other's ways," "the unrestricted pursuit of objective truths," "the common welfare of mankind." The other, Article I, speaks of the purpose of the Organization "to contribute to peace and security," "to further universal respect for justice," through "advancing the mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples,"

²⁸Ibid., p. 109.

²⁹Charles S. Ascher, Program-Making in Unesco (Chicago: Public Information Service, 1951), p. 15.

through giving "fresh impulse to popular education," and by undertaking to "maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge." Clearly, reference to either the Preamble or to Article I would seem to justify an almost inexhaustible range of program activity.

In optimistic tone, the Director-General observed to the Sixth Session that "as the Program becomes less and less speculative and more and more based upon experience, it becomes clearly less general and more precise, less dependent on chance and more efficacious, less nebulous and more concentrated. It avoids . . . duplication and unreality."³⁰

That the "turning point" in Unesco extended to program planning was evident too from Sr. Bodet's significant observation in his 1951 Report that

to an increasing extent, Unesco is emerging from its initial phase in which the chief problems were those of organization and method. These problems are still far from being perfectly solved; nonetheless, they no longer retain their previous urgency and predominance. From now on the important thing is not so much how Unesco should be run but what it can do.³¹

In the typical cycle of the effective institution, a consideration of methods to be employed usually follows some measure of agreement on the objectives sought. It is, therefore, with more than passing interest that the reader notes this further observation of the Director-General in his 1952 Report:

The adoption by the General Conference at its Fifth Session of the basic program and the program for 1951, wrought a decisive change in the approach to both these matters. From then onwards, consid-

³⁰General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 149.

³¹Report of the Director-General on the Activities of the Organization from April 1950 to March 1951, presented to the Sixth Session of the General Conference, June-July, 1951, 6C/3. (Paris, 1951), p. 6.

eration of objectives took precedence over, and governed, consideration of methods and fields of action.³²

While it may not have been anticipated in the early years of Unesco, it became rapidly clear that, as the program of Unesco developed, successfully completed projects would pave the way for others. That is to say, a multiplier effect could be expected of a successful Unesco program. Recognition of this logical consequence of effective programming, of the character of the program as dynamic and not static, was made by Count Jacini of the Executive Board at the time of the Sixth Session, when he remarked that

as the Organization grows and the part it has to play in the world becomes more clearly defined, there is an ever greater need for its action to be continuous, for the work successfully undertaken during any one year to be carried on and extended, and for the enterprises begun in one year to take firmer shape and be developed during the year following.³³

Essential agreement with this view and its implication - that there was a need to plan more than one year ahead - was voiced by the American delegation.³⁴

Program Criteria

Program criteria, it will be recollected, had been offered in the first few years of Unesco's existence from a variety of quarters.³⁵ Not necessarily were they adopted or for that matter, endorsed. But despite this, the quest for acceptable criteria for a Unesco program which Sir

³² Report of the Director-General on the Activities of the Organization from April 1951 to July 1952, presented to the Seventh Session of the General Conference, Paris, November-December, 1952 7C/3. (Paris, 1952), p. 11.

³³ General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 53.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 79.

John Maud termed "a network of mutual services" went on.³⁶

In the Seventh Session of Unesco, the British Delegate, Miss Florence Horsburgh, possibly by way of testing her conception of Unesco against that of the Conference, proffered the following program criteria. Is the project essential: Is it the most effective way in which it can be carried out? Is it most economical of Unesco's resources?

The Iraqi delegation offered three alternatives: "the reconstruction of the human spirit," "the exchange of ideas between nations and implementation of United Nations' ideals" and finally, the emphasis of "creative work, scientific research, the arts and the humanities." The third, in the view of his delegation, had low priority.³⁷ The speaker following suggested that the program should be tested by its relation to three major problems: fundamental education, technical aid and education in relation to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.³⁷

Since the earliest days of Unesco,³⁸ the Yugoslav delegate had hammered on Unesco's responsibility for ensuring the peace of the world.

³⁶Ibid., p. 72. The quest was not confined to Unesco members. Dunn, in his book War and the Minds of Men, p. 108, proposes these criteria: (1) Does it directly serve to advance the restoration of a free world in which men can exercise free choice? (2) Is the project clearly aimed at a receptive audience and does it have any real chance in terms of our present knowledge of bringing about a desired modification of attitude or of behaviour? (3) Is it essential to the maintenance of those conditions which make for harmonious relations in a liberated society? (4) Does it aid in developing common concepts and methods of thinking which help to discover the basis for consensus among nations? (5) Is the project one which can be done better by Unesco than by any other agency?

³⁷General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 323. See also Ascher, Program-Making in Unesco, p. 63.

³⁸See above, Chapter III, p. 72.

The Sixth Session of the General Conference provided an opportunity to repeat his point and add an additional criterion: does the proposed activity contribute directly or indirectly to the cause of peace? According to the answer, Unesco must decide upon the advisability or urgency of the project.³⁹ By way of contrast and speaking too, with a view to the major concerns of his government, the Iranian delegation put prime emphasis on the education of the masses and a "determined world-wide campaign against illiteracy."⁴⁰

From quite another point of view, the Director-General himself at the Seventh Session proposed, as a criterion, whether or not the project under discussion could be carried out by a state or other agency of itself. This touched on a recurring complaint in Unesco. There was strong feeling that on too many occasions Unesco had undertaken projects which could have been handled more expeditiously and more economically outside of its own Secretariat. Nevertheless, there is merit in the observation of an Australian delegate that, "part of the strength of Unesco lies in the fact that it is in a better position than any other organization to do certain very important things."⁴¹

A closely related matter and one equal in difficulty was that of program priorities. Nor was this problem unique with Unesco alone of the United Nation agencies. While the various secretariats might deny charges of overlapping or duplication in program, there were examples of inadequate consultation between agencies, differences in professional

³⁹General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 86.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 104.

⁴¹General Conference, Seventh Session, p. 92.

focus and a degree of insensitivity to the concern of other U.N. agencies.⁴² Thus, at its Fifth Session, the General Assembly of the United Nations instructed the Economic and Social Council to review programs of the Specialized Agencies with respect to certain criteria.⁴³

Having in mind not only Unesco's needs but this intervention of the Economic and Social Council, the Swedish delegate felt moved to remark that it was

one of the main tasks of this Conference to establish priorities, not merely by means of general resolutions and declarations of principle, or as a kind of technical presentation of the budget estimates, but by an actual classification of projects in two classes: those which ought to be carried out immediately and with a concentration of efforts, and those which, if approved in principle by the General Conference, could be kept as reserve and carried out as far as considerations of personnel and financial resources allow. A clear classification of that kind would enable us, in the momentous years ahead of us, to direct Unesco's activities towards the most urgent tasks.

Enthusiastic support for this view was evident from the delegations of Norway, Canada and the United States, among others. But with regard to priorities and their use, Professor Piaget of Switzerland warned that the conception of priority was not absolute but chronological. For Unesco, he said, "there can be no 'important' and 'unimportant' duties; there is but one single duty. All duties are independent, and failure

⁴²Ascher, Program-Making in Unesco, p. 75.

⁴³Ibid., p. 64. These criteria related to: urgency; feasibility in terms of personnel; readiness of governments to participate; scope of the program, i.e. its benefit to a significant number of member states and people; preparation and coordination (work already done, possibility of outside action or financing, prime suitability of the agency for the undertaking, possible integration in other projects); and results (under which six questions are asked) such as: significance in relation to outlay, demonstrability, ability of the states to carry on by themselves, relation to the economic and social objectives of the Charter.

⁴⁴General Conference, Seventh Session, p. 61.

to fulfill the lesser may prejudice the fulfillment of the greater."⁴⁵ Shrewdly, the Australian delegation pointed out the administrative difficulty after the program had been established in terms of priorities, of providing sufficient latitude in operation so that the Secretariat was not tied down irrevocably or its operation made completely inflexible.⁴⁶

A device sought by the Fourth Session of the General Conference by way of distinguishing the long range from the transitory items of program was initiated by a request to the Director-General and the Executive Board to work out, as a joint statement, a "basic program" of the Organization and a statement of purposes. This was subsequently provided to Conference delegates. The main tasks of Unesco - ten in number - were tabulated together with a basic program grouped under seven different heads: education, natural sciences, social sciences, cultural activities, exchange of persons, mass communications, relief services.⁴⁷

Quite apart from the requirements of delegates, there was as well a need for a popular statement if Unesco was in fact to become more than a name to rank and file citizens of the nations. This greater degree of precision in programming and the clear distinction made between the basic program and the current projects of each year was received with some satisfaction. Program flexibility was still necessary as the Brazilian representative pointed out, in that "the varying political and administrative conditions obtaining in each country are a bar to any uniform solution."⁴⁸

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 96. ⁴⁶Ibid., p. 94.

⁴⁷Records of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Fifth Session (Florence, 1950). Resolutions. Document No. 5C/Resolutions, Unesco publication 750, pp. 16-52.

⁴⁸General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 82 and p. 123.

It is difficult to believe that any proposal with respect to program, could have received unanimous approval of the General Conference and the observer notices without surprise the criticism of the United States delegation that the basic program "consists too largely of a summary of program activities not always clearly related to Unesco's purpose of peace and security, and at times carried on independently by the several departments of Unesco, without subordination to common unifying purpose, and therefore lacking full effectiveness."⁴⁹ It was, nevertheless adopted by the 1950 Session and unlike previous proposals, became legislatively a firm part of Unesco.

Thus, the record of Unesco in its first six years is studded with a series of proposals which were intended to provide suitable criteria for its projects through rule-of-thumb, categories of priority and finally, an accepted set of ten tasks (which took on the mock title of "Decalogue") and a "basic program."

The debate begun in 1957⁵⁰ on the long term - short term needs of Unesco's program was extended into the period 1950-52. Not untypical of this recurring discussion was the British view that certain projects, though they seemed intangible and difficult to define, were not necessarily unreal or unimportant. The long term approach, it was suggested, was the more difficult because it was new, because it was revolutionary. Emphatically, the British leader cautioned delegates not to abandon the

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 110.

⁵⁰See above, Chapter III, p. 90.

slow, painstaking building of international understanding because of impatience.⁵¹ Or as the Italian delegate said in making the same point,

we must also take care not to make our work fruitless by letting skepticism confine us to superficial agreement for practical purposes and by implication, abandoning the effort to find more precious points of contact in more essential matters.⁵²

But clearly, if Unesco were to engage the sympathies of the peoples of the world, it would be expedient to announce and publicize results of short term projects. The practical Dutch proponent of this point of view, Dr. Rutten, pointed to the need to pick projects from which concrete results might be expected and whose importance and value would be apparent to the readers of the daily papers.⁵³

Nor was the concern of delegates entirely for the man in the street. Intellectual circles, it was suggested, wanted "to see concrete results accompanied by telling figures."⁵⁴ As one delegate put it,

many prominent thinkers, while appreciating the value and effectiveness of our work, are showing signs of impatience for they find our program too theoretical for these troubled times. They expected more of us. They feel that . . . we should . . . take some action prompted by the needs of the moment, exerting stronger pressure in order to achieve immediate results.⁵⁵

One might conclude these illustrations of the lack of consensus on relative values of the short-term and long-term programs with this admonition from the Belgian delegation:

⁵¹General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 134.

⁵²Ibid., p. 78. ⁵³Ibid., p. 33.

⁵⁴General Conference, Seventh Session, p. 60.

⁵⁵General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 87.

We should be careful to avoid a tendency to pragmatism which would limit our ambitions to the pursuit of immediate results. To help the outcasts of this world to attain an adequate living standard is essential and urgent, but it is not enough. Material progress is but a necessary condition of spiritual progress.⁵⁶

Program concentration, a matter of great interest during the first Sessions, was no less important in the minds of delegates attending the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Sessions of the General Conference. For the Australian delegation it was of prime concern during the Fifth Session at Florence. The diffuse Unesco program must, Dr. Walker pointed out, be concentrated upon a limited series of activities, the value of each of which was clearly understood and recognized by members of the Organization. Specifically, he favored practical assistance to under-developed countries in education and science.⁵⁷

With a different point of view and from his position as Chairman of the Executive Board and working colleague of the Director-General, Sir John Maud urged delegates to make sure that nothing was added to the program which they did not honestly feel was indispensable. Unless the program was concentrated, he warned, the Conference would have given only half-hearted help to the Director-General in his problems of staffing.

⁵⁶General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 126. See also the comment of the Philippine delegation, p. 134, that literacy by itself is not enough and that it must be related to practical things such as better farming methods and as well to citizenship and other phases of living.

But among delegates at large, expressions of gratification at the measure of concentration to date were general. Uruguay, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Venezuela, offered their congratulations on the job of pruning done thus far. Somewhat more acidly, the leaders of the Yugoslavia and South African delegations remarked that while much had been done to concentrate the program, very much still remained to be done.⁵⁸

These efforts to limit the diversity of the Unesco program were cordially received by the Canadian delegation. The Canadian delegation expressed the feeling that Unesco should concentrate its efforts in a strictly limited field. Certain proposals in the opinion of that delegation might "profitably be postponed or, indeed, omitted." The Director-General and the Executive Board were congratulated by the Canadian leader "on their manifest efforts to reduce administrative expenses." For, he argued,

in order to achieve its goal, Unesco must have the support of public opinion in all countries. It will be able to win the confidence and sympathy of the people only if it avoids dissipating and wasting its energies, coordinates its work with that of the United Nations and other specialized agencies, makes its administrative services more efficient, and keeps a rigid check on its expenditures.⁶⁰

But support for the principle of concentration meant reconciliation to its obvious results - curtailment of the specialties of a nation or a region. On the one hand were pressures for reducing and focusing the program; on the other were pressures to include particular programs, the specialty of this nation or that. As Ascher points out, the easiest compromise was to adopt both proposals.⁶¹ Thus, as the American delegation baldly remarked:

The Executive Board, and heads of the delegations to the General

⁵⁸General Conference, Fifth Session, pp. 114, 87, 83, 73, 89, 142, 72.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 75-77. ⁶⁰Ibid., p. 77.

⁶¹Ascher, Program-Making in Unesco., p. 13.

Conference have said that the program should be concentrated. None of us has been willing to accept the responsibility for concentration . . . the United States believes that it is time to come to grips with this problem.⁶²

With a not unexpected thoroughness, the German delegation to the 1952 Conference proposed a set of principles for guiding the process:

1. Projects in the field of education should help people to live in a human community and to realize their responsibilities in it.
2. In the realm of science, all program energies should be concentrated on activities likely to further research.
3. In the cultural field, the task of Unesco is that of helping to bring about closer contact among the great cultural spheres of mankind.⁶³

But the process of concentration was not simply a matter of cutting a number of projects from the annual program. France took its stand among those nations which agreed that

it would be a grave mistake to make a restrictive suggestion among the projects set forth in the program and thus destroy the balance of the program, since its component parts, though manifold in form, are, nonetheless, firmly held together and form a coherent whole.⁶⁴

But the matter did not rest there.

The Austrian delegate plunged to the heart of the matter in another way:

Whoever listened with some attention to the debate could not help feeling that there was, and is, some malaise in the air, and we are in duty bound to do the necessary heart-searching in order to find its deeper roots. Is it really only concentration that we need? This word has been bandied about very much during this debate and I am almost afraid of its becoming a slogan. Concentration is alright. It is of the greatest importance to concentrate your striking forces at the critical points, in peace as well as in war. We have got to plan reasonably, to cut out everything which threatens to exceed our financial power and the capacity of our apparatus. But we have to find out where to concentrate. We have to thrash that out here and now. We have to find

⁶²General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 111.

⁶³General Conference, Seventh Session, p. 85.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 144.

out the right directions in which to concentrate, to clear our minds regarding the principles which have to underly our decisions regarding concentration. This needs singleness and clearness of purpose.⁶⁵

In direct reply, although two years delayed, the Director-General was to examine at the 1952 Conference these "deeper roots" to which the Austrians referred. The essence of Dr. Bodet's comment was that unity and balance in the program were essential and that concentration could not be achieved simply by the process of amputation. His position was that the program had indeed been trimmed but had as well been balanced so that in 1952, not only was it balanced but it was also a minimum program for the Organization in his view at that stage of Unesco's development. Concentration, he said,

means combining in a properly balanced and well integrated whole three separate factors - the responsibilities of the Organization, the interests and resources of Member States, the possibilities offered by and problems inherent in the lines of research and the technical methods involved. It does not mean choosing between these responsibilities, interests and possibilities, and dropping some while retaining others. Should you wish . . . to stress the development of certain priority activities, the only way for you to do so is not to re-shuffle allocations within the present budget, but to make increases above the figure of the budget submitted to you Whether there is to be concentration by coordination, which preserves the balance and variety of the Organization's program, while leaving it free to develop, or concentration by amputation, which upsets the present equilibrium and compromises the future, is a matter you will determine when you decide on the budget figure.⁶⁶

The Organization did indeed decide on the budget figure, a decision which left Unesco staggering.

Operational Problems

Unesco, as any organization, was a dynamic organism. The nature of

⁶⁵General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 161.

⁶⁶General Conference, Seventh Session, p. 148.

its task was changing in the minds of its members. The external environment in which it worked was quite different from the hopeful days of 1945. It was to be expected then that members engaged in critical examination of Unesco's operation would give thoughtful consideration to Unesco's means.

In answer to a question as to whether Unesco, in its short period of life had always employed its resources to the best possible advantage, the Director-General was

inclined to answer this question in the negative. We are fully aware that all experiments in all beginnings must necessarily be accompanied by a certain number of mistakes but . . . the time of the errors of extreme youth is passed.⁶⁷

Limited support for this view was evident from an Indian delegate, among others. Where six years ago, he pointed out, Unesco was the victim of its own enthusiasm, groping its way and experimenting endlessly, today it had achieved a measure of efficiency. His satisfaction, however, did not extend to agreement that Unesco was getting the best returns for its time and money spent. His delegation was worried, he said, about administrative costs, allocated, he suggested, always at the expense of programs. Further, he asked

whether Unesco's program and budget and the directions of the General Conference are not too rigid, tending to exclude the element of flexibility which is essential in the working of all growing organizations and especially in the case of Unesco.⁶⁸

Characteristic of the efforts made in the first six years of Unesco's life towards the formulation of policies and methods was a "Code of Policies" to which major consideration was given at the 1950 Conference.

⁶⁷General Conference, Seventh Session, p. 99.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 113.

It grew out of a resolution directed towards the Director-General and the Executive Board and matured in 1952 as an eighteen-item document. Some of its directives, for example, Item 7, stated a field of action; others for example, Item 2, stated methods of action.⁶⁹ There was, however, more than a little doubt in the minds of members that the statement was worthwhile or that it should characterize Unesco's operations for the public. It was therefore determined to circulate it as a memorandum only to Member States.⁷⁰

By way of an alternate to the "Code of Policies," a "Statement of Methods" was proposed by the Board as a means of eliminating discussion of method in the implementation of a resolution. Moreover, the Board had in mind that the statement would be useful as well to the public as a means of understanding Unesco's work. Some six pages in length, the Statement of Methods (which was adopted at the 1950 Conference) was accompanied by an explanatory note and a preamble. More than a mere promulgation of directives implying finality and rigidity, the "Statement of Methods" was more

⁶⁹General Conference, Fourth Session, Document 4C/Resolutions.

VII As a contribution to intellectual progress and to the improvement of living conditions of mankind, Unesco will encourage international enterprises which seek to increase and disseminate scientific knowledge.

II In all spheres of common interest, Unesco will cooperate closely with the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

⁷⁰Ascher, Program-Making in Unesco, p. 59. The author relates that by the Fifth Session of the General Conference, the Code of Policies had disappeared. Seemingly, the Executive Board had come to the conclusion that it was too early to frame a statement of directives which would bind the Board or the Director-General.

a description of "some of the principle means the Organization can employ to achieve its aims."⁷¹

Preceding pages have sketched a picture of an Organization working in a field of vast dimensions, engaging itself with individuals, organizations and nations and involved with intangibles. Unesco needed public support for its efforts; it needed understanding if it were to cooperate effectively. But neither, to the exasperation of delegates, came readily.⁷²

This exasperation led to the examination of possible solutions to the problem, among them the matter of better liaison, of closer contact within the parts of the far-flung Unesco Organization, of the amount and quality of publications, the training of journalists and the possibility of general decentralization accompanied by the development of regional organizations. In his second last Report, the Director-General, Dr. Bodet, seems to have caught the feeling of all members when he observed of Unesco's special character and activities that

they deserve to be better known and understood by the peoples we serve, because of the devoted efforts they have inspired, the results already achieved and all the future possibilities inherent in them. Unesco's action is indirect, and therefore difficult to analyze, and the results hard to estimate. Its method of international co-operation, of attaining its practical aims through each nation's individual contribution, are indirect, as is also its aim to perfect techniques, to establish working instruments, to train leaders - in short, to forge the weapons of the mind that will one day reshape society rather than itself to direct that transformation. Thus the public is often at a loss when it wishes to follow - and, to understand - Unesco's action. Yet Unesco, more than any other institution,

⁷¹General Conference, Fifth Session, Document 5C/Resolutions.

Ascher recalls: "At no time has the Statement of Methods been used by the General Conference, the Executive Board or the Secretariat, either in the planning of program or the execution of the plan of work. It is not clear what sanction this check-list gains through formal adoption by the General Conference." Program-Making in Unesco, p. 60.

⁷²See above, Chapter IV, p. 101.

needs the support of public opinion, for its mission can be fulfilled only in the minds of men.⁷³

He went on to outline some not unimportant steps towards establishing better liaison, not only with the public but with Member States. Specifically, regional conferences of National Commissions had been instituted which since they were regional, permitted more realistic and thorough examination of problems than was possible in a world scale conference. Secretaries of National Commissions were attached to the Paris headquarters (at the expense of the Organization), thus enabling a better mutual understanding. A substantial number of Member States had appointed permanent delegates to Unesco in Paris. Reports from Member States which, in the past had only been superficially examined, were now to be carefully scrutinized and weighed.⁷⁴

Clearly, in an Organization as far-flung as Unesco, an important avenue to clear communication within the Secretariat, with Member States and with the public, lay in the preparation of its reports and documents. But this flow of documents and reports was the subject of a continuing tirade of criticism. The British delegate, for example, in 1949, pointed questioningly to the publication, "The Effects of the Introduction of Exotic Fish Into the Belgian Congo."⁷⁵ New Zealand reported that the experts on their National Commission were being "smothered with a blanket of words."⁷⁶ The Pakistan delegate complained of being "buried" under

⁷³Report of the Director-General, Sixth Session, p. 24. "The purposes of Unesco may be defeated because of inertia or indifference. Few persons in this country know anything about Unesco." Benjamin Fine in "Unesco and International Education," The Journal of Educational Sociology, 20, No. 1 (September, 1946), p. 17.

⁷⁴See Appendix A, Article VIII. See also "Resolutions," Documents of the 1950 Conference.

⁷⁵General Conference, Fourth Session, p. 80.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 103.

an avalanche of reports⁷⁷ and the delegate from Egypt prefaced his complaint with the story of an Arab scholar found dead under his own mass of books.⁷⁸ In sober understatement the Belgian delegate observed that the "present profusion of publications seems to be excessive."⁷⁹

The criticism extended not only to the volume of Unesco's reports and documents, but as well to what seemed an obvious lack of coordination and perhaps of greater significance, their quality. A clearly serious view of the problem was that of the United States delegation which was concerned with the brief remark in the 1950 report of the Director-General that "we have been so occupied with reporting on the past and preparing for the future that we have scarcely had time to do anything in the present; this is not the way to imbue a new organization with energy and enthusiasm."⁸⁰ The Australian delegation as well was alarmed by excessive documentation which they said "was far beyond the capacities of any delegation to absorb."⁸¹

Those members, however, who paused to reflect with the Director-General, would recognize that the problem was in part a reflection of the structure of the Secretariat and its divisions, of the need to maintain a relationship between the Secretariat and Member States, and of the necessity to maintain and to forward close working ties with National

⁷⁷General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 102.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 130.

⁷⁹General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 125.

⁸⁰General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 111.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 142. See Report of the Director-General, 1951, p. 13. "It was natural that in the early years, the accent should be put on documentation, since full and accurate information is a condition of systematic action. The work under this head is far from complete, particularly in statistics; there are gaps in the data about all too many countries, and this work must go on."

Commissions in a variety of languages. Above all, the administrative regulations imposed by the Conference was perhaps chiefly to blame.⁸²

Effective communication, both internal and external, is generally held to be a sine qua non of the successful organization. In the small organization with a small constituency, effective communication is not necessarily the product of special effort. But in a large organization with a large staff, with a world-wide constituency and a virtually unlimited program, clearly effective communication is an administrative concern of no small importance.

A problem related to communication and one which occupied the minds of members of Unesco during this period was the matter of decentralization. The essence of the argument was put by Count Jacini in his report to the General Conference on behalf of the Executive Board. Unesco, he pointed out, was as a league of Member States, present in the world wherever there was one of those fifty-nine states. There was, however, a risk that in "preparing and carrying out its projects, it may lose contact with the regions that are distant from headquarters." This gap, he argued, could be filled progressively and logically throughout the various parts of the world by a planned process of decentralization.⁸³

⁸²General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 135. The Director-General pointed out that for the Fourth Session of the General Conference, which it had been agreed in advance was to have been a short session, it had been necessary to produce some five million pages of documents.

⁸³General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 55. During the Sixth Session, the Executive Board proposed to the General Conference a project described as "the most important project that has ever been submitted to the General Conference of Unesco," viz. the creation of a world network of regional fundamental education centres.

This principle, which Dr. Bodet described as "a requisite of efficiency" had general backing. With this support, the Director-General had a warning to offer: that any adaption to special regional needs would lose its real meaning if it did not take into account the universal outlook proper to Unesco.⁸⁴

This danger would seem to be real indeed. On the one hand, Unesco could not afford the embarrassment of competing blocs of states within the Organization. On the other hand, logically to extend itself, it must reach out effectively from the confines of the Paris Secretariat. Or in the words of the Pakistan delegate:

Undue emphasis on regionalism is likely to promote regional grouping which will militate against Unesco's ideal of securing complete understanding among all nations of the world, and not merely among groups of nations.⁸⁵

There is almost, one is led to suspect, an inherent contradiction in proposals to extend Unesco's regional organization.

A further insight into the potential contribution of regional centres for fundamental education is given by the Director-General himself:

To be effective, the Centre's work, while benefiting from outside help, must remain within the framework of the sociological and cultural realities of the region in which it has been set up and for which it was designed; that is to say, it can meet only limited needs. But similar needs await attention the whole world over. There is an imperative need not for one, but for several centres of the same type, forming a world network. Then all regions where the needs are most urgent could be covered, and such a network would also have the great advantage of enabling services to be exchanged and experiences compared. There would be a technical gain and a moral gain - a demonstration of the solidarity of mankind.⁸⁶

This imaginative proposal had the support of Cuba in which a full-fledged regional office had been established, of Lebanon which urged the

⁸⁴General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 150.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 88.

⁸⁶Report of the Director-General, 1951, p. 12.

establishment of a similar regional office in its area, in Mexico where a training centre had already been established, and as well by Brazil.

The 1951 Session of the General Conference approved in principle the progressive establishment, in regions distant from the Paris headquarters, of a network of regional offices and a group of scientific cooperation centres at Cairo, New Delhi, Manilla, Djakarta and Montevideo.⁸⁷

Reference to the principle of decentralization might aptly be concluded by taking note of the cautious strain evident in the French delegation's view.

The question of regional organization is not a new one, but the difficulties and sometimes even the dangers involved become more apparent as we advance . . . but can these regions in fact be defined? Where do they begin, where do they end? . . . Decentralization - well and good! But any measures likely, under cover of regional organization, to keep alive, encourage or sometimes even provoke the spirit of nationalism, often political rather than cultural in character will continue to encounter our opposition.⁸⁸

It is, perhaps, not out of the ordinary in the international organization, as in national government, for the civil servant to be the target of criticism. One might expect to find Unesco's staff, both individually and as organized, the focus of some attention and such was the case. In 1952, for example, the Australian delegate with a watchful eye on both numbers of personnel and the budget, noted that while the volume of activities forecast for the forthcoming year had decreased, the staff required to carry it out had, in the view of the Director-General, increased.⁸⁹ It was the duty of every member of Unesco, the Australian delegate insisted, to see that

⁸⁷General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 226.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 99.

⁸⁹General Conference, Seventh Session, p. 94.

the most effective use was being made of every penny contributed by the Member States.

The matter of recruitment, it will be recollected,⁹⁰ was of concern at the first three meetings of the General Conference. This was a continuing problem and as Sir John Maud, the Chairman of the Executive Board remarked in presenting the Report of the Director-General, "there never are, and I suspect never have been, enough first-rate men and women to do the work either in national or international efforts for peace."⁹¹ It was evident to both the Board and the Director-General that first-class people were necessary; this, in turn, suggested to the Director-General that Member States must cooperate in providing staff members, taking care at the same time not to do a disservice to the formation of their National Commissions. Recruitment posed a delicate problem to the Director-General, who faced from some of the Member States, the criticisms of the type presented by India, which frequently voiced its concern that Asia and Africa, which together constitute perhaps two-thirds of the total population of the world, had not even ten percent of the posts among the higher executives.⁹²

It was of particular concern to Dr. Bodet that his Secretariat did not include more ranking specialists whose thorough knowledge of the problems or of the program or of the varied needs and resources of Member States would make Unesco's operation more effective. Despite adequate salaries, he was obliged to report that men of the calibre he wished were not much attracted. Partly, he suggested, this was because of the nature

⁹⁰See above, Chapter III, p. 95.

⁹¹General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 60.

⁹²General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 102.

of the work itself which could not provide complete satisfaction and partly it was because Unesco was not sufficiently firmly established for candidates to be sure of a career within the Organization which might tempt them to abandon a safe one in their own countries.⁹³ While the Director-General commented on the unfortunate effect of strain and overwork on his staff, the Italian delegate with less sympathy, remarked that Unesco must be sure that the Secretariat does not cease to be the instrument of the will of Member States, and because of its rapidly growing size, tend to become independent of the direction of the General Conference.⁹⁴

Turning from problems of recruitment and working conditions to a matter of staff organization, the reader notes in a Report adopted at the First Session of the General Conference, a directive that the administrative system should be so designed as to prevent the development of compartmentalized activities and programs. It was clearly the view of the Conference that all efforts to achieve the Organization's objectives should be integrated. In the same Report, it was recognized that many of Unesco's activities would require joint action by several or all divisions on a "task force" or continuing basis.⁹⁵ It was possible, the record of the Fifth Session suggests, to record that a Unesco-wide approach to the planning of projects instead of a departmental one had not been achieved. At that time,

⁹³General Conference, Fifth Session, pp. 2, 3.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 78. Several members of Unesco who had attended General Conference meetings as delegates for a short period of time served on the Secretariat of Unesco. These included Professor Piaget of Switzerland and Dr. C. E. Beebe. For a live, warm account of the Secretariat and staff as seen from the inside, see pp. 85, 138 - 140.

⁹⁵General Conference, First Session, Annex 3 "Report on Organization of the Secretariat by the Administrative and Financial Sub-Commission," p. 254.

D. R. Hardman, M.P., the leader of the British delegation termed it one of Unesco's pressing problems.⁹⁶ What was wanted he added was a "cabinet government" under the leadership of the Director-General and considerably more consultation between departments and divisions towards the end of better coordination. And indeed, even as late as 1952, the Swedish delegate remarked that "some parts of the Secretariat are like water-tight compartments,"⁹⁷ a charge which was confirmed but, it should be said, defended, by the Greek delegation.

The Director-General's warning that the staff was overworked and that there was scarcely time between Sessions to do the work of the Organization did not fall on deaf ears. This was evident from a proposal by the United States delegation that the General Conference be put on a bi-annual basis. From the point of view of savings in both time and staff effort, the leader of the delegation, Mr. Howland Sargeant, made a good case.⁹⁸

Such action would necessitate an amendment to Article IV of the Constitution. The implication of such an amendment in terms of responsibility for the program was reviewed by the Director-General at the ninth meeting of the Procedure Committee in 1950.⁹⁹ After delay and further study over a period of several sessions, the appropriate constitutional amendment was made.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 135.

⁹⁷General Conference, Seventh Session, p. 63.

⁹⁸General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 111.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 681.

¹⁰⁰Ascher, Program-Making in Unesco, p. 69.

Of one operating principle of Unesco - cooperation with individual experts, with professional organizations and as well, with Member States - there had been little disagreement. Dr. Huxley had urged its importance upon members. No less Director-General Bodet, who suggested that Unesco's approach was well illustrated by

an examination of the work of member states and of our cooperation with the experts. Both bring us to the very core of Unesco, an inter-governmental agency concerned with the things of the mind, whose task can be carried out with the cooperation of sovereign states and with the freely given help of independent specialists. The measure of our progress in these two respects is the most accurate pointer to the Organization's present position.¹⁰¹

It is significant that in his 1951 Report, Dr. Bodet devoted exceptional emphasis to a review of Unesco's role in collaboration with the specialists of different countries. No other Specialized Agency, not even the Economic and Social Council itself, he reported, had so large a network of collaborators. It was with pride he reported that this type of collaboration was one of those methods of Unesco which had proved soundest and through which the results had been most striking. Not only were these specialists and professional organizations of assistance to Unesco but an opportunity was provided both to become helpfully aware of the Organization.

In some instances, cooperation involved assistance to existing organizations such as the International Council of Scientific Unions which was "ready-made" for Unesco's purposes. In other instances it meant the creation of new organizations such as the International Union of Crystallography.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹Report of the Director-General, Sixth Session, p. 8.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 20. "Moreover, in many important developments, Unesco has played its proper part as the catalyst, the trigger which releases action and which is forgotten in the results."

"C.H.D." in "Unesco in 1950-51," The World Today, 7, No.6 (June, 1951), 262.

While not all delegates were satisfied¹⁰³ in the early years with the procedure worked out to provide international organizations with the necessary subsidy, there was general agreement that through realistic subventions many of these organizations could carry out items of work better or more cheaply than the Secretariat.¹⁰⁴ In particular, the delegations of Canada, Denmark, Italy and Mexico are recorded at the Florence Conference as favoring this approach. Attention was drawn to the need for more stringent criteria in the selection of collaborating organizations.¹⁰⁵ Cooperation from the most diverse quarters, as the Director-General pointed out, was the only possible basis of fulfilling Unesco's ideal of universal, intellectual and moral solidarity.¹⁰⁶

Turning now to Unesco's relationship during this period with the United Nations, it will be recollected¹⁰⁷ that there were differing points of view on how close this connection should be. But coincident with Dr. Bodet's leadership, recognition seemed general that Unesco did indeed have a particular responsibility to the United Nations. But whether Unesco could fulfill its obligation in full for the building of peace to the United Nations and the other Specialized Agencies was, in the view of the Director-General, doubtful. Essentially, the Director-General argued, Unesco's work was all a contribution towards peace, but on a long-term basis, the results of which,

¹⁰³General Conference, Second Session, p. 98.

¹⁰⁴General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 55.

¹⁰⁵General Conference, Fifth Session, pp. 74, 78, 79, 120.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 59.

¹⁰⁷See above, Chapter III, p. 94.

he said "are all the more fundamental because they are not immediate."¹⁰⁸ He urged upon the Conference the need to consider carefully what steps Unesco might take to contribute to the United Nations mission for peace.

But while the Secretariat and members alike recognized the strides which Unesco had made in cooperating with individuals and professional organizations, they were mutually alarmed and depressed with Unesco's failure to stimulate the National Commissions to carry a larger share of the load. Count Jacini of Italy, as President of the Sixth Session of the General Conference, reiterated that Unesco depended on something more important than money, namely the active participation of Member States for the execution of its program. Not only had certain States given no satisfactory answer to requests for information but some of those which had established Commissions had established organizations which were nothing more than shells which lacked resources or staff and met only at irregular intervals. In his candid assessment of the program as of 1950, the Director-General could not conceal that with few exceptions, the action of Member States in their National Commissions was unsatisfactory; they lacked the resources in men, money and material and they had not acquired the necessary experience. So serious had this matter become that in his major address to the Fifth Session, the Director-General gave prime attention to this plight. And with reference to problem after problem raised by the delegates, he felt obliged to report that " . . . the solution of these problems as a whole depends on effective and increasing cooperation from all our Member

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 14.

States."¹⁰⁹

The free-swinging Sir John Maud of the Executive Board felt impelled to insist that

we must agree, ladies and gentlemen, upon a rate of work which is within the reasonable capacities of both the Secretariat and member states, and then we must do our utmost, all of us, to keep in step . . . if I may put it in this way, we are all of us, Secretariat and member states in the same boat. We cannot expect to be paddled along by the Secretariat.¹¹⁰

Nor did the officers and the Secretariat of Unesco stand alone in their recognition of the need for actively supportive National Commissions. According to the Australian delegate, a National Commission would never capture the imagination of interested groups or much less the general public were it obliged to use only slender resources and to confine its work to the provision of statistics and documents rather than active projects designed to promote better understanding between peoples. For five years, he continued, the attention of members had been confined to the Organization itself but now it was time to make the National Commissions active working partners. If this challenge were not faced, Unesco would stagnate.¹¹¹ Ribnikar of Yugoslavia provided an excellent argument in support of the National Commission idea. Modes of life varied from country to country. By implication, the same method could not be used everywhere in, for example, primary or fundamental education; such work was better done within the country itself. Thus, in his opinion, the problem of preparing the National Commissions for more important and responsible work became extremely urgent.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 171.

¹¹⁰General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 60.

¹¹¹General Conference, Seventh Session, p. 93.

¹¹²General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 86.

The Lebanese delegate suggested that when in 1945, Unesco was given such a structure as it had, it began with a handicap, a handicap, he said, in terms of "blind spots" and lack of understanding in relationships between the Paris Secretariat and the National Commissions. The blind spots, in his view, lay in the interpretation outside of the Secretariat of its directives and concepts.

The same words mean utterly different things in different countries: the interpretation placed upon freedom, peace and human dignity, depends on political ideologies . . . but because Unesco has held aloof from the everyday life of the peoples, its prestige is seriously impaired today.¹¹³

One can appreciate as well the practical difficulties encountered by the Director-General in the face of non-existent, ill-organized or nominal National Commissions. All too often, he pointed out in 1951, the Secretariat's work yields no practical results because it is not followed up at the national level by the government action which it was intended to stimulate and facilitate. Moreover, what was needed for Unesco was an intensive campaign conducted daily, perseveringly and taking the most varied forms. But Unesco, he argued, would never have the material resources and even if it had them, would still lack the necessary direct access to public opinion which could come only from direct contact with the daily life of a country.¹¹⁴ That is to say the Secretariat itself could not do the necessary promotional job within the boundaries of a country. A different aspect of the same problem is suggested in the view of the Venezuelan delegate who was convinced that

so long as the National Commissions for Unesco are not fully aware of the important work they are called upon to play in Unesco's work, the

¹¹³General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 93.

¹¹⁴Report of the Director-General, Sixth Session, p. 16.

Organization is bound to be too much taken up with administrative work and its influence on the outlook of the peoples of the world will in consequence be limited.¹¹⁵

There was perhaps a tendency for Member States to avoid assuming an individual responsibility for the Unesco operation as long as they were maintaining an extra-national agency for the purpose. But on the other hand, the reader notes a greater sense of responsibility in the remark of the Norwegian delegate who said simply that if Unesco had not succeeded in making itself a living organism in the world and in the thinking of the peoples, that this was a criticism which ought to be directed at the Member States and their National Commissions.¹¹⁶

Stung, perhaps, by these charges, a number of Member States rose to their own defence. With reference to a charge by Iraq that that country was not made to feel an integral element of Unesco, Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan of India adjured the Secretariat to note the implication of that fact: that it was a responsibility of the Secretariat to weave the Member State into the overall Unesco pattern.¹¹⁷ A more acceptable criticism, perhaps, was that voiced by the United Kingdom delegate, D. R. Hardman, M.P. It was that in the past, too often it had seemed that the role of the National Commissions had been considered only after a project had been planned. In his view, a required approach in planning a program should be the involvement of the National Commission. Later, he reminded the Secretariat that a swift, efficient documentation service was absolutely essential if the National Commissions were to play an effective role.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 85.

¹¹⁶General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 119.

¹¹⁷General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 94.

¹¹⁸Ibid., p. 136. See above, Chapter IV, p. 125.

On Hardman's point, the Swedish delegate could add his opinion that too often, the starting point of a Unesco project was a plan conceived and developed within the offices of the Secretariat. In his view, the flow of problems requiring solution should stem from the member country and flow to the Secretariat in order to give a greater degree of realism to the program.¹¹⁹ Unlike the Norwegian delegate, who fixed the responsibility for the criticism that Unesco had not made itself a living spirit in the minds of people in the countries themselves, the Pakistan delegate to the 1950 Conference argued that the Secretariat had not done its job in making Unesco a vivid reality. What was required in his view were visits by the Director-General and his staff. Further, he suggested that Unesco should charter a ship, put in it four or five hundred

honest workers from every country who would go round and visit as many countries as possible and meet, very informally, large numbers of peoples and workers, so that they could make that intimate personal contact, and arouse that enthusiasm which alone can achieve anything in this world.¹²⁰

Much the same criticism was made by the Egyptian delegate who suggested that Unesco was not well enough informed. His view of Unesco is instructive.

There is an office in Paris, a machine about as cumbersome as can be imagined, that produces an unending series of documents, distributes them throughout the world and waits for the various countries to reply to them.¹²¹

Unesco's staff, he argued, needed to get out and see the world; more specifically he suggested that Unesco accredit a representative to the senior educa-

¹¹⁹General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 73.

¹²⁰General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 102.

¹²¹Ibid., p. 132.

tion official in each Member State to conduct liaison.¹²²

In summary, the problem of stimulating participating National Commissions was one which appeared crucial to Unesco, to the states, to the Director-General and the Secretariat. From the point of view of the states it was clear that greater assistance, guidance, consultation and leadership was required of the Secretariat. From the Secretariat's standpoint in turn, member nations had to realize that they could do what the Secretariat could not do, that the Secretariat's work, to be effective, must be followed up and that there must be active consultation between partners. Other suggestions raised during this period included that of a thorough-going clarification in precise terms of Secretariat-Member State responsibility, more thorough-going reporting and analysis of constitutionally required reports by Member States, the establishment of national "sub-commissions" and regional "supra-commissions." Certainly the concern over this problem was real enough in the minds of the Director-General:

By its administrative structure, Unesco is linked with governments; by its National Commissions, it is more directly linked with peoples; by the international non-governmental organizations it is linked with experts. All these resources must converge if Unesco is to succeed, and the mere desire to go on existing will never make it betray the reasons for its existence.¹²³

¹²²Ibid., p. 132. "Unesco in 1948," The World Today, 5, No. 30 (March, 1949), 115. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that those who originated Unesco, recognizing how easily the Organization might become parochialized by its location and become an instrument of 'regional nationalism' rather than of world unity, included in its Constitution an ambitious ruling that the annual conference should be held every year in the territory of a different Member State. New Statesman and Nation, XXVI, No. 924 (November 20, 1948), 431. Paris was chosen as the site for Unesco in part because of assistance from the French government in rent and maintenance. A British delegate was concerned that Paris had the wrong atmosphere. This article suggests that the "miasma of French cynicism has penetrated Unesco House."

¹²³General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 150.

It would be inaccurate to say that the delegates to the London Conference of 1945 did not clearly foresee a period in which Unesco would be a political jousting ground in the world limelight. Nevertheless, despite its titular concern for education, science and culture, Unesco was inevitably caught up in contemporaneous political quarrels. No one has any illusions today, the Lebanese delegate said in 1952, about the obvious fact that states are obliged to bring their individual policy into line with one, two or three big so-called international policies. In his view, this meant that the policy of sovereignty was out of date and all that remained was power politics through power blocs.¹²⁴

To the Director-General as well, the relative harmony of 1945 and the division of 1951 presented a disheartening contrast. Indeed, he was led to speculate whether events would allow Unesco the necessary time to carry out its task.

An analysis and an interpretation of Unesco's position in this situation would have been expected of him. In his mind there existed a kind of parallel relationship with the United Nations.

The whole reason for the existence of Unesco is to construct the defences of peace in the minds of men through education, science and culture. If this mission is to succeed, we shall certainly need justice and equity in the world order, and a collective security that is solid and assured. Unesco is a technical institution, and as such, not responsible for establishing political security. But it is responsible, at least in part, for establishing a more general form of security - pacification in its deepest sense, without which political security is no more than a truce between wars To fight for collective security always means, therefore, that we must fight for something else at the same time - for universal progress and (which is much the same thing) for economic and social security We must never forget that these two tasks are parallel . . . in other words, the zeal and solicitude of the Specialized

¹²⁴General Conference, Seventh Session, p. 69.

Agencies should never be damped by the gravity of the problems confronting the United Nations.¹²⁵

The Swiss delegate pointed at the immediate problem to Unesco in these years in this way:

The first difficulty is that politics are continually impinging on cultural matters . . . we are in constant danger of allowing questions of national politics or questions of ideology to affect our program. Unesco should be above all national policies, above all ideologies.¹²⁶

The knotty problem was that there was a conflict of interest within the mind of the representative of each Member State; on the one hand he was a state representative responsible for voting on a program solely concerned with world civilization; on the other hand he was, inevitably, at the same time a representative of the political requirements of his government. The naive observer might well suggest that winning the support of public opinion would be difficult until there was public confidence that the matters of Unesco were treated without political bias.

As the Indian delegate, Mr. Abul Kalam Azad reflected:

To my mind it seems that the time has come when Unesco must decide whether it will reflect the political divisions which exist in the United Nations or develop into an instrument where men and women of knowledge, understanding and goodwill may meet together, irrespective of political differences. We in Unesco have, therefore, to make up our minds whether the political limitations which restrict the

¹²⁵General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 63. C.M. Thomson, in an article, "Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization of the United Nations," Foreign Policy Reports, XXI, 310 (February 15, 1946), writes: "But once the world has succeeded in achieving a measure of stability and security, the work of agencies of the U.N.O. charged with the task of remedying the causes of war and of promoting international cooperation and understanding will gain increasingly in importance and influence."

¹²⁶General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 66.

activities of the United Nations must necessarily be binding on us as well.¹²⁷

The position of Unesco was not clarified by the Director-General's statement of 1952 that Unesco could never be "entirely above politics."

By way of elaboration, he pointed out to the General Conference that

it is one thing for Unesco to assume the political responsibility for its acts, and quite another for it to abandon, for political reasons the moral and intellectual laws which should govern its conduct - namely, a world outlook, mutual understanding, and free investigation.¹²⁸

But there was no question that he recognized as a great danger to Unesco the "discouragement in the face of the political difficulties of the period through which we are passing."¹²⁹

In the meantime, while the French delegation was of the view that

Unesco has no rival blocs and was one large community composed of men of good will, united in their devotion to the ideals of peace and security, freedom and independence and resolved to defend them against disruption from any quarter, or for the benefit of any one,¹³⁰

the Israelis and the Arabs clashed noisily in the General Conference of 1950. The Czechoslovakian, Hungarian and Yugoslavian delegations vehemently fought the seating of the Chinese delegation (who consigned them "to that inferno reserved for soulless men and women, without truth in their hearts, mere propagandists, repeating raucously their master's voice at the Kremlin.")

¹²⁷General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 102. Byron Dexter in "Yardstick for Unesco," Foreign Affairs, XXVIII (October, 1949), 60, writes that " . . . inexorably and inescapably, Unesco as designed and set going is an Organization that wields political power. The work it was designed to do bears directly and indirectly on the relations of governments. Misjudgment of that aspect of the original structure and purposes is the chief source of confusion in the work of the agency."

¹²⁸General Conference, Seventh Session, p. 59.

¹²⁹Ibid.

¹³⁰General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 99.

During this period too, the pall of the Korean conflict shrouded the Organization.¹³¹

A final and devastating disharmony of this period was disagreement over the financial resources needed by Unesco to forward its program. The Seventh Session of the General Conference, the delegate from Colombia observed, presented a curious contradiction. All of its members, he said, were devoted to Unesco yet they were about to dash its hopes and cut down its activities.¹³² Or again, as the Iranian delegate commented " . . . there does exist a striking disparity between the means at Unesco's disposal and its present and future aims."¹³³ But the nub of concern for both the Conference and its officers was that expressed by the Belgian delegation which observed that "we view with much concern the discrepancy between an essentially dynamic program of action and a more or less static budgetary program."¹³⁴ Throughout this period, the Director-General had been obliged to warn members that Unesco's needs were not in fact being met as they should. Words were one thing, he made clear, but the real value which members set upon Unesco would be demonstrated by their willingness to provide growing resources.¹³⁵

¹³¹General Conference, Fifth Session, pp. 90, 129, 130, 141, 48, 147, 72;
and Sixth Session, pp. 144-145.

¹³²General Conference, Seventh Session, p. 189.

¹³³Ibid., p. 99.

¹³⁴Ibid., p. 106.

¹³⁵General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 149.

Throughout his tenure of office, the Director-General made his views clearly and insistently known. In four years, he pointed out, the budget of the Organization had grown seven percent, very slight considering its stage of initial development and growing needs. Budgetary restrictions, he reported in 1951, had had a detrimental effect on the Organization's development. Because of the uncertainty in the provision of financial support, the execution of the program was made uncertain, a pointed difficulty as the program became more concentrated.¹³⁶ No substantial reductions could be made without compromising the continuity and the effectiveness of the program, he made clear as early as 1950. There was, moreover, a point below which the budget could not sink without imperiling the future and even the existence of the Organization.¹³⁷ The criticism made by delegates that administrative expenditure was excessive he dismissed, commenting that the program had reached a stage where a reduction in general expenditure would not result from a reduction in the program. Moreover, the Organization's structure and its methods did not permit him to reduce further the size of an administrative apparatus whose unwieldiness he admitted, but which, he said, it was easier to criticize than to remedy.¹³⁸

From year to year, the Director-General's criticism of the too modest budget approved by the Conference grew.

There is not one of you who does not feel that this \$8,718,000 is a ridiculous sum for an Organization which is dedicated by its Constitution to such an ambitious mission, and which can boast sixty-four member states . . . the budget is not large enough to cover all that the Organization is capable of doing . . . the Organization

¹³⁶Report of the Director-General, Sixth Session, p. 9.

¹³⁷General Conference, Fifth Session, p. 170.

¹³⁸Ibid.

cannot go on forever drawing blank cheques on the future.¹³⁹

Nor was concern for the budget of Unesco entirely that of its Director-General or its Secretariat. The Yugoslav delegation admitted that the natural expansion of the work of Unesco was essential to its survival and that this truth should be recognized with appropriate financial support. "Stabilization" of the budget (a word which came to take on much opprobrium) was synonymous with retreat.¹⁴⁰ This view, the Belgian delegation reiterated, adding by way of explanation of the seeming lack of financial support, the revealing comment that "many of our countries are engaged, during these difficult years, in performing the more urgent duties of protecting the peace."¹⁴¹

The Canadian delegate expressed the hope that the General Conference of 1952 would aim at 'stabilizing' the budgets for 1953-1954, adding with unconscious irony that "my Government views Unesco with continued confidence and lends it its entire support."¹⁴² But to stabilize Unesco in the view of the Chairman of the Executive Board, was to condemn it to extinction. Under no pretext, he argued, could Unesco's budget be kept permanently to the same fixed limits.¹⁴³

An important aspect of the problem, as all members of the Conference

¹³⁹General Conference, Sixth Session, pp. 227, 229.

¹⁴⁰General Conference, Seventh Session, p. 136.

¹⁴¹General Conference, Seventh Session, p. 106.

¹⁴²Ibid., p. 71. In his speech to the General Conference, the leader of the Canadian delegation made note of the grants of its government to its universities as a contribution of Canada to the work of Unesco.

¹⁴³Ibid., p. 51.

recognized, was the inflationary movement throughout the world. Stability in the budget meant that while Unesco would each year receive approximately the same sum of money as in previous years it would be unable to carry out its program on the same scale.¹⁴⁴ A further difficulty, and an aggravation of the problem was the failure of certain states to carry out their constitutional obligation to remit their contributions. The Secretariat thus never felt entirely safe in its financial commitments.¹⁴⁵

Let there be no illusions, the Director-General warned the Seventh Session of the General Conference in 1952: it was not possible to cut down the program without seriously affecting the normal development of the Organization. The program could not be preserved while at the same time reducing the cost of administration. Nor could certain projects in the program (as had been hinted by delegates) be financed from sources outside the ordinary budget of Unesco except perhaps in part by voluntary contributions of a public or private character.

Seemingly, the Director-General sensed that Member States were seeking a way out of this budget crisis - some alternative to an increase in the current budget. But whether or not this was the case, the Director-General did take pains to point out that

we should be deluding ourselves if we supposed that we were entitled to leave much more to the National Commissions than is provided in the proposed program, or that we could correspondingly reduce the resources of the International Executive Body, that is, the Secretariat.¹⁴⁶

In a similar vein, he said of the cooperating agencies, "do not imagine that this remarkable network of organizations . . . can maintain itself by its own resources in staff and money. Its existence depends to

¹⁴⁴General Conference, Sixth Session, p. 54.

¹⁴⁵Ibid., p. 58.

¹⁴⁶General Conference, Seventh Session, p. 151.

a great degree on Unesco sub-ventions."¹⁴⁷

A proposal put to the Conference by the United States delegation was that Unesco should turn over part of its program to the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Program. Towards this proposal, the Director-General was notably cool. In the first place, he argued, this seemed to be a shirking of a Unesco responsibility and it would certainly mean that Unesco would lose control of an important part of its program. Moreover, he pointed out, technical assistance as he viewed it, must be based on solid primary and secondary education which were in turn succeeded by higher education and research institutes. Finally, the Technical Assistance Program has a time limit as well as a limited field of application and Unesco's program was more sustained and worthy of continuing support.¹⁴⁸

In a final summary statement to the Conference, Dr. Bodet indicated two conflicting lines of thought: development and stabilization. In his view development meant a steady and rational march forward by the Organization. Stabilization on the other hand might mean the maintenance of the Organization at the present level of activity which would require a somewhat higher budget or alternatively, stabilization of contributions which would clearly mean a cutting down of the Organization's activities and therefore a retreat. Public opinion, he claimed, would find it hard to understand why, after unanimously expressing

appreciation of Unesco's development, you should decide to check, nay, even to reverse, that development at the exact moment when each of your countries and the international community as a whole are beginning, on your own admission, to feel its beneficial effects, as the delegations of Costa Rica, Ceylon, Uruguay, Thailand and of so many other countries have movingly testified.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷Ibid., p. 151.

¹⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 149-150.

¹⁴⁹General Conference, Seventh Session, p. 149.

A British delegate perhaps summed up the feeling of most members when he pled with the Director-General not to call for budget support at a much higher figure. It took time, he pointed out "to nurture and enlighten faith in a new international organization." Nor was Unesco the only one requiring support. As a practical man, he argued, how could greater support be won for Unesco if, each year, contributing countries were required to pay still more. And again, "a great deal of very valuable and useful work can be done by careful planning with such a sum as \$8,000,000."¹⁵⁰

The Director-General, with the support of the Executive Board, had asked at the 1952 Conference for a budget of \$20,000,000 for the succeeding two-year period. In a tense and highly charged meeting, this recommendation was put to the delegates. After a number of amendments, delegates voted a budget of \$16,866,354.¹⁵¹

The Director-General and the Chairman of the Board resigned and Unesco was thrown into crisis.

¹⁵⁰Ibid., p. 179.

¹⁵¹Ibid., pp. 204, 186.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has pictured the inception of a new public international organization and presented an analysis of some of the major problems which it encountered.

Unesco was not without its precursors to the experience of which it fell heir. One of these was the Economic and Financial Organization of the League, which, in its own failure, offered a valuable lesson to Unesco. Following the failure of the 1933 Conference, its work was oriented more to problems of groups of individuals than to economic problems at large. It learned the advantages of cooperative organization and of close working relationships with its sister organizations, the Health Organization, the ILO and the International Institute of Agriculture. Where, in its early years, the Economic and Financial Organization attempted to make its main contribution through devising formal international agreements, following the experience of 1933, it enjoyed an unexpected renaissance through its practical studies of problems of immediate consequence.

A sister organization, the ILO, had, in its experience too, a contribution to make to Unesco. Relatively, the activities of the ILO did not range across a wide spectrum of human activities. Partly because of this, it would seem to have had some success in stating its objectives clearly and in gaining recognition for them. In its early days, it enjoyed first-class leadership. Shrewdly, it drew its strength not only from government, but from management and labour ranks as well, which gave its work an added vitality.

A well-drawn constitution would seem to have guided it from ill-conceived projects and provided it with a lever to focus public opinion. Personal contact, consultation and discussion away from the Secretariat was emphasized and seemingly, it was able to steer a successful course between the twin dangers of problems which were too broad in character and those which were too narrow.

Unesco's most immediate forerunner, the League's Organization for Intellectual Cooperation, would seem to have enjoyed much less success than the ILO. Various writers have speculated as to whether it was possible for such an Institute to function in a world of political anarchy such as the middle 'thirties would seem to represent. Indeed, it would seem not unreasonable to believe that the Organization might have sunk its roots deeper and made a more effective contribution had it begun to grow in the pre 1914 world. The function of the Organization was considerably more limited than that envisaged by the originators of Unesco and, of course, it did not have the resources in the mass media which were available to its 1945 counterpart. The membership of the Committee for Intellectual Cooperation was, perhaps more than Unesco, comprised of membership of ranking intellectuals. At them was levelled the criticism that they were unable to work at the practical and mundane levels at which their influence might have been felt. Those critics of the League's Organization for Intellectual Cooperation who argued that its program was too large, too all-embracing, might well have found a parallel in Unesco's operation. Like Unesco, the Organization suffered financial problems, even acute embarrassment. Neither Organization could be said to have long enjoyed the public limelight. Clearly, the contribution of each is difficult to measure precisely.

Despite the criticisms of the Organization for Intellectual Co-operation, it was virtually taken for granted that the experiment would be resumed after World War II. The movement for a Unesco-like organization gathered strength unto itself and emerged in 1945, after what has been described as an exceptionally brief but harmonious working conference, as a fully-fledged organization. More so than the League's Organization, it was conceived in a broad perspective. In absolute terms, it was to be much more handsomely supported. In terms of finance, far from the lack of interest which almost thwarted the League's Organization, Unesco on the contrary was received with bright and optimistic enthusiasm.

The account of the development of this new international public organization, Unesco, is that of a body aided by a Secretariat of limited experience, comprised of intellectuals diverse in their views, struggling to achieve a sense of direction, to establish a mutually agreeable philosophic point of departure, determined to initiate a program related to its complex objectives but saddled with the conflicting pressures of nationalism, regionalism and specialism. After the first flush of organization, it was to enjoy only lukewarm support from the major governments and suffer the pangs of popular apathy in too many countries. Both to those in and out of the Organization, its tasks were almost too diverse and too baffling. Faced with an abundance of advice on the one hand, they endured a shortage of high quality staff and adequate financial support on the other. Throughout the first six years of its life, it was injected with a sense of urgency - an intimation that it might not have an opportunity even to commence its job before war was to destroy its chances forever.

With respect to the first six years of Unesco's operation, we have selected and recorded a number of experiences and difficulties which Unesco faced, either on a number of occasions or in a number of different ways.

How may Unesco's experience be evaluated?

The first Director-General of Unesco saw clearly the need for a philosophy for this new Organization and attempted to shape one for it. Doubtless some parts of it would have been acceptable to some members of Unesco. Nevertheless, it was equally clear that, as a whole, it was unacceptable. What reasons might be offered for this? It is reasonable to believe that the delegates to Unesco were not prepared to receive it. Was it not too much to expect its representatives, heterogeneous as they were, should at once endorse this new thinking? One might speculate, too, that a more personal element was involved in that Dr. Huxley's initial appointment was something of a compromise. Thirdly, because of his deliberate tongue-in-cheek neglect of religious influence, because of his interest in eugenics, in population control, in yoga, he may well have diverted the support of the Catholic members of Unesco. The most telling blow, however, against his philosophy was delivered by the Communist-led delegation of Yugoslavia, which was emphatically not prepared to accept a doctrine which neither endorsed nor gave neutral acceptance to Marxist principle. Nor would members of Unesco, as a whole, accept such a super-culture, national interests and prejudices being what they are. Indeed, they pointed to the Constitution which stressed "the fruitful diversity of cultures." Unesco was not ready for such a proposal. Not only was it dismissed, but in terms which made it clear that the Organization did not wish to be remotely associated with it.

Jacques Maritain's theory of "practical action," was not, of course, a package philosophy for Unesco. It proposed simply that Unesco should, for the time at least, move in such a direction and act in such a way,

that members might agree on the practical results of its program. The proposal which he articulated and which might well have been in the minds of other members of Unesco, was received with relief, coming when it did. His was a notable contribution to the Organization.

While general debate on Niehbur's contribution was neither intended nor planned, one might speculate, however, in the light of debate in the years following on other subjects, that his point of view may have been well received. Unlike Huxley, he did not agree that a synthetic world culture could take the place of all the historic cultures of mankind. Rather, Unesco should build towards developing, on an international basis, a sense of community through ensuring an exchange of knowledge, through the integration of existing "trans-national communities" and by searching for and expanding some minimum commonly-held ground. Indeed, it would seem that sheer survival might constitute that minimal measure of common agreement necessary; that international organization is already pulling together trans-national communities which Niehbur described as the fabric of a world community; and that, barring war as an outlet, the encounter between nation and nation, culture and culture, might be permitted to take place in broader and deeper terms.

While Unesco had no statement which, at the conclusion of the seven-year period under review, members might have pointed to as a "philosophy," nevertheless, the Organization did function with increasing effectiveness throughout the period. Like many another organization, its members would seem to have come together because of mutual interests which defied compression into a single statement and although lacking such a statement established its objectives and carried on. Like many another organization

too, Unesco might well, at some future stage, review what it has done and with what effect, and then, perhaps, produce a relevant statement of philosophy.

In any event, the preceding chapters provide, by inference at least, an insight into the philosophy of Unesco.

Here was an Organization which laid emphasis upon democratic values and upon individual initiative. Its philosophy is to be found in the stress it laid on arranging for people to work with people. Unesco's projects - and this is in contrast to the League's Economic and Social Organizations - emphasized action by individuals, by communities and by nations; action by scientists in the exchange of information with colleagues in other countries. Individual citizen participation was to be large. Human rights have been emphasized; directly and indirectly citizens were to be prepared for public responsibility. Closer relations between peoples and cultures was considered of prime importance. Unesco was to appeal to the voluntary organization. Its role was seen to be that of the "facilitator," or the "catalyst" in international cultural action. The concept of the National Commission emphasized the democratic in its provision to citizens of a direct voice in formulating Unesco policy. To the small nation, Unesco was to provide an opportunity to make a cultural contribution to a world which it could not affect politically. These, in short, were some of the elements out of which a philosophy might be fashioned.

For Unesco, as for any organization, we would suggest that its stated objectives function to provide not only a focus but also a basis for planning, a means of judging performance, points of departure in

giving direction and instituting control. The most significant characteristic of proposed Unesco objectives during its first six years is the great variety. To the Turkish delegation, Unesco should serve as the rallying point of the western world. There is a hint of a role for Unesco as an evangelical missionary organization in the suggestion of the Lebanese delegate. To the Poles and others, Unesco was meant to give its main effort towards reconstruction; to other members, the emphasis of Unesco was to be primarily human welfare or peace or international understanding. It was seen as an Organization which would facilitate the exchange of knowledge; it would give particular emphasis to the mass media and would act so as to preserve and transmit cultures.

It is obvious that a state's conception of Unesco's function would vary with what it had to give, with what it needed to receive, with the sophistication of its political system, with the nature of its economy, with its standard of education and many other factors. Thus, the objectives proposed for Unesco by delegates were a reflection of the variation in the life of each state.

The narrative above has suggested that Unesco's Constitution was a matter of compromise and, indeed, deliberately vague compromise. We have noted that the Preamble to the Constitution and Article I on careful examination, lent themselves to virtually any interpretation and much of the oratorical finery of General Conference Sessions were furbished with extractions from both. For contrast, we may compare the relative pin-point precision of I.C.A.O., the FAO and WHO. Unesco was hampered in its search for a clear statement of objectives by the fact that it operated in the all-embracing field of education, science and culture; by its Constitution

and by the special needs and interests of member states and, for that matter, the needs and interests of various disciplines within the Organization. The effort that was spent on the determination of objectives was prodigious but perhaps understandably so. But through a process of trial and error, through the developments and discard of statements of criteria, basic program, Unesco passed in progression towards objectives which drew closer to living, concrete realities. It was a trying process; critical, exasperating, but given the circumstances necessary and doubtless profitable. Nevertheless, we must conclude that through its inability to hitch its wagon to a single star, Unesco was severely hampered in its developments.

From what had been earlier described as a parade of "hobby horses," Unesco's program, as Director-General Bodet was able to point out accurately, had developed as the Organization gained experience, to become more precise, more concentrated, avoiding duplication and that unreality which an American observer interestingly described as "a pork barrel floating around in a cloud." The six-year period was one of constant program reformulation. One needs little imagination to guess the demoralizing effect this might have had on the Secretariat. It seems extraordinary that a responsible delegate should have been able to observe to the Organization three years after its inception that it should attempt to plan more than one year ahead. But this was the case.

It will have been noted that the emphasis of the program initially was broad, due in part to the encyclopedic interest of its first Director-General. In the opinion of many members, it was much too broad to do anything really well. This argument has merit, especially when coupled to a

knowledge of the size of the Organization's budget. It was perhaps inevitable that there should be debate as to whether the Organization should maintain a broad front or develop a narrow front. For some delegates, Unesco would relinquish its responsibility did it not plant its flag of interest in many fields. For other members, the Organization suffered because of the lack of any effective cutting edge. But from the broadly nebulous, the Organization did move to establish a relatively more narrow and specific program. We have noted some of the widely dispersed pressures on program, pressures from various countries depending on their needs, pressures from specialists within the Organization and pressure on the Secretariat for quick results which could be 'converted' into necessary publicity. And while, from the beginning, the emphasis within Unesco was on an approach to the masses rather than to the intellectual elite, nevertheless the Organization was obliged to divide its resources. This was only realistic.

One notes with interest the development and pigeon-holing of a mass of program criteria. Indeed, it might be argued, that these criteria were so voluminous as to defeat their purpose in their very mass. One can only regard Unesco's trying experience in developing a program with sympathy and gain some comfort from the knowledge that the intervention of the Economic and Social Council indicated that others of the United Nations' Specialized Agencies were having somewhat similar problems.

Clearly Unesco had need for a program conceived on a long-term, continuing basis. Equally clearly, there was need for special, short-term projects. The difficulty was on determining an appropriate balance as between the two. It was vital, as Director-General Bodet made clear

immediately prior to his resignation, that the process of program concentration must not become one of amputation. Unesco's program demanded unity and balance. The reader will have noted the implications of the multiplier effect deriving from the successful program. For example, an effective project in reducing illiteracy creates a need (and perhaps an obligation) to provide materials and techniques through which the new readers might capitalize on their skill. Thus, it would be appropriate that the budget should, through successive increases in its size, recognize the effective program. One final and self-evident conclusion: that the arduous and difficult process of developing the program was a direct reflection of a fundamental lack of agreement as to objectives.

We come now to a consideration of the policies of Unesco which, as in any organization, are related to its methods and are improvised to accomplish the objectives of the organization. Some have made bold to dismiss these as administrative superfluities. The reader of the proceedings of the Fifth Session of the General Conference, for example, would have noted the comment of Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan that "on all sides we see the perfecting of organization and the withering of man."¹ Or again, the observer at the 1952 Session would have heard the fire-breathing Ribnikar suggest that what characterizes an organization is not its aims, its form, its structure, but its work. This thesis submits that while these thrusts are eminently readable, they are less easily verifiable. It is all very well to talk glowingly of the supreme importance of the work of an organization. However, "work" is the product of the effective harnessing of resources, of technique, of imagination,

¹ Records of the General Conference of Unesco, Fifth Session, Florence, 1950. p. 94.

of common sense, of energy and so on. Thus the aims, the form, the structure, is the machinery which makes possible the end product.

In a sense, the preceding analysis of Unesco's first six years has presented a rather dreary picture of quibbling, of endless debate about things one feels long ago should have been settled, or petty quarrels and unfortunate carping. But it needs to be emphasized, and it is perhaps apparent from the narrative above that Unesco, in six years, had achieved in the eyes of the Director-General, of the world and of its harshest critics, its own members, a substantial measure of efficiency.

Unesco, perhaps more than others of the Specialized Agencies, needed public support and understanding. The second Director-General of Unesco was aware that Unesco needed to be better known and understood by the people it served. However, Unesco's action, through its program, was largely indirect. It was, therefore, difficult to analyse. Its results were hard to estimate. It operated so as to make its contribution through other individuals, other organizations and other nations - a much more difficult task than simply doing the job directly, since this method required all the skills of the capable coordinator. Unesco had to perfect its tools and its techniques as it went along. It had to train those leaders whom it expected would have a share in reshaping society. For Unesco to fulfill its mission, it needed the support of public opinion. That is to say, it required a climate of receptiveness in the minds of men. The League's Organization for Intellectual Cooperation, it will have been noted, was not cheered by wide public support. Unesco, with a much broader program, with its orientation towards the masses, did not, except at its inception, enjoy the encouraging warmth of public regard.

The reader's perusal of the Constitution as set out in Appendix A will have brought to his attention uncertainties within it which inhibited clear-cut action. For example, we have noted above the vagueness, the lack of sharpness which characterized Unesco's objectives in the Preamble and Article I. Article VIII, which called for periodic reports from Member States was, in its interpretation, so unproductive that the Director-General was obliged to take steps to encourage Member States to do a better job. The striking of the budget was an annual responsibility for the Executive Board and the Director-General and was subject to the approval of the General Conference. But such was the variety of opinion within these three elements that the Secretariat could not be sure how much money it might have to work with. Such was the uncertainty, indeed, that it led to the resignation of the second Director-General. Now, as he pointed out shortly before his resignation, did Member States live up to their financial pledges to the Organization.

The reader will agree that a mark of strength within an organization is its capacity to adapt itself to rapid change. Unesco was obliged to keep pace with the kaleidoscopic change which characterized the post-World War II world. In our examination of the cords of the General Conference, we have observed the great variety in the minds of delegates of methods of action. To some delegates, and this was particularly emphasized by the first Director-General, Unesco had an important clearing-house function which was essentially passive. In the minds of others, it was at its most effective as an active field force. In fact, it filled both roles and thus was subject to the administrative demands of each approach.

While a Specialized Agency of the United Nations, Unesco was essentially autonomous and there was no clear-cut agreement on the precise nature of its working relationship. Unesco could scarcely survive in a world in which the United Nations was gone. But on the other hand, Unesco's projects were of such a nature that it could be expected to assist the United Nations only after it (Unesco) had matured. To some delegates, Unesco was a technical institution and there was clear concern over an overlapping in its relationship with the Expanded Technical Assistance Program. To still others, Unesco was a moral force. Thus, as was the case with the objectives of the Organization, there was no clear agreement on the methods it should pursue. One might observe, however, that in an organization as diverse as Unesco, with as little experience as it had, it would of necessity have to experiment and experience the certainty of some failure.

Let us turn for a moment to the General Conference, that great debating forum of Unesco. In order for members of any group to work as a team towards the accomplishment of a certain end, it is necessary for them to have experience of one another, to develop confidence in each other. There must be common appreciation of the needs and objectives and of method. But in Unesco, the team of delegates sent by States each year, was not necessarily the same, either in its composition or in its leadership. In some instances, this might well mean that the delegation could move only haltingly until it had caught up with the organizational environment in which it was expected to contribute. It is perhaps not unfair to say that it might take a number of years of constant service in that capacity to give a delegate the experience he would need to

adequately perform on behalf of his government and on behalf of Unesco. The Director-General, Dr. Bodet, remarked on one occasion that a multiplicity of opinions did not hinder common devotion to essentials.² Nevertheless, common action, in fact, is speeded by common agreement.

Any reader of the verbatim records of the Conference would have to ask himself before reaching his conclusions, whether the record showed the true feeling of the members or to what degree the speeches were a matter of social or political expediency. So much in the way of idealistic praise of its purpose was evident; yet the Organization was thrown into crisis for want of but a little more money. But in fairness too, one must recognize the pressure on delegates from the press and the mass media, from hard political facts and direction relayed to speakers by their governments.

Was or was not Unesco a "political" organization? It would seem reasonable to believe that Unesco would have to avoid politics at its gutter level if it were to develop. It is difficult, for example, to imagine that a Unesco team would be acceptable in a Member State if it were felt that its stated objectives were but a cloak for some clandestine activity. Yet, paradoxically, Unesco could not avoid being a political organization. Its members were governments which in turn comprised the United Nations where quarrels and differences of opinion were that Organization's raison d'etre. One sees in the narrative above, the reflection of this in the Arab-Israeli clash, the bitter debate occasioned by the seating of the Chinese delegation and undoubtedly,

² Records of the General Conference of Unesco, Sixth Session, Paris, 1951.

coolness and tensions among others. One is driven to the conclusion that Unesco was a political organization. Yet it is clear that there could be no public confidence in Unesco unless there was evident a degree of political objectivity.

We turn now to the matter of Unesco's leadership. Characteristic of the reports of the General Conference Sessions were the panegyrics and paeans of praise not only for the idea of Unesco but for its leadership. In part, perhaps, these tributes were social necessities, but in part they were heart-felt and doubtless deserved. So eulogistic did these tributes become prior to Dr. Bodet's resignation, that the cynical reader might have been tempted to conclude that delegates had sniffed the coming storm and were, in fact, softening the blow. In the quality of the two men who occupied the position during this six-year period, Unesco could have been scarcely more fortunate. Though his views were largely unacceptable, Huxley was a man of ideas, of far-ranging concepts. One reads between the lines that administration was not his forte. Nevertheless, his views stimulated a great deal of discussion which one ventures to predict will be weighed in the future as having served the Organization well. Dr. Bodet, too, was another with a grasp of the ideals of Unesco which he had better success in conveying to delegates. Although he was ultimately unable to move delegates with him, he did much to help them to refine and unify their conception of their task.

A function of leadership, it is suggested, is to represent the organization to the world. In some way, the leader must catch the imagination and fire the spirit of his constituents. It must be recorded, however, that Unesco did not live in the minds of ordinary men. To make

it so live is an admittedly prodigious task. But to the degree that it was not accomplished, it must be said that Unesco's leadership failed in part. The change of leadership at Unesco in 1948 meant a loss in time, a loss in morale and a loss in continuity, which was unfortunate. In contemplating the problems of leadership in such an Organization as Unesco, one can appreciate a delegate's remark that Leonardo Da Vinci would have been a fair candidate for the Director-Generalship of Unesco - had he had administrative experience.

One of the most striking failures of Unesco as an Organization, it is evident, was the failure of the National Commission idea. These national extensions of Unesco had, for the most part, not come to life nor made a substantial contribution. On the one hand, without the National Commissions, it was clear that Unesco could not begin, particularly with the resources at its disposal, to do the job envisioned in its Constitution. On the other hand, the cooperating States were faced with problems of lack of capacity, lack of interest, insufficient staff, insufficient funds and perhaps a lack of sympathy, understanding of even conflict, with their national governments. In fairness, however, members in this brief space of time had hardly a satisfactory opportunity to organize and to make work their National Commissions. Each National Commission tended to be a reflection of Unesco with all of Unesco's problems. To develop, they needed time, experience, funds, close liaison with the parent body and the active and sympathetic support of both government and people.

Unesco's relationships, on the other hand, with specialist organizations at large seemed generally to be very satisfactory. To be sure, there was some criticism that supportive funds had not been applied to

best advantage but this would seem to have been the exception rather than the rule.

We have noted the disagreement over the size of the budget which led to the unfortunate resignation of Dr. Bodet. Member States seemed not to have caught the Director-General's vision and were not prepared, as a group, to support their eulogies with cash. Most significant, however, is the comparison of budget size to Unesco's task. In 1952, it was \$8,737,000.00, surely a completely inadequate sum in terms of what the world expected of it.

The charge of excessive documentation could fairly be dismissed. As preceding pages have made abundantly clear, many of the difficulties of Unesco stemmed from the diversity of its constituents. Thus, information which might have been most valuable to one might easily have been redundant to another. What is clear from Unesco's objectives, from the dispersal of Member Nations and their varied character is that a central concern of the Organization was that of communication. The documentation which was termed excessive was, in fact, a recognition of this problem by the Secretariat of Unesco and a tribute to their zeal in attempting to meet it.

The problem of staff in a new organization is a familiar one. One is encouraged with the British delegate's comment that there are and always will be too few good people to go round. Not only was the problem of getting the good people but of training them to do Unesco's different and difficult job. It would seem that the difficulty with respect to securing staff would diminish as the Organization matured and as more stable employment terms could be worked out.

The pros and cons of the proposal to decentralize Unesco have been sketched in preceding pages. The central issue was this: the need for the Paris Secretariat effectively to extend its influence as against the danger of establishing regional organizations with attendant dis-harmony. Much might be and has been said on both sides, although this writer would argue that Unesco's best procedure would have been to establish firmly its central Paris Organization, its objectives, its working methods and then, as the opportunity presented itself, gradually work out a pattern of decentralization. It will be recollected that there was criticism, seemingly not valid, of the League's Organization for Intellectual Co-operation, on the grounds of domination, by France because of its Paris seat and its excessively European concern. Similar criticisms of Unesco were evident and fear that the Paris nucleus had become permeated with the miasma of French cynicism.

One is struck in perusing the record of Unesco in its formative years by what might almost be termed excessive introspection of its members. Year after year, the Organization was hung up, examined for flaws, criticized and set down, undoubtedly in a wilted condition. This was to be expected, however, of a new Organization. To a degree, it was a healthy condition and it is evident that towards the end of the six-year period, this constant searching analysis of Unesco - its philosophy, its objectives, its methods and its policies - had resulted in an acceptable framework within which it could do a job. One recollects the sensitivity of the nations of the world to the League's Organization working in this field. It was proper, and indeed profitable, that Unesco should have felt its way carefully in this maze compounded of national suspicion.

We return now to the initial concern of this thesis: Mangone's conception of a world organization in the area of education, science and culture. It seems not unreasonable to conclude that Unesco did not, nor was it likely to achieve except, perhaps, after many years of harmonious operation, the stipulated "unison of basic tenets of government." There was certainly no "supreme allegiance to a body politic transcending the local interest and the nation."³ Neither was this intended nor had it matured in the six years following its inception. On the contrary, Unesco was enjoined not to interfere in the domestic concerns of its Member States and, as we have noted, was obliged to work indirectly where such domestic concerns were involved.

The core element in the diffusion of a world culture according to Mangone was the spreading of 'democratic principles of government.' But it is apparent that in the first few years of Unesco's life there seemed to be no common acceptance of what was meant by the term. Nor, considering the different stages of development of the states of the world and the general political bi-polarization, was agreement on the horizon. A task essential to the development to the kind of movement envisioned by Mangone was the instillation into the minds of the world a militant zeal for self expression and self government. We have seen in the early experience of Unesco, the extreme difficulties involved in overcoming the apathy to and ignorance of Unesco's purpose. In particular, we have noted the lack of success of the National Commission idea in its early stages. A pertinent question is whether there now exists sufficient skills in society and the capacity to organize itself either to offer or receive a world culture

³See above, Chapter I. p. 8.

immediately or, further, to develop the effective trade organization, resource development, and food distribution which it has been suggested would need to accompany the spreading of a world culture.

The democratic world, we are reminded by the Conference debates, gives approbation to what has been termed the "fruitful diversity of cultures." The sharp rebuttal of Huxley's philosophy underscored the intense feeling of member nations for the individuality of the culture of a country, its independence and its integrity. It is difficult to believe that an artificial philosophy would be acceptable to nations of the world.

One is led to ask, too, whether there is not an inherent contradiction in a super philosophy which on the one hand argues the democratic ideal and on the other, poses uniformity of approach.

It would seem that the essential difference between the nature of Unesco and the movement proposed by Mangone lies less in the matter of long-run purpose than in method of approach. In its essentials, the latter involves the formulation and imposition of a world philosophy by force. The former argues the building up, albeit slowly, of a sense of community and common purpose among nations. Appropos of the movements proposed by Mangone, one is obliged to ask whether there exists the capacity to evolve such a philosophy or the resources to sustain it. One speculates whether such a philosophy having been imposed, armed might would ensure its permanence if, as Niehbur suggests, force cannot assure law if there is not a community that wishes to obey it.

The evidence from the first six years of Unesco's life - the reluctance to accept a manufactured philosophy, the emphasis on differences, the variation of political sophistication between states, the

disparity in their capacities and resources both economic and human - would seem to favor the Unesco approach.

In Unesco we have seen an organism whose progress has been slow, even tortuous, but which has progressed. Given time, it could, as water drop by drop changes the character of the stone below, move the world perceptibly towards community as a base for mutually advantageous world political organization.

APPENDIX A

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (1957), WITH A NOTE ON UNESCO'S STRUCTURE.¹

The Governments of the States Parties to this Constitution on behalf of their peoples declare:

That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defence of peace must be constructed;

That ignorance of each other's ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that suspicion and mistrust between peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into war;

That the great and terrible war which has now ended was a war made possible by the denial of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men, and by the propagation, in their place, through ignorance and prejudice, of the doctrine of the inequality of men and races;

That the wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfill in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern;

That a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.

For these reasons, the States Parties to this Constitution, believing in full and equal opportunities for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives;

In consequence whereof they do hereby create the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization for the purpose of advancing, through the educational and scientific and cultural relations of the peoples of the world, the objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of mankind for which the United Nations Organization was established and which its Charter proclaims.

Article I. Purposes and Functions

1. The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which

¹ Source: W.H.C. Laves and C.A. Thomson, Unesco: Purpose, Progress, Projects, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957).

are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations.

2. To realize this purpose the Organization will:

- (a) Collaborate in the work of advancing the mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples, through all means of mass communication and to that end recommend such international agreements as may be necessary to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image;
- (b) Give fresh impulse to popular education and to the spread of culture;
 - by collaborating with Members, at their request, in the development of educational activities;
 - by instituting collaboration among the nations to advance the ideal of equality of educational opportunity without regard to race, sex or any distinctions, economic or social;
 - by suggesting educational methods best suited to prepare the children of the world for the responsibilities of freedom;
- (c) Maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge;
 - by assuring the conservation and protection of the world's inheritance of books, works of art and monuments of history and science, and recommending to the nations concerned the necessary international conventions;
 - by encouraging cooperation among the nations in all branches of intellectual activity, including the international exchange of persons active in the fields of education, science and culture and the exchange of publications, objects of artistic and scientific interest and other materials of information;
 - by initiating methods of international cooperation calculated to give the people of all countries access to the printed and published materials produced by any of them.

3. With a view to preserving the independence, integrity and fruitful diversity of the cultures and educational systems of the States members of this Organization is prohibited from intervening in matters which are essentially within their domestic jurisdiction.

Article II. Membership

1. Membership of the United Nations Organization shall carry with it the right to membership of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

2. Subject to the conditions of the Agreement between this Organization and the United Nations Organization, approved pursuant to Article X of this Constitution, States not members of the United Nations Organization may be admitted to membership of the Organization, upon recommendation of the Executive Board, by a two-thirds majority vote of the General Conference.

3. Territories or groups of territories which are not responsible for the conduct of their international relations may be admitted as Associate Members by the General Conference by a two-thirds majority of Members present and voting, upon application made on behalf of such territory or group of territories by the Member or other authority having responsibility for their international relations. The nature and extent of the rights and obligations of Associate Members shall be determined by the General Conference.

4. Members of the Organization which are suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership of the United Nations Organization shall, upon the request of the latter, be suspended from the rights and privileges of this Organization.

5. Members of the Organization which are expelled from the United Nations Organization shall automatically cease to be members of this Organization.

6. Any Member State or Associate Member of the Organization may withdraw from the Organization by notice addressed to the Director-General. Such notice shall take effect on December 31, of the year following that during which the notice was given. No such withdrawal shall affect the financial obligations owed to the Organization on the date the withdrawal takes effect. Notice of withdrawal by an Associate Member shall be given on its behalf by the Member State or other authority having responsibility for its international relations.

Article III. Organs

The Organization shall include a General Conference, an Executive Board and a Secretariat.

Article IV. The General Conference

A. COMPOSITION

1. The General Conference shall consist of the representatives of the States members of the Organization. The Government of each Member State shall appoint not more than five delegates, who shall be selected after consultation with the National Commission, if established, or with educational, scientific and cultural bodies.

B. FUNCTIONS

2. The General Conference shall determine the policies and the main lines of work of the Organization. It shall take decisions on programmes submitted to it by the Executive Board.

3. The General Conference shall, when it deems desirable and in accordance with the regulations to be made by it, summon international conferences of States on education, the sciences and humanities or the dissemination of knowledge; non-governmental conferences on the same subjects may be summoned by the General Conference or by the Executive Board in accordance with such regulations.

4. The General Conference shall, in adopting proposals for submission to the Member States, distinguish between recommendations and international conventions submitted for their approval. In the former case a majority vote shall suffice; in the latter case a two-thirds majority shall be required. Each of the Member States shall submit recommendations or conventions to its competent authorities within a period of one year from the close of the session of the General Conference at which they were adopted.

5. Subject to the provisions of Article V, paragraph 5(c), the General Conference shall advise the United Nations Organization on the educational, scientific and cultural aspects of matters of concern to the latter; in accordance with the terms and procedure agreed upon between the appropriate authorities of the two Organizations.

6. The General Conference shall receive and consider the reports submitted periodically by Member States as provided by Article VIII.

7. The General Conference shall elect the members of the Executive Board and, on the recommendation of the Board, shall appoint the Director-General.

C. VOTING

8. (a) Each Member State shall have one vote in the General Conference. Decisions shall be made by a simple majority except in cases in which a two-thirds majority is required by the provisions of this Constitution. A majority shall be a majority of the Members present and voting.
- (b) A Member State shall have no vote in the General Conference if the total amount of contributions due from it exceeds the total amount of contributions payable by it for the current year and the immediately preceding calendar year.
- (c) The General Conference may nevertheless permit such a Member State to vote, if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member Nation.

D. PROCEDURE

9. (a) The General Conference shall meet in ordinary session every two years. It may meet in extraordinary session if it decides to do so itself or if summoned by the Executive Board, or on the demand of at least one-third of the Member States.

- (b) At each session the location of its next ordinary session shall be designated by the General Conference. The location of an extraordinary session shall be decided by the General Conference if the session is summoned by it, or otherwise by the Executive Board.

10. The General Conference shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall at each session elect a President and other officers.

11. The General Conference shall set up special and technical committees and such other subordinate bodies as may be necessary for its purposes.

12. The General Conference shall cause arrangements to be made for public access to meetings, subject to such regulations as it shall prescribe.

E. OBSERVERS

13. The General Conference, on the recommendations of the Executive Board and by a two-thirds majority may, subject to its rules of procedure, invite as observers at specified sessions of the Conference or of those referred to in Article XI, paragraph 4.

14. When consultative arrangements have been approved by the Executive Board for such international non-governmental or semi-governmental organizations in the manner provided in Article XI, paragraph 4, those organizations shall be invited to send observers to sessions of the General Conference and its Commissions.

Article V. Executive Board

A. COMPOSITION

1. The Executive Board shall be elected by the General Conference from among the delegates appointed by the Member States and shall consist of twenty-four members, each of whom shall represent the Government of the State of which he is a national. The President of the General Conference shall sit ex officio in an advisory capacity on the Executive Board.

2. In electing the members of the Executive Board the General Conference shall endeavour to include persons competent in the arts, the humanities, the sciences, education and the diffusion of ideas, and qualified by their experience and capacity to fulfill the administrative and executive duties of the Board. It shall also have regard to the diversity of cultures and a balanced geographical distribution. Not more than one national of any Member State shall serve on the Board at any one time, the President of the Conference excepted.

3. Members of the Board shall serve from the close of the session of the General Conference which elected them until the close of the second ordinary session of the General Conference following that election. They shall be immediately eligible for a second term, but shall not serve consecutively for more than two terms. Half of the members of the Board shall be elected every two years.

4. In the event of the death or resignation of a member of the Executive Board, his replacement for the remainder of his term shall be appointed by the Executive Board on the nomination of the Government of the State the former member represented. The Government making the nomination and the Executive Board shall have regard to the factors set forth in paragraph 2 of this Article.

B. FUNCTIONS

5. (a) The Executive Board shall prepare the agenda for the General Conference. It shall examine the program of work for the Organization and corresponding budget estimates submitted to it by the Director-General in accordance with paragraph 3 of

Article VI and shall submit them with such recommendations as it considers desirable to the General Conference.

- (b) The Executive Board, acting under the authority of the General Conference, shall be responsible for the execution of the program adopted by the Conference. In accordance with the decisions of the General Conference and having regard to circumstances arising between two ordinary sessions, the Executive Board shall take all necessary measures to ensure the effective and rational execution of the program by the Director-General.
- (c) Between ordinary sessions of the General Conference, the Board may discharge the functions of adviser to the United Nations, set forth in Article IV, paragraph 5, whenever the problem upon which advice is sought has already been dealt with in principle by the Conference, or when the solution is implicit in decisions of the Conference.

6. The Executive Board shall recommend to the General Conference the admission of new Members to the Organization.

7. Subject to decisions of the General Conference, the Executive Board shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its officers from among its members.

8. The Executive Board shall meet in regular session at least twice a year and may meet in special session if convoked by the Chairman on his own initiative or upon the request of six members of the Board.

9. The Chairman of the Executive Board shall present, on behalf of the Board, to each ordinary session of the General Conference, with or without comments, the reports on the activities of the Organization which the Director-General is required to prepare in accordance with the provisions of Article VI.³ (b).

10. The Executive Board shall make all necessary arrangements to consult the representatives of international organizations or qualified persons concerned with questions within its competence.

11. Between sessions of the General Conference, the Executive Board may request advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice on legal questions arising within the field of the Organization's activities.

12. Although the members of the Executive Board are representative of their respective Governments they shall exercise the powers delegated to them by the General Conference on behalf of the Conference as a whole.

C. TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

13. At the Ninth Session of the General Conference thirteen members shall be elected to the Executive Board pursuant to the provisions of this Article. One of them shall retire at the close of the tenth session of the General Conference, the retiring member being chosen by the drawing of lots. Thereafter, twelve members shall be elected at each ordinary session of the General Conference.

Article VI. Secretariat

1. The Secretariat shall consist of a Director-General and such staff as may be required.

2. The Director-General shall be nominated by the Executive Board and appointed by the General Conference for a period of six years, under such conditions as the Conference may approve, and shall be eligible for reappointment. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

3. (a) The Director-General, or a deputy designated by him, shall participate without the right to vote, in all meetings of the General Conference, of the Executive Board, and of the Committees of the Organization. He shall formulate proposals for appropriate action by the Conference and the Board, and shall prepare for submission to the Board a draft programme of work for the Organization with corresponding budget estimates.

(b) The Director-General shall prepare and communicate to Member States and to the Executive Board periodic reports on the activities of the Organization. The General Conference shall determine the periods to be covered by these reports.

4. The Director-General shall appoint the staff of the Secretariat in accordance with staff regulations to be approved by the General Conference. Subject to the paramount consideration of securing the highest standards of integrity, appointment to the staff shall be on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

5. The responsibilities of the Director-General and of the staff shall be exclusively international in character. In the discharge of their duties they shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might prejudice their position as international officials. Each State member of the Organization undertakes to respect the international character of the responsibilities of the Director-General and the staff, and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties.

6. Nothing in this Article shall preclude the Organization from entering into special arrangements within the United Nations Organization for common services and staff and for the interchange of personnel.

Article VII. National Co-operating Bodies

1. Each Member State shall make such arrangements as suit its particular conditions for the purpose of associating its principal bodies interested in educational, scientific and cultural matters with the work of the Organization, preferably by the formation of a National Commission broadly representative of the Government and such bodies.

2. National Commissions or National Co-operating Bodies, where they exist, shall act in an advisory capacity to their respective delegations to the General Conference and to their Governments in matters relating to the Organization and shall function as agencies of liaison in all matters of interest to it.

3. The Organization may, on the request of a Member State, delegate, either temporarily or permanently, a member of its Secretariat to serve on the National Commission of that State, in order to assist in the development of its work.

Article VIII. Reports by Member States

Each Member State shall report periodically to the Organization, in a manner to be determined by the General Conference, on its laws, regulations and statistics relating to educational, scientific and cultural life and institutions, and on the action taken upon the recommendations and conventions referred to in Article IV, paragraph 4.

Article IX. Budget

1. The Budget shall be administered by the Organization.

2. The General Conference shall approve and give final effect to the budget and to the apportionment of financial responsibility among the States members of the Organization subject to such arrangement with the United Nations as may be provided in the agreement to be entered into pursuant to Article X.

3. The Director-General, with the approval of the Executive Board, may receive gifts, bequests, and subventions directly from Governments, public and private institutions, associations and private persons.

Article X. Relations with the United Nations Organization

This Organization shall be brought into relations with the United Nations Organization, as soon as practicable, as one of the Specialized Agencies referred to in Article 57 of the Charter of the United Nations. This relationship shall be effected through an agreement with the United Nations Organization under Article 63 of the Charter, which agreement shall be subject to the approval of the General Conference of this Organization. The agreement shall provide for effective cooperation between the two Organizations in the pursuit of their common purposes, and at the same time shall recognize the autonomy of this Organization, within the fields of its competence as defined in this Constitution. Such agreement may, among other matters, provide for the approval and financing of the budget of the Organization by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Article XI. Relations with other Specialized International Organizations and Agencies

1. This Organization may co-operate with other specialized inter-governmental organizations and agencies whose interests and activities are related to its purpose. To this end the Director-General, acting under the general authority of the Executive Board, may establish effective working relationships with such organizations and agencies and establish such joint committees as may be necessary to assure effective co-operation. Any formal arrangements entered into with such organizations or agencies shall be subject to the approval of the Executive Board.

2. Whenever the General Conference of this Organization and the competent authorities of any other specialized intergovernmental organizations or agencies whose purposes and functions lie within the competence of this Organization, deem it desirable to effect a transfer of this resources and activities to this Organization, the Director-General, subject to the approval of the Conference, may enter into mutually acceptable arrangements for this purpose.

3. This Organization may make appropriate arrangements with other intergovernmental organizations for reciprocal representation at meetings.

4. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization may make suitable arrangements for consultation and co-operation with non-governmental international organizations concerned with matters within its competence, and may invite them to undertake specific tasks. Such cooperation may also include appropriate participation by representatives of such organizations on advisory committees set up by the General Conference.

Article XII. Legal Status of the Organization

The provision of Articles 104 and 105 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization concerning the legal status of that Organization, its privileges and immunities, shall apply in the same way to this Organization.

Article XIII. Amendments

1. Proposals for amendments to this Consitution shall become effective upon receiving the approval of the General Conference by a two-thirds majority; provided, however, that those amendments which involve fundamental alterations in the aims of the Organization or new obligations for the Member States shall require subsequent acceptance on the part of two-thirds of the Member States before they come into force. The draft texts of proposed amendments shall be communicated by the Director-General to the Member States at least six months in advance of their consideration by the General Conference.

2. The General Conference shall have power to adopt by a two-thirds majority rules of procedure for carrying out the provisions of this Article.

Article XIV. Interpretation

1. The English and French texts of this Constitution shall be regarded as equally authoritative.

2. Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation of this Constitution shall be referred for determination to the International Court of Justice or to an arbitral tribunal, as the General Conference may determine under its rules of procedure.

Article XV. Entry into Force

1. This Constitution shall be subject to acceptance. The instruments of acceptance shall be deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom.

2. This Constitution shall remain open for signature in the archives of the Government of the United Kingdom. Signature may take place either before or after the deposit of the instrument of acceptance. No acceptance shall be valid unless preceded or followed by signature.

3. This Constitution shall come into force when it has been accepted by twenty of its signatories. Subsequent acceptances shall take effect immediately.

4. The Government of the United Kingdom will inform all Members of the United Nations of the receipt of all instruments of acceptance and of the date on which the Constitution comes into force in accordance with the preceding paragraph.

In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized to that effect, have signed this Constitution in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Done in London the sixteenth day of November, one thousand nine hundred and forty-five, in a single copy, in the English and French languages of which certified copies will be communicated by the Government of the United Kingdom to the Governments of all the Members of the United Nations.

A Note on Unesco Structure

The Charter of Unesco provides that the Organization shall include a Conference, an Executive Board, and a Secretariat. The Conference consists of the representatives of the members of the Organization. The Government of each Member State appoints not more than five delegates, either directly or in consultation with education and cultural bodies within the country. Each national delegation has one vote in the Conference and decision is by a majority being a majority of members present and voting. The Executive Board consists of eighteen members who are selected by the Conference from among its delegates. The Executive Board selects its own officers and determines its own procedures and is responsible for the effective administration of the Organization. The Executive Board nominates a Director-General who is elected by the Conference for a period of six years and who is eligible for re-appointment. He is the chief administrative officer of the Organization and is responsible to the Executive Board. The Director-General appoints the staff of the Secretariat who are responsible to him. In the performance of their duties, the Director-General and the staff are responsible to the Organization and shall not seek or receive instructions from any authority external to the Organization, as for example, from their home Government.

APPENDIX B

UNESCO BUDGETS¹

I. Annual Appropriations

Annual appropriations as voted by the General Conference for the regular program, 1947-56.

1947	\$6,950,000	1952	\$8,736,810 ^a
1948	7,682,637	1953	9,038,199 ^a
1949	7,780,000	1954	9,713,965 ^a
1950	8,000,000	1955	10,314,538 ^a
1951	8,200,000	1956	11,347,038 ^a

a Including donations approved by the Executive Board.

II. Allocations by Program Area

Allocations of annual appropriations by major program areas, insofar as these are clearly identifiable. Costs not identifiable as expenditures in individual program areas are excluded, and the totals are not intended to match appropriation totals given above.

	Education ^a	Natural Sciences	Social Sciences	Cultural Activities	Mass Communication
1947	\$ 884,373	\$ 498,905	\$ 82,976	\$ 364,498	\$ 469,032
1948	1,120,011	747,105	303,108	797,116	1,261,062
1949	1,287,306	689,227	300,176	727,181	1,104,754
1950	1,624,195	700,085	351,865	619,197	969,230
1951	1,501,159	855,870	421,981	817,948	1,157,476
1952	1,811,899	866,711	578,629	913,027	1,285,578
1953	1,687,983	786,574	488,817	855,327	1,105,793
1954	1,801,585	807,286	615,518	963,120	1,158,324
1955	1,995,359	880,919	629,928	1,012,447	1,156,657
1956 ^b	2,588,716	1,094,903	799,366	1,205,281	1,430,738

a Includes Exchange of Persons.

b 1956 figures are provisional.

¹Source: W.H.C. Laves and C.A. Thomson, Unesco: Purpose, Prospects, Progress, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957).

APPENDIX C

MEMBER STATES OF UNESCO as of December 30, 1956 ¹

Member State	Date of Deposit of Instrument of Acceptance	Percent of Contribution to Budget
Afghanistan	May 4, 1948	0.06
Argentina	Sept. 15, 1948	1.10
Australia	June 11, 1946	1.55
Austria	Aug. 13, 1948	0.34
Belgium	Nov. 29, 1946	1.19
Bolivia	Nov. 13, 1946	0.05
Brazil	Oct. 14, 1946	1.02
Bulgaria	May 17, 1956	0.13
Burma, Union of	June 27, 1949	0.09
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic	Apr. 30, 1954	0.45
Cambodia	July 3, 1951	0.04
Canada	Sept. 6, 1946	2.93
Ceylon	Nov. 14, 1949	0.10
Chile	July 7, 1953	0.28
China	Sept. 13, 1946	4.83
Columbia	Oct. 31, 1947	0.35
Costa Rica	May 19, 1950	0.04
Cuba	Aug. 29, 1947	0.25
Czechoslovakia	Oct. 5, 1946	0.79
Denmark	Sept. 20, 1946	0.62
Dominican Republic	July 2, 1946	0.05
Ecuador	Jan. 22, 1947	0.05
Egypt	July 16, 1946	0.34
El Salvador	Apr. 28, 1948	0.06
Ethiopia	July 1, 1955	0.10
Finland	Oct. 10, 1956	0.35
France	June 29, 1946	5.35
German Federal Republic	July 11, 1951	3.94
Greece	Nov. 4, 1946	0.19
Guatemala	Dec. 29, 1949	0.07
Haiti	Nov. 18, 1946	0.04
Honduras	Dec. 16, 1947	0.04
Hungary	Sept. 14, 1948	0.43
India	June 12, 1946	2.79
Indonesia	May 27, 1950	0.48
Iran	Sept. 6, 1948	0.25
Iraq	Oct. 21, 1948	0.11
Israel	Sept. 16, 1949	0.15
Italy	Jan. 27, 1948	1.95
Japan	July 2, 1951	1.84
Jordan	June 14, 1950	0.04
Korea	June 14, 1950	0.12
Laos	July 9, 1951	0.04
Lebanon	Oct. 28, 1946	0.05
Liberia	Mar. 6, 1947	0.04
Libya	June 27, 1953	0.04

Luxembourg	Oct. 27, 1947	0.06
Mexico	June 12, 1946	0.66
Monaco	July 6, 1949	0.04
Morocco	Nov. 7, 1956	0.11
Nepal	May 1, 1953	0.04
Netherlands	Jan. 1, 1947	1.08
New Zealand	Mar. 6, 1946	0.40
Nicaragua	Feb. 22, 1952	0.04
Norway	Aug. 8, 1946	0.46
Pakistan	Sept. 14, 1949	0.52
Panama	Jan. 10, 1950	0.05
Paraguay	June 20, 1955	0.04
Peru	Nov. 21, 1946	0.14
Philippines	Nov. 21, 1946	0.38
Poland	Nov. 6, 1946	1.46
Rumania	July 27, 1956	0.47
Saudi Arabia	Apr. 30, 1946	0.07
Spain	Jan. 30, 1953	1.07
Sudan	Nov. 26, 1956	0.10
Sweden	Jan. 23, 1950	1.37
Switzerland	Jan. 28, 1949	0.95
Syria	Nov. 16, 1946	0.07
Thailand	Jan. 1, 1949	0.15
Tunisia	Nov. 8, 1956	0.05
Turkey	July 6, 1946	0.59
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic	Apr. 30, 1954	1.74
*Union of South Africa	June 3, 1946	-
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Apr. 21, 1954	13.11
United Kingdom	Feb. 20, 1946	7.33
United States of America	Sept. 30, 1946	31.30
Uruguay	Nov. 8, 1947	0.15
Venezuela	Nov. 25, 1946	0.40
Vietnam	July 9, 1951	0.14
Yugoslavia	Mar. 31, 1950	0.34
		<hr/>
		100.00

*Withdrawal from Unesco became effective December 31, 1956.

¹Source: W.H.C. Laves and C.A. Thomson, Unesco: Purpose, Prospects, Progress, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957).

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